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IDAHO COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

David F. Capps
Miriam G. Carroll
HC-I 1 BOX366
Kamiah, ID 83536
208-935-7962
FAX: 208-926-4169

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
MIRIAM G. CARROLL,
DAVID F. CAPPS,
Plaintiffs,

v.
MBNA AMERICA BANK,
Defendant,
MBNA AMERICA BANK,
Plaintiff,
v.
DAVID F. CAPPS,
Defendant,
MBNA AMERICA BANK,
Plaintiff,

v.
MIRIAM G. CARROLL,
Defendant,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2005-36747
ADDENDUM TO THE
BRIEF ON THE APPLICABILITY
OF DELAWARE LAW AND THE
IDAHO CREDIT CODE
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Case No. CV-2006-37320

ADDENDUM TO THE BRIEF ON THE APPLICABILITY OF DELAWARE LAW
AND THE IDAHO CREDIT CODE
Pg 1 of 3

4.2 2

COMES NOW David F. Capps and Miriam G. Carroll (hereinafter "Capps
and Carroll") and submits this ADDENDUM TO THE BRIEF ON THE
APPLICABILITY OF DELAWARE LAW AND THE IDAHO CREDIT CODE. In
their brief, Capps and Carroll referenced the Lake-Snell survey. Capps and
Carroll have been trying for some time to acquire a copy of the survey for the
court's consideration. Having just now received a copy of the Lake-Snell survey,
Capps and Carroll submit the survey to the court for its consideration.

Dated this

2 ~\d.day of March. 2007.

Miriam G. Carroll, in propria persona

ADDENDUM TO THE BRIEF ON THE APPLICABILITY OF DELAWARE LAW
AND THE IDAHO CREDIT CODE-

-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, David F. Capps, do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of this ADDENDUM TO THE BRIEF ON THE APPLICABILITY OF DELAWARE
LAW AND THE IDAHO CREDIT CODE to the attorneys for the
DefendantslPlaintiffs by Certified Mail # 7006 21580003 4551 1132 (Wilson) and
# 7006 2150 0003 4551 1149 (Bishop) this 2
day of March, 2007 at the
following addresses:
Jeffrey M. Wilson
Wilson & McColl
420 W. Washington
P.O. Box 1544
Boise, ID 83701
William L. Bishop
Bishop, White & Marshall, P.S.
P.O. Box 2186
Seattle, WA 98111
720 Olive Way, Suite 1301
Seattle. WA 98101

ADDENDUM TO THE BRIEF ON THE
- APPLICABILITY O f DELAWARE LAW
AND THE IDAHO CREDIT CODE
Pg 3 of 3.
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To:

Paul Bland
Trial Lawyen for Public Justice

From:

Celinda Lake, Alysia SneU, and Dee Brown
Lake Suell Peny & Associates

Re:
Date:

September 27,2001

Lake, Snell, Perry & Associatea was paid $23,000 to conduct the origOnal rosearoh for a
nine minute statewide survey of 800 AT&T customers in the State of California.
Celinda has been an expert witness in two cases - Daggett v. Webster in tb District
Court in Maine and Marcella Landell, et al., v. !TilWiliam if. Sonell, et al., And Vemont
Pubtic Iatemt Research Group, kc., et al., Neil Randall, et al., v. W i k H. Sonell, et
ai., And Vermont Public Interest Reear& Group, Lnc., et a1 in DisIrict Court in Vermont.

-

To:

Paul Bland
Trial Lawyers for Public Justice

From:

C e W a Lake, Alysia Snell, and Dee Brown
Lake Snell Perry &Associates

Re:

Findings from ~csearch'

Date:

September 27,2001

A recent survey of AT&T customers shows that AT&T customers are unlikely to read
solicitationsfrom AT&T and they do not remember receiving a mailing Born AT&T
concerning a Consumer Service Agreement. Additiody, strong majorities do not
remember seeing anything about an arbjtlation provision and they do not W a
contract was formed between AT&T and themsefves.

AT&T customers say they are unlikely to read solicitations they receive in
the mail Only 14 percent of customers say they are extremely or very lkely to
read solicitations, whiie 87 percent say they are less likely to read solicitations,
including 37 oercent who say they are not at aJl likely to read them. Given
people's gen&al survey behavior tiappear smart and demonstrate sociafly correct
behavior, these are very high levels admitting they do not read solioitatious.
o mere is little differonce between men and women, younger and older

customers, and coUege andnon-college educated customers, with eight out
of tencustomers saying they are less likely to read soEcitations.
They are also unlikely to read soficitations they receive from AT&T. %'hen
they think about solicitations from AT&T three-quarters of customers say they are
unlikely to read tbek solicitations (77 percent, inoluding 27 pment who say not at
all likely), Twenty-two percent say they are extrmely or very likely to read the
solicitations.
o Again thore is little difference between men and women and college and

non-college educated customers with at least threequartem saying they
are less lkely to read the solicitations. SB~~OTS,
those over tbe age of 64,
- -'73-e findings are based one statewideRDD sample of 800 AT&TcusWmm in Celifoma, intervitiwai
b o h v m Septemba 17 and Se~tecdxr20,2001 by profedsional intaviewers 1Rtd ofenor for t
his S W C V
is i-1-3.5 percent.

in6 M beet, NW, su~tesw wahing~1,M rW.76. w. 20W76i90ti6 fax 2 0 ~ 1 7 ~ 0 7 4inb@(qa.mm
.

are slightly more Iikely to say they read AT&T solicitations (30 percent
extremely or very likely) than are younger customen under 45 (20
percent).
a

Signincant numbers of customers do not remember receiving the Consumer
Service Agreement. Nearly nine out often customers do not remember receiving
a mailing from AT&T concaning a Consumer Service Agreement - 74 percent
say they don't remember receiving it and an additional 13 percent say they are
unsure. Only 13 percent say thcy remember receiving tltc Agreement. Again,
compared to other sweys we have done on recall of a d v d i n g , these are very
low numbers.
o Across dl demogapllic poups at least eigtac out of ten ctinomers say they
either don't remember receiving tbe Agreement or they are unsure.

o For the customers who remember receiving the Agreement (13 percent of
customers), half read parts of the Agreen~ent(35 percent) or all of it (21
percent). Almost half did not read it An additional 30 percent said they
scauned it and 10percent said they did not read it (4 percent don't know).
Customers are even iess likely to recall seeing an arbitration provision*
Overall, nine out of ten customers (91 percent) either don't remember seeing an
arbitration provision (85 percent) or say they are unsure (6 percent).
o Across demographic groups nenine out of ten customers do not
remember seeing an ahitration provision

o Fm the fav customers who remember the Agreement (I3 percent of
customers), 40 percent say they remember seeing an arbitration provision
while 60 percent don't remember it.
o For thc customers who do not remember the Agreement (87 paccnt of
customers),95 petcent do not rcmember seeing an arbitration prevision.
o For the oustomem who remember the arbitration provision (9 percent of
customers) a majority (58 percent) read aI2 or parts of it, while 42 percat
did not read it.

AT&T customers do not thiik a confract was fanned as a result of the
Consumer Service Agreement, Only 10 percent of the customers feel a contlact
was formed, while a strong majority of customers do not thiofr a contract was
formed (58 percent), and 32 percent are unswe.

o Solid majorities across demographic groups say they don't think a conhacl
was formed.

LAKE SNELL PERRY & ASSOCLATES
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Customers beIieve they should stlll have the right to take the company to
court and the right to talk to others arbout their dispute. Customers believe
that if there were a dispute with AT&T they would be able to take that dispute to
wwt (60 percent yes, 22 percent no, 18 percent don? know). Again majorities
across demographic groups believe they will be able to take disputes to court.
Younger customers under 45 are more likely to believe they can take a dispuh3 to
cowt than are older customers over 45 (66 percent and 54 percent respectively).
Though a solid majority of both agree.
o Even more customers believe that if there was a dispute with AT&T they
would be able to talk to other people about it (80 percent yes, 12 pwcent
no, 9 percent don't know). JVhile there are some slight variations among
goups, threequartem of customers across demographic groups think they
will be able to talk to other people women are slightly more likely than
men to think they will be able to talk to others (82 percent to 76 percent
for men); and,younger customers under 45 are more likely Ulan customers
over 45 to thinlc they can still talk to other people (84 pacent and 75
percent respectively).

-

e

Customers do not believe that continned use of service or paying a bill showg
agreement with the Consumer Service Agreement Customers were asked if
continued use of service, making calls &or August 1,2OOl or paying theL normal
phone bill, suggest agreement with the C o m e r Service Agreement, or if
customers should only be assumed to have agreed to the Consimw Service
Agreement if they knowingly and voluntarily opt into the Agceement. They
believe customers should bave to knowingly and volunWily opt into the
Agreement (78 percent), rather than have continued use of the service suggested
agreement (1 1 percent). When they hear there may be limits on the right to free
speech in the Apement, custome115 continue to believe that customers should
have to opt into the Agreement (79 percsnt).
Bearing parts of the arbitntion provision do= not jog customers' lnemoriw
about receiving infomation. When customers are read portions of the
arbitration provision, most say they have not heard of it or don't know (92
percent), only 9 percent say they remember reading or seeing it.' At least eight
out of ten customers across demographic groups do not remember this provision.

'This section orovides for resolutionof &&s
thmu& Snal and binding arbiblion before a neutral
dimtor insread of iu a coun by pdge or j&y or &roGha class action. %include8 any disputc based
on any product, senice or advcnuug having a cnmectiao with h Ageancut h'o dispur may be jovlcd
with another lawsuir, or in arbitration with a dispute of any otbsr person, or resolved on a class-wide bas15
7he arbiham m y not a w a r d b g c s that an not expressly authorizedby this Agrcemenr aad may not
aaard punitive damages or alromcys' f e a MLzss such darnages arc expressly a u t h b d by a stauitz. h y
ubibation shall remain conljdcntial. Neither you nor AT&T m a y disclose l h c exislcnce, contenr, or rcsulrn
of any arbimtion or award Any d a b or dispute a d i i out of or relating lo this Agtemmtn~lstbe
brought within two years afterthc date the basis for the claim or dispute first arises. Bach party will pay its
ownexxocnses to ~anici~ate
in the arbitralioa irichdinz
" atiomeys' fees sad c m e s for wimesscs,
d&t
pr&iiion,
a& presentationof @videnee.
ZAKE SNELL PERRY & ASSOClATES

There is little difference between men and women, younger and oIder customsrs,
and wfiege and non-college educated oustomcts.
e

HYnally, even after being reminded of the agreement, customers
overwhelmingly believe they have not agreed to this provision. Ninety-four
pemnt of customers say they have not agreed to this provision or are unsure (74
percent haven't apeed, 20 percent don't know). Only six percent o f customers
@inkthey have agreed to this provision, Across demographic gmups nearly nine
out of ten customen say they have not a&
to this provisioa

LAKE S N E L L PERRY & ASSOCIATES
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FINAL WEIGHTED FREQUENCY
800 Sample
9 Minutes

September 2001
Gaiiornla Statewide
Gender of respondent

45
male ....................................................
female ................... .........................55
CALIFORNIA
September 2001

.
.

Hello. My name i
s
. I'm calling for California Opinion Surveys. We are canducting a public
opinion survey and Iwould like to ask you some questions. We are not selling anything, and 1 will not ask
you for a contribution or donation and your name will not be added to any mailing list.
I. Are you a current AT&T customer?

Yes
................................................................................ 100
No
................................................................
TERMINATE
(don't know) ASK: Could I please speak with romeone In your household &at la familiar
with your phone servioe? [If they say no one k n o w then mark TQi.]
2. How likely are you to read solicitations that you receive in the mail - extremely likeiy, very likeiy,
somewhat likely, a little likely, or not likely at all?

Extremely likely ...............................................................................................
6
Very likely ............................................................................................
:.........8
4
A little likely .................................
4
Not likely at all
7

.........................2

14

85

-

3. How likely are you to read solicitations you receive from AT&T extremely likely, very likely,
somewhat likely, a little likely, or not likely at ail7

4. Do you remember receivtng a mailing from AT&T concerning a Consumer Service Agreement or do
you not remember receiving this mailing or are you not sure?
Remember receiving GO TO 12.6....................................................................13
Don't remember receiving GO TO Q.5 ...........................
.........................74
Not sure GO TO Q.5 ...................................................................................
13

.
.
.

IF Q.d-2 or 3, ASK:
5 Do you remember seeing anything from AT&T about an arbitration provision7
Yes GO TO Q.8
No GO TO (2.9 .....................
(don't know) GO TO Q.9

.
.
.
..................................................................

Trial Lawyers for Public Justice
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Cslifornia Statewide

IF QA.1, ASK:
6. What did you do when you received the AT&TConsumerSewiceAgreement- did you read all of it,
did you read parts of it, did you scan it did you not read it, or aren't you sure?
Read allof it .............................................................................................
21
Read parts of it .............:..................................................................................
35
Scan it .............................................................................................................
30
Did not read it..................................................................................................
10
.......... 4
Not sure ..........................

.
.
.

IF Q.4=1, ASK:
7. Do you remember seeing anything in the Consumer Service Agreement about an arbitration
provision?

..................................................
Yes GO TO Q.8.................................... .
.
40
NO 00 TO Q.9 .............................................................................................. 48
(don't know) GO TO Q.9 ............................................................................. $2
IF Q.5 or 0.7-1.l,ASK:
8. Thinking about the arbitration Provision, did you read all of the arbitration provision, did you read parts
of it, did you scan it, did you not really read it, or aren't you sure?

.
.
.
.

...................................................................
27
Read all of it ....................
Read parts of i
............................31
Scan it ..........................................................................................................
27
Did not read .....................................................................................................
70
..................................................................... 5
Not sure ..................................

.
.

RESUME ASKING ALL
Based on what you know do you think a contract was formed between AT&T and yourself as a result
of this Consumer Service Agreement or do you NOT think a contract was formed?

9.

Contract forme
10
No contract formed .......................................................................................... 58
(don'l know) ......................
.
.
......
32

10. If you had a major dispute with ATST that you wanted to have resolved, would you expect that you
would be able to take that dispute to court?

Yes
....................................................................................................
No
(don't know) ................................................................................................

60

.....22
la

11. If you had a major dispute with AT&T that you wanted to have resolved, would you expect that you
would be able to talk to other people about it?

page 2
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California Statewide

12. Now th~nklngabodt the Consumer Service Agreement which AT&T sent out to its customers and
which deals with major customer disputes with ATRT end customers' nghh in those situations.

The company says bzit if customers continued the~rService and msde long dtstance calls after August I ,
2001 or paid their normal phone blll, then they agreed to abide by the Agreement Other W O D ! ~sav that
customers shouid only be assumed to have agreed to the Consumer Service ~greementif they kniwingly
and voluntarily signed something or notrfisd the company that they will pattinpate.
Which statement comes closer to your vlew- that continued use of the service or paying a bill shows
agreement with the Consumer Service Agreement O r that Customers' ShoUid have to knowingly
-.and
voluntarily opt into the Agreement?
Continued use of service shows agreement.................................................
1I
Customers should have to opt into ........................
.
.
....................................78
(don't know) ................................................................................................... 11

13. Now what if the Consumer Service Agreement included limits on fundamentai rights such as the right
to free SDeeCh when vou have a dis~uiewifh the companv. Which statement cames closer to
.- vour
,
view- that continueduse ofthe service shows agreement with the Consumer ~ e r v i c i ~ ~ r e e r nor
ent
that customers' shouid have to knowingly and voluntarily opt into the Agreement?
~

Continued use of service shows agreement............
.
.................... :..............8
Customer6 shouid have to opt into .............................
........................... 7Q
(don't V.now) ................................................................................................... 13

..........

Now let me read to you portions of the arbitration provision in the Consumer Service Agreement
This section provides for resoiution of disputes through final and binding arbitration before a neutral
arbitrator instead of in a court by a judge or jury or through a class action. This includes any dispute
based on any product, service or advertising having a connection with this Agreement. No dispute may be
joined with another lawsuit, or in arbitration with a dispute of any other person, or resolved on e class-wide
basis. The arbitrator may not award damages that are not expressly authorized by this Agreement and
may not award punitive damages or attorneys' fees unless such damages are expressly authoriied by a
statute. Any arbitrationshall remain confidential. Neither you nor ATeT may disciose the existence,
conlent or results of any arb.tratton or award Any claim or dispute arls ng out of or relat~ngto th~s
agreement must ce brouqht wlthtn two vears alter the date the basts for the clam or olspute first arlses
~ach
party will pay its orin expenses td participate in the arbitration, inciuding attorneys;fees and
expenses for witnesses, document production, and presentation of evidence.
14. Do you remember reading or seeing this section in the Consumer Service Agreement?

15. Do you think you have agreed to this provision In the Consumer Service Agreement or do you think
you have NOT agreed to it?

page 3
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RESUME ASKING ALL
Thank you The few remaining questtons are for dasslficalion purposes only

.

.

(CODE 101 FOR DON'T KNOW)
16. What is your age?
IF REFUSED: Iam gong to read you some age categories. Stop me v r h we
~ get to your category
18-24 years ..............................................................................................................
7
25-29 ..................................................................................................................... 8
30-34 ................................................................................................................... 10
35-39 .....................................................................................................................
9
40-44 ..................................................................................................................
12
45-49 .......................................................................................................................
9

50-54.................................................................................................................... 8
55-59 ...................................................................................................................... 6
60-64.................................................................................................................... 5

Over 64........................................;..........................................................................
21
(refusedldon't know) .................................................................................................
4
17. Are you married. single. separated. widowed. or divorced?

.
.

Married......................... ...................................................................................
80
Single .................... ............................................................................................
20
Separatedldivorced................................................................................................ 8
10
Widowed.......................................................................................................
(don't know) ...........................................................................................................
2

.
.

{IF FEMALE RESPONDENTJDo you have a paidjob. half-time or more. ouhide your home or
18.
would you say that your work is mainly at home?

Employed......................................................................................................
At hom
(don'

60

19. How would you describe the area in which you live-Do you live in a city with over a million people. in
a smaller city. in a suburban area outside a dty. in a small town. or in a rural area?
City (imillion+).................................................................................................... 2 9 6 4
Smallercity....................................................................... .
.
.
.......................... 35
20
Suburban area....................................................................................................

page 4
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20. What is the last year of schooling that you have w

-

I

[CIRCLE ONE DO NOT READ]
I llthgrade ...............................
..,.................................................................
7
High school graduate.................................................................................... 31
Non-collegepost H.S.(e.g. tech) .........................................................................4
Some college (incl. jr. college or associate degree) ........................................
2t
Qllege graduate.......................... ................................................................
28
Post-graduate school......................................................
:..................................8
(don? know) ................................................................................................I

-

..

21/22. Just to make sure we have a representative sample, what is your race')

DO NOT READ
White ................................................................................................................. 67
Black....................................................................................................................... 7
Hispanic (Puerto Rican. Mexican-American, etc.) ............................................... 'i6
Asian ............................ .....................................................................................
:......5
(ot!er) ................................................................................................................. 2
(don't knowlrefused)...............................................................................................
3
23. What is your zip code?
And finaiiy, strictiy for verification purposes, can Ihave just your first name?

And your phone number to make sure it is correctly marked off of our iist?

That completes our public opinion survey. Thank you very much for your time and cooperation,
and have a pleasant (daylevening).
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Young men
Men underthe age of 45
Young women
Women under the age of 45.

Older men
Men aged 45 or older.
Older women
Women aged 45 or older.
EDUCATION

B.S. Grad
Respondents with no more than a high school diploma

Post-14,s.
Respondents with some post high school education, such as
technical or vocational school or some college education.
Non-coil
Respondents who do not have a coilege diploma.
Coli prad
Respondents with at least a colIege degree.
GENDERiEDUCATION

No coilege men
Male respondents who have not graduated from college
College men
Male respondents who have graduated from college.
No college women
Female respondents who have not graduated from college.
College women
Female respondents who have graduated from college.

FEMALE
WORK STATUS

Working women
Female reswndents who have a .aid -iob, half-time or
more, outs;de the home.
Homemakers
Female respondents work mainly at home.

Female respondents over the age of 64 whose work is
mainly at home.

MARITAL STATUS

Married
Respondents who are married.
@
i
&

Respondents who are single and have never been married.

Separated/Divorced/Wldowed
Respondents who are separated, divorced, or widowed

DEIMOGWIHC AREA

City lmi14
Respondents who live in a city with a population over one
million.
Small city
Respondents who live in a city with a population under one
million.
Suburbs
Respondents who Iive in areas surrounding a big or smaller
ciry.
Small town
Respondents who live in a smail town.
Rural
Respondents who live in a rural area.
Urban
Respondents who live in a city with a populaiion over one
million or Iive in a city with a population under one
million.
Rural/ Small town
Respondents who live in a rural area or small town

RACE
Respondents who identify themselves as White.
Black
-

Respondents who identify themselves as black or African
American.

Hisaanic
Responden* who identify themselves as Wispanic.
Asiap
Respondents who identify themselves ;is Asian

LA C o u n e
Los h g e l e s
Orange County
Orange

Inland Empire
Riverside, San Bemadino

San Diego
Imperiaf, San Diego

Central Coast
Monterey, San Louis Obispo, SantaBarbara, Ventura

Fresoa
Fresno, Invo, Kern, Kings, Madera, Mariposa, Merced, San
Benito, Tulare

Sacramento
Alpine, Arnador, Calveras, Colusa, El Dorado, Mono,
~ e v a d a ,Placer, Sacramento, San Joaquin. Solano,
Stanislaus, Sutter, Toulumne, Yoio, Yuba.
Bay Area
Alameda, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Santa
CNZ

North
Butte, Del Norte, Glenn, Humboldt, Lake, Lassen,
Mendocino. Modoc, Plumas, Shasta, Sierra, Siskiyou.
Tehma, Trinity

North Bay Area
Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, Sonoma

STJRVEY METHODOLOGY

Lake Snell Peny & Associates designed and administered this survey which was
conducted by telephone using professional interviewers. The survey reached a total of 800
AT&T customers, at least 18 years old in the state of California .The survey was conducted
statewide September 17* through September 20*, 2001.
Telephone numbers for the surrey were drawn from a random digit dial sample (RDD).
The sample was stratified geographically by county based on the population in each region. The
data were weighted slightly by race.
In intemreting survey results, all sample surveys are subject to possible sampling error;
that is, the results of a survey may differ fiom those which would be obtained if the entire
population were interviewed The size of the sampling error depends upon both the total number
of respondents in the surrey and the percentage distribution of responses to a particular qwstion.
For example, on question 9, which all respondents answered, 58% said there was not contlaot
formed based on AT&T consumer service agreement. We can be 95% confident that the tnte
percentage will fall within +/- 3.5 percentage points of this percentage, or from 54.5% to 61.5%.
The table below represents the estimated sampling error for different percentage distributions of
responses. The sampling error for subgroups is greater.
Sampling Error by Percentage
(at 95 in 100 confidence level)

TOTAL

GEHOER

Over

K m

U-

.

2 LIKELIHOM Of
ReADlNG WAIL
SOLICITATIONS

.......71

...,..
V e r y t i k e l y ...........

€xt~eme<yl i k e l y

6%

8%

7 1

-71

-i3

6%
7%
19%

5%
9%
27%
24%

4%
8%
26%

....... 24%
24X
.......
23%
26%
....
37L 4YI 332 36%
.........
Z! 3% 1% 1%
.-------------L i k e l y ......:......... 14% 13% 14% 12%
Unl!kely .............. 85% 86% 85% 8%
3K
1%
( D o n ' t knou ......... t!!
11
Scnawhsr ( i k e l y
A l i t t l e likely
Notlikelystall
(Oon'tkmw)

GEHDER 81 AGE

AGE

FENALE WRK

STATUS
.
.
Men women Uerk
Ref Uoder 30-39 40-69 50-64

)

64

maker Worm 30

- 5 8 , -69
9%

11%
17%

R
8%

.69
1
20%

.

3%

15%
83%
2%

15%
84%

-36

-63

2%

65

over
-72

Young Young Older Older

men uonen

men women

-69

.73

~ 7 0 , 70

-70

-73

-69

5%
8%

7%

5%

6A
8%
22%
26%
36%
1%

A
7% 7% 8%
25% 18% 26%
2%
2zY
25%
38% 39% 34%
3X
2%
1%

12%
86%
2%

15%
84%
1%

13% 14%
85% 84%
3% 2%

15%
85%
1%

12%
85%
A

84%

-40

.59

-53

-56

-56

-50

8%
22%

8%
13%
30%

8%

7%
24%
24%
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
DAVID F CAPPS,
MIRIAM G CARROLL,
Plaintiffs,
vs
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N A ,
Defendant,

MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A.,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No CV-2005-36747
REBUTTAL OF PLAINTIFF'S
MEMORANDUMBYMBNA
AMERICA BANK IN
OPPOSITION TO CONTINUING
MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

)

)
)
)
)

Combined with
Case No. CV-2006-37201

1

VS.

DAVID F. CAPPS,
Defendant,

)
)
)
)

,

COMES NOW David F. Capps and Miriam G. Carroll ("Capps and
Carroll") and hereby submits their Rebuttal of Plaintiff's Memorandum by MBNA
REBUTTAL OF PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM BY MBNA AMERICA BANK IN
OPPOSITION TO CONTINUING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

UTY

America Bank in Opposition to Continuing Motion for Reconsideration regarding
Delaware choice-of-law provisions and related matters, as follows:

I
APPLICABILITY OF DELAWARE LAW
There is a Delaware choice-of-law provision in the agreement between
MBNA America Bank, N.A. ("MBNA) and Capps and Carroll. That choice-of-law
provision was not valid when it was placed in the agreement by MBNA undei
Delaware law and constitutes a misrepresentation of a material fact by MBNA in
the construction of the agreement. 6 Del. Code S2708 clearly states that "a
Delaware choice of law provision shall not apply to contracts, agreements or
undertakings less than $100,000." The Delaware choice-of-law provision lacked
legality when it was placed in the agreement and was thus void ab initio.
In addition, the ldaho Credit Code, § 28-41-201(8) provides that "the
following agreements by a buyer or debtor are invalid with respect to regulated
credit sales, regulated loans, or modifications thereof, to which this act applies:
(a) That the law of another state shall apply;" The ldaho Credit Code, in § 28-41106 also provides that "(I)
Except as otherwise provided in this act, a debtor may

not waive or agree to forgo rights or benefits under this act."
Clearly, under both Delaware law and ldaho law the Delaware choice-oflaw provision in the agreement is not valid. MBNA argues that because Capps
and Carroll and this court were deceived by MBNA before this court's September
14, 2006 Memorandum Decision and Order, and their deception has now been
discovered, that because of the passage of time, the deception should now be
REBUTTAL OF PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM BY MBNA AMERICA BANK IN
OPPOSITION TO CONTINUING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

accepted as truth. MBNA either knew, or should have known, that the Delaware
choice-of-law provision in their agreement was not valid under 6 Del. Code fj
2708 when it was placed in the contract. This is a misstatement of a material
fact. MBNA's continued insistence on the Delaware choice-of-law in this case
constitutes a fraud upon the court. MBNA also argues that because Capps and
Carroll have discovered this fraud late in the judicial process, that this court
should accept the fraud as truth and not allow the fraud to be presented to this
court. In doing so, MBNA is asking this court to assist in perpetuating the fraud
upon the court, thus becoming complicit in this fraud in the process.

I1
THE DELAWARE CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION IS NOT VALID
MBNA states that "CarrolllCapps assert that the Delaware choice-of-law
provision, admittedly in the credit card agreement between the parties, is
nevertheless invalid, claiming that 6 De. Code $2708 "prohibits contracts less
than $100,000 from containing a Delaware choice-of-law provision."
CarrolllCapps have raised this same objection on at least two previous
occasions, MBNA has provided legal argument on both occasions demonstrating
I

that CarrolllCapps' repeated assertion in this regard is legally wrong and the
court has rejected this same argument by Carroll/Capps on those previous
occasions. This argument is no more meritorious the third time around."
(Emphasis added). There is no record of this court having rejected the argument
by Capps and Carroll on any occasion. This is another misstatement of a

REBUTTAL OF PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM BY MBNA AMERICA BANK IN
OPPOSITION TO CONTINUING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

material fact. To date, this court has rendered no such decision rejecting Capps
and Carroll's argument that the Delaware choice-of-law provision is invalid

IDAHO RECOGNITION OF CHOICE-OF-LAW PROVISIONS
MBNA asserts that "Intentionally or otherwise, CarrolllCapps mis-read
ldaho Code 528-41-201(8) which, in truth, provides that an agreement may be
invalidated if it provides that the laws of another state applies and that the parties
consent to the jurisdiction of another state, and that fixes venue." (Emphasis
added). MBNA then argues that because the card agreement does not fix
jurisdiction and venue in Delaware, the claim of Capps and Carroll that this
section of the ldaho Credit Code invalidates the Delaware choice-of-law is
without support or merit
The ldaho Credit Code 5 28-41-201(8) states:
"(8) Except as provided in Subsection (7) of this section, the following
agreements by a buyer or debtor are invalid with respect to regulated
credit sales, regulated loans, or modifications thereof, to which this act
applies:
(a) That the law of another state shall apply;
(b) That the buyer or debtor consents to the jurisdiction of another
state; and
(c) That fixes venue."
There is no statement that an agreement may be invalidated. It states that
the following agreements are invalid. There is no and in this section of the Code.
There is nothing combining the elements (a) through (c). There is only a list of
the agreements which are invalid, "That the law of another state shall apply"
being one of them. Delaware law is not valid for modifying this agreement

REBUTTAL OF PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM BY MBNA AMERICA BANK IN
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MBNA argues that the distinction between the "business based contract"
in Ward v. Puregro Co., 128 ldaho 366, 913 P. 2d 582 (1996) and the regulated
consumer "credit card agreements" used by MBNA is meaningless. The
distinction is not meaningless t~ the State of Idaho, which has chosen to let
business based contracts alone and to regulate consumer credit contracts. The
fact that these consumer credit contracts are regulated by the State of ldaho and
the business based contracts are not is the only distinction necessary. The State
of ldaho has regulated consumer credit agreements, transactions, and any
modifications thereof, and this agreement falls under that regulation.
IV
DOES IDAHO LAW LEAD TO THE SAME RESULT?
While Delaware law may appear to authorize a unilateral amendment to
an open ended credit card agreement (an interpretation which is contested by
Capps and Carroll), ldaho rejects unilateral amendments to agreements.
Therefore the result of the application of Delaware law and ldaho law do not lead
to the same conclusion. While the ldaho Credit Code provides that a creditor
may change terms of an open-end consumer credit account, there is no
authorization to do so unilaterally. Under ldaho law there must be a "meeting of
the minds" and a common understanding of the terms for an agreement to exist.
Lacking that "meeting of the minds" or common understanding, there is no
agreement. In addition, where the agreement deals with the waiver of a
substantial, constitutionally protected (7thAmendment - U.S. Constitution), right,
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the waiver must be knowing and voluntary, neither of which is present in this
case. Under ldaho law no valid arbitration agreement was created.

v
CONCLUSION
Capps and Carroll seek, as they have from the very beginning, to have the
arbitration awards against them overturned. MBNA argues that this must have
been done through a timely ldaho Code §7-912 motion to vacate, which MBNA
claims was never filed by Capps andlor Carroll. MBNA cites Driver v. SI Corp.,
139 ldaho 423,426, 80 P.3d 1024, 1027 (2003) and Bingham County Comm'n v.
Interstate Electric Co., 105 ldaho 36, 665 P.2d 1046 (1983) in support of this
position. The issue in both cases is whether an application was submitted within
90 days of notification of the arbitration award, specifying the grounds for
vacating the arbitration award. The five recognized grounds are specified by
statute:
(1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;
(2) there was evidence of partiality by an arbitrator;
(3) the arbitrators exceeded their powers;
(4) the arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing to the prejudice of a
party; and
(5) there was no arbitration agreement and the party did not participate in
the hearing without objecting.
In the case of Capps, an award letter was issued on September 3 0 ' ~2005
by the National Arbitration Forum which was received on October 7'h 2005.
Capps filed an application (Complaint and Summons) with the District Court on
November 3rd2005, well within the 90 day time limit. The complaint specified
that Capps had filed a MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION;
REBUTTAL OF PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM BY MBNA AMERICA BANK IN
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OBJECTION TO ARBITRATION with the National Arbitration Forum based on
the lack of an agreement to arbitrate. The complaint also specified in "(29) That
the arbitrator exceeded his authority to decide the matter and illegally entered an
award against Plaintiff, absent jurisdiction when no agreement existed between
the parties to arbitrate." This establishes the required conditions: ( I ) that
application be made within the 90 day limit (application was filed 27 days from
notice to filing in the bistrict Court) and that the grounds for vacating the award
be specified (the Complaint specified that a timely objection was made to
arbitration and that there was no agreement to arbitrate - (5) above). The
Complaint also asserted that the arbitrator exceeded his authority (item 3 of the
grounds for vacating an arbitration award). The complaint urged the District
Court to (43) grant immediate relief from the arbitration award and "(44) That the
award must be vacated immediately before further harm is done to Plaintiff"
(C~PP~).
In the case of Carroll, an award letter was issued on August 3rd2005 by
the National Arbitration Forum which was received on August 6'h 2005. Carroll
filed an application (Complaint and Summons) with the District Court on
September 3oth2005, 55 days after receiving the notice of award letter, well
within the 90 day time limit. The rest of the conditions are exactly the same as
with Capps. The conditions required by ldaho Code §7-912 have been met by
both Capps and Carroll.
MBNA argues that Capps and Carroll's Motion for Reconsideration
presents no new evidence nor does it provide any grounds under the ldaho
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Rules of Civil Procedure. This is not true. Capps and Carroll provided new
evidence regarding the validity of the Delaware choice-of-law provision upon
which this court based its September 1 4 ' ~2006 Memorandum Decision and
Order. Capps and Carroll demonstrated that their Motion for Reconsideration
was based on errors in fact as well as errors in law - results of MBNA's
deception before this court.
Capps and Carroll also became aware of new evidence regarding bias on
the part of the National Arbitration Forum, (item 2 of the grounds for vacating an
arbitration award) and presented the court within 90 days of discovery with this
new evidence as required. Capps and Carroll also discovered new evidence
indicating that the arbitration award was procured by fraud or other undue means
(item 1 of the grounds for vacating an arbitration award) and presented that to
the court as well within 90 days as required. In reconsideration, the arbitration
award is being challenged on four different grounds: (1) Fraud or other undue
means; (2) Arbitrator bias; (3) the arbitrator exceeded his authority; and (5) no
agreement to arbitrate. Any one of these grounds is sufficient for this court to
change its decision and vacate the award letters. This is a proper use of a Rule
II(b) Motion for Reconsideration or a Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend a

Judgment.
Before the court are four reasons, with appropriate evidence, for changing
its September 141h2006 decision and vacating the arbitration awards against
Capps and Carroll. Capps and Carroll therefore pray that this court will change
its September 1 4 ' ~2006 decision and vacate the award letters against them.
REBUTTAL OF PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM BY MBNA AMERICA BANK IN
OPPOSITION TO CONTINUING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Dated this / I ? ~ d a yof March, 2007

I
~ a r r ~P
l l l, a e f e n d a n t , in propria persona

BV\ \
Miriam G.

~ a m \ JL
. qc-rp..

\

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, David F, Capps, hereby certify, under penalty of perjury, that I mailed a
true and correct copy of this REBUTTAL OF PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM BY
MBNA AMERICA BANK IN OPPOSITION TO CONTINUING MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION to the attorneys for MBNA America Bank, N.A. by Certified
2+ (Jeffrey M. Wilson) and Certified
mail # 78&1(60
U802 7
7$&"04+2~3 1 (William L. Bishop) this
Mail # 7
w
day of March, 2007, at the following addresses:

@&Jr
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Jeffrey M. Wilson
Wilson & McColl
420 W. Washington
P.O. Box 1544
Boise, ID 83701

William L. Bishop Jr.
Bishop, White & Marshall, P.S
P.O. Box 2186
Seattle, WA 981 11-2186
720 Olive way, Suite 1301
Seattle, WA 98101
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Miriam G. Carroll
David F. Capps
HC-11 BOX366
Kamiah, ID 83536
.'
208-935-7962
FAX: 208-926-4169
PlaintifflDefendant, in propria persona

&?
?y

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
MIRIAM G. CARROLL,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)

Case No. CV-36747

I

)
\

MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A.,
Defendant,

MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A.,
Plaintiff,

)
)

POST-HEARING
MOTION TO OPEN
LIMITED DISCOVERY
ON THE ISSUE OF
STANDING

j
1
)
)

VS.

1

DAVID F. CAPPS,

1

Defendant,

)
)

MBNA AMERICA BANK,

)

)

)

Case No. CV-2006-37320

Plaintiff,

MIRIAM G. CARROLL,

)
)

Defendant,

1

1
POST-HEARING MOTION TO OPEN LIMITED DISCOVERY ON THE ISSUE
Pg. 1 of 4.
OF STANDING
2 54 5

COMES NOW the PlaintiffIDefendant, David F. Capps and Miriam G.
Carroll, (hereinafter "Capps and Carroll") and respectfully moves this court to
open limited discovery on the issue of standing in this case. This motion is
necessary because jurisdiction cannot be assumed, but must be proved by
MBNA in this case before this court can properly render judgment on the validity
of an agreement to arbitrate. Without proper jurisdiction, any judgment rendered
by this court is open to collateral attack as a void judgment. it is therefore
prudent for this court to allow limited discovery on the issue of standing (subject
matter jurisdiction) so this issue can be fully resolved before rendering judgment
on any other issues.
While this motion may appear late in the process, jurisdiction is not a time
related issue, and can be raised at any point. Judgments rendered without
proper jurisdiction are void ab inifio and can be attacked at any time, even
decades after the judgment has been rendered. In the interest of truth and
justice, Capps and Carroll seek limited discovery on the BA Credit Card Master
Trust and whether MBNA sold the Receivables in question to the trust, and if the
receivables were in the trust, when and if the Receivables were re-purchased by
MBNA. Capps and Carroll also will seek information regarding MBNA's role as
Servicer for the BA Credit Card Master Trust and the capacity in which MBNA
has filed this action in this court.
The proposed limited discovery would entail the following:

POST-HEARING MOTION TO OPEN LIMITED DISCOVERY ON THE ISSUE
OF STANDING
- Pa. 2 of4.

1. Identification of the person or persons responsible for determining which
accounts are dedicated to the BA Credit Card Master trust.
2. Deposition of the identified person or persons involved in the
determination and inspection of the documents on which they rely.
3. Documents relating to the sale andlor transfer of the Receivables from

MBNA to the BA Credit Card Master Trust.

4. Documents relating to the sale andlor transfer of the Receivables from the
BA Credit Card Master Trust to MBNA.
5. The Pooling and Servicing Agreement between MBNA and the BA Credit
Card Master Trust.

6. The factual determination of the true ownership of the Receivables in
question and the history of that ownership.

7. The true role of MBNA in this action.
The answers to these questions are necessary for this court to determine the
true standing of MBNA in this case. Standing (subject matter jurisdiction) must
be resolved before any other judgment can be rendered.
Dated this z 4 % a y of May, 2007.

Miriam G. Carroll, PlaintiffIDefendant, in propria persona

POST-HEARING MOTION TO OPEN LIMITED DISCOVERY ON THE ISSUE
Pg. 3 of 4.
OF STANDING
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8

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, David F. Capps, do hereby certify, under penalty of perjury, that I mailed
a true and correct copy of this POST-HEARING MOTION TO OPEN LIMITED
DISCOVERY ON THE ISSUE OF STANDING to the attorneys for the
DefendantIPlaintiff (MBNA) this
day of May, 2007, by Certified Mail #
7005 1160000276304330(Wilson)and#7005 1160000276304347(Bishop)
at the following addresses:
Jeffrey M. Wilson
Wilson & McColl
420 W. Washington
P.O. Box 1544
~ o i s eID
. 83701
William L. Bishop
Bishop, White & Marshall, P.S.
P.O. Box 2186
Seattle, WA 98111
720 Olive Way, Suite 1301
Seattle. WA 98101
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Miriam G. Carroll
David F. Capps
HC-11 BOX366
Kamiah, ID 83536
208-935-7962
FAX: 208-926-4169

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
MIRIAM G. CARROLL
DAVID F. CAPPS

)
)

Case No. CV-2005-36747

1
Plaintiffs,
vs .

)
)
)

MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A ,

1
1

MEMORANDUM ON
COURT JURISDICTION
COVERING DISCOVERY
ON STANDING ISSUE

)
)

Defendant,
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A.,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
VS.

MIRIAM G. CARROLL,
DAVID F. CAPPS,
Defendants,

Combined with CV-2006-37320

MEMORANDUM ON COURT JURISDICTION COVERING DISCOVERY ON
Pg. 1 of 7.
STANDING ISSUE

--
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COME NOW the PlaintiffslDefendants, David F. Capps and Miriam G.
Carroll (hereinafter "Capps and Carroll") and submit their MEMORANDUM ON
COURT JURISDICTION COVERING DISCOVERY ON STANDING ISSUE as
follows:

I
INTRODUCTION
Capps and Carroll have raised the issue of standing, claiming that MBNA
does not have standing in this court. There is sufficient information in publicly
available documents to demonstrate that MBNA America Bank, N.A. (hereinafter
"MBNA) has sold the receivables involved in this lawsuit to a third party, and
either does not own the debt receivables involved, or has adopted the role of
debt collector for a non-lender and has acquired the alleged debt receivables
after they have gone into default or were delinquent. If MBNA has sold the
alleged debt receivables and/or acquired them after they were in default, then
MBNA needs a permit from the Director of Finance for the State of ldaho in order
to gain standing in an ldaho state court. A search of the collection agency permit
holders in the State of ldaho reveals that MBNA does not have the required
permit. Discovery into the standing issue is necessary to establish whether or
not MBNA can maintain the above titled actions against Capps and Carroll.
This court has requested briefing on whether this court has jurisdiction to
open discovery on the standing issue, or whether that issue should have been
decided by the arbiter in arbitration.

MEMORANDUM ON COURT JURISDICTION COVERING DISCOVERY ON
Pg. 2 of 7
STANDING ISSUE

-

290

JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of the arbitrator in arbitration is strictly dependant on the
agreement to arbitrate established between the parties involved. In Hecla Mining
Co., v. Bunker Hill Co., 101 ldaho 557, the court stated,
[9] "It is beyond cavil that arbitrator's powers stem from the agreement of
the parties. United Steelworkers o f America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358,4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960); Swift
Industries Inc., v. Botany Industries, Inc., 466 F.2d 1125, 1131, (3d Cir.
1972); Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104 (gthCir. 1962). See also, H.
S. Cramer and Co., v. Washburn-Wilson Seed Co., 68 ldaho 416, 420-1,
195 P.2d 346, 349 (1948); Western Const., Inc. v. Oregon-Southern ldaho
and Wyoming Disf. Council of Laborers and Laborers Local Union 267,
101 ldaho 145, 609 P.2d 1136 (1980). The matters submitted for
arbitration by the parties are relevant in determining the scope of the grant
of power, and must be considered along with the original agreement to
arbitrate."
The jurisdiction of the court is equally established. In Oil, Chemical &
Atomic Workers International Union, AFL-C/O Local 2-652 v. EG & G Idaho, lnc.,
115 ldaho 671, the court stated,
[ I ] "A preliminary issue involves the role of the courts: whether the court
has jurisdiction and authority to determine the arbitrability of these
differences. On this question, there is no dispute. Both parties cite A T &
T Technologies, Inc., v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 106
S.Ct. 1415, 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986), which supports our preliminary holding
that the question of arbitrability is a question of law properly decided by
the court."
See also, Lewis v. CEDU Educational Services, Inc., 135 ldaho 139
The existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate is a critical factor in
arbitration proceedings. In Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin, 388 U.S. 395, 87 S
Ct. 1801, 18 L.Ed.2d 1270, the U.S. Supreme Court divided arbitration cases into
two distinct categories: where the challenge is to the contract as a whole, and
MEMORANDUM ON COURT JURISDICTION COVERING DISCOVERY ON
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where the challenge is to the arbitration clause itself. The court clearly
established that a challenge to the contract as a whole which contained an
arbitration clause was for the arbitrator to decide, while a challenge to the
arbitration clause itself was for the courts to decide. The arbitrator, deriving
hislher only authority from the arbitration agreement itself, cannot decide on the
validity of the arbitration clause. Only a court can make that determination. See
also Buckeye Check Cashing v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 126 S.Ct. 1204, 163
L.Ed.2d 1038 (2006).
While the Federal Arbitration Act [FAA] specifies a federal district court for
making decisions on agreements to arbitrate, the arbitration law appl~esin state
court as well as federal court, see Soufhland Corp., v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 104
S.Ct. 852, 79 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984). The validity of an arbitration clause must be
decided by a court, not the arbitrator. With the adoption of the Title 7, Chapter 9
of the ldaho Code, the Uniform Arbitration Act, courts in the State of ldaho have
jurisdiction over the validity of arbitration agreements. Once a court validates the
arbitration agreement, then, and only then, does an arbitrator gain jurisdiction
over the parties. Until that happens, the arbitrator has no jurisdiction to decide
anything.

111
STANDING
There are two issues which cannot be assumed in the beginning of a
lawsuit: the jurisdiction of the court, and the standing of the Plaintiff. The Uniform
Arbitration Act of the ldaho Code establishes this court's iurisdiction. The issue
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of standing is for the Plaintiff to prove. In Miles v. ldaho Power Co., 116 ldaho
635, the court stated,
[5] "The doctrine of standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on
the issue the party wishes to have adjudicated. Valley Forge College v.
Americans United, 454 U.S. 464,102 S.Ct 752,70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982).
While the doctrine is easily stated, it is imprecise and difficult in its
application. O'Hair v. White, 675 F.2d 680 (Former 5'h Cir. 1982).
However, the major aspect of standing has been explained:
The essence of the standing inquiry is whether the party seeking to
invoke the court's jurisdiction has "alleged such a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete
adversariness which sharpens the presentation upon which the
court so depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions." As refined by subsequent reformation, this requirement
of "personal stake" has come to be understood to require not only a
"distinct palpable injury" to the plaintiff, but also a "fairly traceable"
causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged
conduct. (Citations omitted.)
Duke Power Co., v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72, 98 S.Ct.
2620, 2630, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978).
Thus, to satisfy the case or controversy requirement of standing, litigants
generally must allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial
likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the
claimed injury. Id. At 79, 98 S.Ct at 2633."
NIBNA sold the receivables involved in this lawsuit to a third party and was
paid for those receivables. MBNA cannot now come back and claim it was
injured. That is the prerogative of the actual owner of the receivables, not
MBNA.
Since an arbitrator has no jurisdiction until a court of competent jurisdiction
has validated the agreement to arbitrate (once challenged), an arbitrator cannot
decide standing, or anything else without a court order validating the agreement
to arbitrate. This court has jurisdiction to decide both the question of the validity
of the arbitration agreement and the Plaintiff's standing.
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The real question becomes: which question gets decided first, the validity
of the arbitration agreement, or the standing issue? The simple fact is: if MBNA
does not have standing in this court, it does not matter what issue MBNA would
like to have decided, they are not entitled to relief of anything. The standing
issue must be decided first. If MBNA actually has standing in this court, then,
and only then, can the court entertain the issue of whether the alleged arbitration
agreement is valid. Without standing MBNA can request nothing of this court

IV
CONCLUSION
Capps and Carroll have presented publicly available information indicating
that MBNA has sold the receivables involved in this lawsuit and does not have
standing in this court. According to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, this court
is in control of discovery. This court therefore has the jurisdiction and the
authority to order limited discovery to be re-opened on the issue of standing in
order to establish whether MBNA is entitled to be a party to this lawsuit or not.
This is a fundamental threshold Issue and it needs to be established and decided
before any other issue is addressed by this court
Capps and Carroll are well within their rights to request that limited
discovery be re-opened on the issue of standing in this case. This court has the
jurisdiction and authority to make such an order, and in the interest of justice
should do so. The standing of MBNA cannot be assumed, but must be proven.
Capps and Carroll are seeking that proof. This court should order the requested
discovery.
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Dated this

9.Pday of July, 2007

Miriam G. Carroll, PlaintiffIDefendant in propria persona
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, David F. Capps, do hereby certify under penalty of perjury, that I mailed
a true and correct copy of this MEMORANDUM ON COURT JURISDICTION
COVERING DISCOVERY ONSTANDING ISSUE to the attorney for the
~efendantl~laintiff
this '23q day of July, 2007, by Certified Mail #
70t75- ((66 i%DP 763O-WA at the following address:

Alec T. Pechota
Wilson & McColl
420 W. Washington
P.O. Box 1544
Boise, ID 83701
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IDAHO COUNN DISTRICT GC)URT

David F. Capps
Miriam G. Carroll
HC-11 BOX366
Kamiah, ID 83536
208-935-7962
FAX: 208-926-4169

A%

?A5 % % c d L . ~ ~
JUL 2 3 2007

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
MI'RIAM G. CARROLL,
DAVID F. CAPPS,

)
)

Case No. CV-2005-36747

f

Plaintiffs,
VS.

MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A.,
Defendant,
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A.,
Plaintiff.
vs.
MIRIAM G. CARROLL,
DAVID F. CAPPS,
Defendants,

i
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MOTION TO VACATE
VOID JUDGMENT

Combined with: CV-2006-37320

1
)
)
)

COME NOW the PlaintiffsIDefendants, David F. Capps and Miriam G.
Carroll, (hereinafter "Capps and Carroll") and submit their MOTION TO VACATE

Pg. 1 of 8

VOID JUDGMENT under Rule 60(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure as
follows:
I

INTRODUCTION
MBNA America Bank, N.A., (hereinafter "MBNA") has come into this court
seeking confirmation of arbitration award letters issued by the National Arbitration
Forum (hereinafter "the NAF") against both Capps and Carroll. Those award
letters are based on an alleged arbitration agreement purportedly added to the
cardholder agreement by MBNA. MBNA submitted a claim to the NAF. Capps
and Carroll both sent an objection and motion to dismiss to the NAF based on no
agreement to arbitrate, see EXHIBIT 1 & 3. The NAF received these objections
along with a Motion to Dismiss, see EXHIBIT 2 & 4. The NAF ignored the
objections and proceeded to issue award letters against both Capps and Carroll.
The arbitrator either knew, or should have known, that once the arbitration
agreement itself was challenged, as was the case with Capps and Carroll, that
the NAF had no jurisdiction to proceed without a court order compelling
arbitration. The award letters were thus without proper jurisdiction and are void
ab inifio. The arbiter cannot be clothed with jurisdiction after the fact If the

award was made without proper jurisdiction, it is forever void.

1
I
JURISDICTION OF THE ARBITRATOR
In Prima Paint,

v. Flood & Conklin, 388 U.S. 395, 106 S.Ct.

1801, 18

L.Ed.2d 1270, (see also, Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., v. Cardegna, 546 U.S.

MOTION TO VACATE VOID JUDGMENT
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440, 126 S.Ct. 1204, 163 L.Ed.2d 1038 (2006)) the U.S. Supreme Court divided
arbitration cases into two distinct categories: where the challenge is to the
contract as a whole, and where the challenge is to the arbitration clause itself.
The court clearly established that a challenge to the contract as a whole which
contained an arbitration clause was for the arbitrator to decide, while a challenge
to the arbitration clause itself was for the courts to decide The arbitrator,
deriving hislher only authority from the arbitration agreement itself, cannot decide
on the validity of the arbitration clause. Only a court can make that
determination. Once a party objects to arbitration based on no agreement to
arbitrate, the arbitrator has no jurisdiction or authority to proceed. The Federal
Arbitration Act [FAA] in Title 9, § 4 provides that,
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to
arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitrationmpetition any United
States district court which, save for such agreement, would have
jurisdiction under title 28, in a civil action or inadmiralty of the subject
matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an
order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in
such agreement.
MBNA failed to obtain a court order to compel arbitration. Without a court order
to compel arbitration, the NAF could not gain jurisdiction. ldaho has followed the
same principle. In adopting the Uniform Arbitration Act under ldaho Code § 7-

On application of a party showing an agreement described in section 7901, ldaho Code, and the opbosing party's refusal to arbitrate, the court
shall order the parties to'proceed with arbitration, but if the opposing party
denies the existence of the agreement to arbitrate, the court shall proceed
summarily to the determination of the issue so raised and shall order
arbitration if found for the moving party, otherwise, the application shall be
denied.
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A party's refusal to arbitrate based on the denial of the existence of an
agreement to arbitrate must be resolved by the court, not the arbitrator.
The matter is also spelled out in MBNA America Bank, N.A., v. Boafa, 94
Conn.App. 559, 893 A.2d 479, (2006) where the court held,
"Because the arbitrator's jurisdiction is rooted in the agreement of the
parties, a party who contests the making of a contract containing an
arbitration provision cannot be compelled to arbitrate the threshold issue
of the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, only a court can make that
decision", "In any given case, whether a particular dispute is arbitratable is
a question for the court, and deference need not be given to the
arbitrator's decision", ..."The arbitration provision in an agreement is, in
effect, a separate and distinct agreement".
Other states are deciding this issue in the same way. In MBNA America
Bank, N.A., v. Credit, No.94380 (April 28, 2006), 132 P.3d 898 (Kan. 2006), the
court held
"An agreement to arbitrate bestows such jurisdiction. When the existence
of the agreement is challenged, the issue must be settled by a court
before the arbitrator may proceed. See 9 U.S.C. § 4; K.S.A. 5-402." "All
we have in the record is Credit's assertion that she sent an apparently
timely objection to the arbitrator, contesting the existence of an agreement
to arbitrate. Although no copy of this objection is in the record, MBNA's
counsel admitted at oral argument before this court that his client
'probably' has a copy of the objection; thus we look to MBNA as the
appellant to demonstrate that the objection was so'mehow ineffective to
trigger its responsibility to seek court intervention to compel arbitration.
See 9 U.S.C. § 4; K.S.A. 5-402. In the absence of such a demonstration,
we, like the district court, have no choice but to accept Credit's version of
events. Under both federal and state law, Credit's objection to the
arbitrator meant the responsibility fell to MBNA to litigate the issue of the
agreement's existence. See 9 U.S.C. § 4; K.S.A. 5-402. Neither MBNA,
as the party asserting existence of an arbitration agreement, nor the
arbitrator was simply free to go forward with the arbitration as though
Credit had not challenged the existence of an agreement to do so. If there
is a challenge to the arbitration, it is for the courts, not the arbitrator, to
decide whether the agreement to arbitrate exists and whether the issue in
dispute falls within the agreement to arbitrate."

Pg. 4 of 8
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A party resisting arbitration may dispute the existence or validity of the
agreement to arbitrate (see E-Z Cash Advance, Inc. v. Harris, 347 Ark. 132, 60
S.W.3d 436 (2001)). Before a court compels arbitration, it must resolve any
claim concerning the validity of the contract containing the arbitration clause (see
Mid-America Surgery Center, L.L.C. v. Schooler, 719 N.E.2d 1267 (Ind. Ct. App.
1999)), however, once it is satisfied that the parties contracted to submit their
dispute to arbitration, the court is required to compel arbitration in accordance
with the terms of that agreement. Conversely, in the absence of a contract
conforming to the requirements of the applicable statute, the relief will be denied
(see Moff v GaerBros., Inc., 22 Conn. Supp. 449, 174 A.2d 549 (Super Ct
1961))
The party seeking to compel arbitration has the burden of seeking a
prel~minaryjudicial determination as to the existence of a valid agreement to
arbitrate (see Arrow Overall Supply Co. v. Peloquin Enterprises, 414 Mich. 95,
323 N.W.2d 1 (1982)), and of proving the existence of such a contract (see Ex
Parte Webb, 855 So. 2d 1031 (Ala. 2003)).
MBNA has improperly come into this court seeking confirmation of void
award letters. MBNA should have come into this court seeking to compel
arbitration, and if successful, that court order would have established the
arbitrator's jurisdiction and authority. The arbitrator cannot be clothed in
jurisdiction retroactively. Jurisdiction must be established first. Without proper
jurisdiction, any decision of the arbitrator is void ab initio.

MOTION TO VACATE VOID JUDGMENT
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VOlD JUDGMENTS
In Dragotoiu v.Dragotoiu, 133 ldaho 644 (App.) the court held that,
[I-31 ...Rule 60(b) enunciates a variety of grounds upon which relief from
a judgment may be obtained. Discretionary relief is permitted, under
subsection (b)(l), for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect. Knight Ins., lnc., v. Knight, 109 ldaho 56, 58-59, 704 P 2d 960,
962-63 (Ct.App 1985). However, relief from a void judgment pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) is nondiscretionary. Id. At 59, 704 P.2d at 963.
[4] In order for a judgment to be considered void under Rule 60(b)(4),
there generally must have been some jurisdictional defect in the court's
authority to enter the judgment, because the court lacked either personal
jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction. Puphal v. Puphal, 105 ldaho
302, 306, 669 P.2d 191, 195 (1983); Dufur v. Nampa & Meridian lrr. Dist.,
128 ldaho 319, 324, 912 P.2d 687, 692 (Ct.App.1996). Accord
Cockerham v. Zikratch, 127 Ariz. 230, 619 P.2d 739, 743 (Ariz. 1980);
Bradford v. Nagle, 763 P.2d 791, 795 (Utah 1988). Additionally, a
judgment is void when a "court's action amounts to a plain usurpation of
power constituting a violation of due process." Hoult v. Hoult, 57 F.3d 1,6
(1" Cir. 1995); accord Dike v.Dike, 75 Wash.2d 1, 448 P.2d 490,494
(1968); I 1 Charles A. Wright et al, Wright Miller & Kane, Federal Practice
& Procedure § 2862, at 326-29 (2d ed.1995).
The same essential rules apply to arbitrators as apply to courts. Once the
existence of an agreement to arbitrate was challenged by Capps and Carroll in
arbitration, the NAF and the arbitrator no longer had subject matter jurisdiction,
nor did they have personal jurisdiction over Capps or Carroll. The arbitrator, in
deciding the arbitration claim, exerted a plain usurpation of power, constituting a
violation of due process. Capps and Carroll have a Seventh Amendment
protection of their right to a jury trial which was not knowingly, voluntarily, or
intelligently waived. By proceeding to a decision, the arbitrator violated Capps
and Carroll's right to due process
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In State v. Bullis, 93 ldaho 749, the court held,
17-91A judgment rendered without jurisdiction is void and unenforceable.
Baldwin v. Anderson, 51 ldaho 614, 8 P.2d 461 (1932); Wright v. Atwood,
33 ldaho 455, 195 P. 625 (1921); Salifan v. Dashney, 219 Or. 553, 347
P.2d 974 (1959); 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments, § 22, p. 327. It IS also
fundamental that a writ of execution based on an invalid or void judgment
is itself invalid. Garren v. Rollis, 85 ldaho 86, 375 P.2d 994 (1962); Evans
v. City of American Falls, 52 ldaho 7, IIP.2d 363 (1932).
The award letters issued by the NAF against Capps and Carroll were
issued without proper jurisdiction and are void and unenforceable.
IV
CONCLUSION

MBNA and the NAF erred in proceeding with arbitration once Capps and
Carroll had challenged the existence of an agreement to arbitrate. MBNA should
have proceeded to court to obtain an order compelling arbitration. If the court
found that a valid agreement to arbitrate existed, that court order would have
given the arbitrator jurisdiction to proceed. Without that court order, the award
letters issued by the NAF lack jurisdiction and are void ab inifio. Capps and
Carroll therefore move this court to vacate the award letter against Miriam G.
Carroll in the amount of $30,241.41, file numberFA0503000443990, and to
vacate the award letter against David F. Capps in the amount of $28,156.49, file
number FA0506000498945 issued by the NAF as void judgments.

Dated this w V d a y of July, 2007.
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Miriam G. Carroll, PlaintiffIDefendant, in propria persona

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I. David F. Cams. do herebv certifv, under penaltv of perjury, that I mailed

a true and correct coby of this M O ~ I O NYO
attorney for the DefendantlPlaintiff (MBNA)
1(60 0002
Certified Mail #
address:

I3 JUDGMENT to the
day of July, 2007, by
at the following

Alec T. Pechota
Wilson & McColl
420 W. Washington
P.O. Box 1544
Boise, ID 83701
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E NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM

Of%

David F. Capps
C/OHC- 11 BOX366
Kamiah, ID 83536
208-935-7962

4

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF
JURISDICTION, OBJECTION TO
ARBITRATION

I

RESPONDENT,

Fonun File Number: FA0506000498945
Account Number: 5490-3536-0367-4374
Cert. Mail: 7004-1 160-0006-1461-3323

MBNA America Bank, N.A.
C/OWolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P.
Two lrvington Centre
702 King Farm Blvd.
Rockville, MD 20850
240-386-3900
CLAIMANT.

I, David F. Capps, Respondent, hereby declare and state:
That the original agreement I entered into with Claimant did not contain any provision of

1.

arbitration or any provision that allowed, for new terms to be added, such as arbitration.

The agreement attached to the Claim filed with the National Arbitration Forum is not the

2.

agreement I entered into with Claimant and does not represent the original agreement.

I have never been notitied

3.

or received any amendment containing

arbitration clause,

thus' giving me an opportunity to opt out of imy such change of terms;
..

.

Arbitration forum, or at all

Natibnal ~rbitrahon
for& (~erehaftei'"Fonun"), or *'other
,
,

..

.

That thereis no igre&ent between the parties to resolve a dispute using arbitration or the

4.
.

.

. ,

. .

.

.
.

.

.
.
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5.

That this Motion to Dismiss should not be construed as a submittal to Arbitration in any

way whatsoever, and that I object to any such arbitration proceedmg;

6.

That the National Arbitration Forum would be acting illegally and without jurisdiction by

proceeding on the claim;
7.

That I discharge and prohibit the Forum from making any award or taking any other action

whatsoever, except to dismiss the case for lack ofjurisdiction.

I, David F. Capps declare that the statements herein and above are true and correct under penalty
of perjury.
Signed by David F. Capps
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Motion was caused to be deposited and mailed
on the 8th day of July, 2005, via Certified Mail Number 7004-1 160-0006-1461-3316 to
the following party:

Dated this 8th day of July, 2005.
Respectfully submitted and signed by

.
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July 12,2005
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David F Capps
Hc 11 Box 366
Kamiah, ID 83536-0000

1

8j)

-.3,..., ~ 9.p
2.

,.

MBNA America Bank, N.A.
C/OWol~off& Abramso~L.L.P.
Paraleg&Department
Attorneys in the Practice of Debt Collection
702 Kina Farm Blvd.
TWO ~rv&ton Centre
Rockville, MD 20850-5775
RE: MBNA America Bank, N.A. v David F Capes
File Number: PA0506000498945
Claimant File Number: 5490353603674374
Claimant Reference Number: 0138076967

Dear Parties:

ti^& Arbitration Forum is receipt of the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss for h c k of
Jurisdiction; Objection to Arbitration, dated July 8,2005 for the above case.
~~l~ 4 1 of~the Fo-'s
Code of Procedure states, "If a Requst for i n v o l u n t ~m
a is
the only quest for a Dirpositive Order, that Request may be determined at theD0cmentor
Participatory Hearing."
a 1 docmen& r u b ~ f t &
by the Respondent will be forwarded to the Arbitrator for review and
consideration at the Document Hearing.
hitule co~spondencereceived fkom the Pdiea regarding this matter will also be f~rwarded
to the Arbitrator for review at the Document Hearing.
Sincerely,

Tom Cieslukowski
Case Coordinator
The Fwum $0.Box 50191 Mmneapds USA 55405.0191 H n w v a ~ ~ ~ ~ o n8004742371
m m
6516 3 1 3 7 ~
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IN THE NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM
Miriam G. Carroll
C/OHC-1 I Box 366
Kamiah, ID, 83536
208-935-7962

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF
JURISDICTION; OBJECTION TO
ARBITRATION
RESPONDENT,

MBNA America Bank, N.A.
C/OWolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P
Two Inrington Centre
702 King Farm Blvd.
Rockville, MD 20850
1-800-830-2793

Forum File Number: FA0503000443990
Claimant File Number: 0135832603
Account Number: 43 13-0331-1100-6016
Cert. Mail: 7004-1 160-0006-1461-2487

CLAIMANT.

I, Miriam G. Carroll, Respondent, hereby declare and state:
1.

That the original agreement I entered into with Claimant did not contain any provision of

arbitration or any provision that allowed for new terms to be added, such as arbitration.

2.

I have never been notified or received any amendment containing an arbitration clause,

thus giving me an opportunity to opt out of any such change of terms;

3.

That there is no agreement between the parties to resolve a dispute using arbitration or the

National Arbitration forum (Hereinafter "Forum"), or any other Arbitration forum, or at all;
4.

That this Motion to Dismiss should not be construed as a submittal to Arbitration in any

way whatsoever, and that I object to any such arbitration proceeding;
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5.

That the National Arbitration Forum would be acting illegally and without jurisdiction by

proceeding on the claim;
6.

That I discharge and prohibit the Forum from making any award or taking any other action

whatsoever, except to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
I, Miriam G. Carroll, declare that the statements herein and above are true and correct under
penalty of perjury.
Signed by Miriam G. Carroll

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Motion was caused to be deposited and mailed
on the 4th day of April, 2005, via Certified Mail Number 7004-1160-0006-1161-2494 to
the following party:
Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P.
Two Irvington Centre
702 King Farm Blvd.
Rochille, MD 20850

Dated this 4th day of April, 2005.
Respecthlly submitted and signed by
Miriam G. Carroll,
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April 11,2005
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FORM
Miriam G Carroll
Hc 11 Box 366
Kamiah, ID 83536-9410

MBNA America Bak,N.A.
C/OWolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P.
Ronald M. Abramson, Esq.
Attorneys in the Practice of Debt Collection
702 King Farm Blvd.
Two Irvington Centre
Rockville, MD 20850-5775

RE: MBNA America Bank, N.A. v Miriam G Carroll
File Number: FA0503000443990
Claimant File Number: 4313033111006016
Claimant Reference Number: 0135832603
Dear Parties:
The National Arbitration Forum is in receipt of the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Jurisdiction; Objection to Arbitration dated April 4,2005 for the above case.
All documents submitted by Respondent will be forwarded to the Arbitrator for review and
consideration at the Document Hearing.
All hture correspondence received from the Parties regarding this matter will also be forwarded
to the Arbitrator for review at the Document Hearing.
Sincerely,

Tom Cieslukowski
Case Coordinator

The Forum PO. 80x50191 Minneapolis USA 55105.0191
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208-935-7962
FAX: 208-926-4169
PlaintiffslDefendants, in propria persona

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
MIRIAM G. CARROLL,
DAVID F. CAPPS,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

PlaintiffslDefendants,
VS.

MBNA AMERICA BANK,

STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF IDAHO

Case No. CV-2005-36747
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT

)

)
) ss:
)

I, Miriam G. Carroll, having been duly sworn upon oath, hereby deposes,
and if called upon to testify, would state as follows:

I. That I am over the age of 18 years of age.
2. That I am a resident of ldaho County, State of ldaho.
3. That I am a patty to the above titled lawsuit.

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT

-

-
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4. That I open all mail which I receive addressed to me.
5. That I examine all of the contents of the envelope.
6. That Ido not recall any offer or notice to amend the card agreement with

MBNA America Bank to include arbitration.
7 . That I have never voluntarily, knowingly or intelligently agreed to

arbitration with MBNA America Bank at any time.
8. That to the best of my knowledge there is no agreement to arbitrate this

dispute, or any dispute, with MBNA America Bank.
9. Further deponent sayeth not.

Dated this (6%

day of August, 2007

Miriam G. Carroll
NOTARY PUBLIC
The above identified person appeared before me this W-$h day of August,
2007.

,
County of Idaho, State of ldaho.
My Commission expires

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT

-

-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, David F. Capps, do hereby certify under penalty of perjury, that Imailed
a true and correct copy of this SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT this
day of
August, 2007, to the attorney for the DefendantJPlaintiff by Certified Mail #7005
1160 0002 7630 4446 at the following address:

Alec Pechota
Wilson & McColl
420 W. Washington
P.O. Box 1544
Boise, ID 83701
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
MIRIAM G. CARROLL,
DAVID F. CAPPS,

)
)

Case No. CV-2005-36747

)

j

PlaintiffslDefendants,

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT

)

1

VS.

)
)
)
)

MBNA AMERICA BANK,
Defendanffplaintiff,

STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF IDAHO

)
) ss:
)

I, David F. Capps, having been duly sworn upon oath, hereby deposes,
and if called upon to testify, would state as follows:
1. That I am over the age of 18 years of age.
2. That I am a resident of ldaho County, State of ldaho.
3. That I am a party to the above titled lawsuit.

- -SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT

-
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4. That Iopen all mail which Ireceive addressed to me.
5. That I examine all of the contents of the envelope.
6. That I do not recall any offer or notice to amend the card agreement with

MBNA America Bank to include arbitration.
7. That I have never voluntarily, knowingly or intelligently agreed to
arbitration with MBNA America Bank at any time.
8. That to the best of my knowledge there is no agreement to arbitrate this

dispute, or any dispute, with MBNA America Bank.
9. Further deponent sayeth not.

Dated this

1/0eday of August, 2007.

NOTARY PUBLIC
The above identified person appeared before me this
2007.

/ 0 &day

of August,

Countv of Idaho, State of Idaho.
My Commission expires
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, David F. Capps, do hereby certify under penalty of perjury, that I mailed
a true and correct copy of this SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT this /& %ff day of
August, 2007, to the attorney for the DefendantlPlaintiff by Certified Mail #7005
1160 0002 7630 4446 at the following address:

Alec Pechota
Wilson & McColl
420 W. Washington
P.O. Box 1544
Boise, ID 83701

On September 28,2006, Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll moved for reconsideration or
in the alternative to alter or amend a judgment on the basis of that the Bank's claim was
fraudulent, that the arbitrators did not have jurisdiction, that National Arbitration Forum
(NAF) was biased in favor of the Bank, that the arbitration was unconscionable, that the

arbitration provision was obtained by stealth, and that the Arbitration Agreement
(Agreement) was illusory and deceptive. Each of these issued was raised for the first
time in the motion for reconsideration.
On October 10,2006, Ms. Carroll and Mr. Capps amended their motion for
reconsideration or to alter or amend the judgment to include their argument that Delaware
law did not apply to the Agreement because of 6 Del. C. § 2708. The Bank responded
that any faults with the arbitration awards should have been brought by a motion to
vacate the awards pursuant to Idaho Code 5 7-912(5).
Briefing on the motion went through April of 2007. On May 24,2007, Ms.
Carroll and Mr. Capps moved to open limited discovery on the issue of whether or not
the Bank had standing to bring the underlying action. On July 12,2007, the hearing was
held on the standing and reopening discovery issues. I indicated I would have a decision
by the end of August. However, on July 23,2007, Ms. Carroll and Mr. Capps questioned
this court's jurisdiction to issue its decision in the first instance. Since the court's
jurisdiction over the subject is a predicate to the other two motions, I have deferred ruling
on them until I could review the jurisdiction issue.
11.

FACTS

In December 2004, after receiving a monthly statement for their credit card
agreement, Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll mailed a letter to the Bank alleging a dispute in

their credit card liability. Ms. Carroll's letter purported to place in dispute a debt in
excess of twenty-four thousand dollars. Mr. Capps' letter purported to place in dispute a
debt in excess of twenty-one thousand dollars. The Bank did not reply to these letters.
Rather the Bank filed claims against Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll with the NAF, requesting
that the disputes be arbitrated.

In April 2005 the NAF received a letter from Ms. Carroll moving to dismiss the
claim tiled with them. The motion to dismiss alleged that the original agreement between
Ms. Carroll and the Bank did not include an arbitration agreement. The motion to
dismiss also alleged that she had not received notice of an amendment to the agreement
which added an arbitration clause that would have allowed her the opportunity to opt-out.
Therefore, the motion to dismiss posited that NAF did not have authority to arbitrate her
dispute with the Bank. In July 2005, an equivalent letter was sent by Mr. Capps to NAF.
After acknowledging receipt of the April motion to dismiss and requesting
submission of evidence from the parties to the dispute, the NAF issued a decision on
August 3,2005. The NAF arbitrator found that there was a valid arbitration agreement
between the parties thereby granting it authority to hear the dispute. The arbitrator, upon
considering the evidence submitted, issued an award to the Bank in the amount of
$30,241.41 against Ms. Carroll. On September 30,2005 a different arbitrator made a
similar finding in the claim against Mr. Capps. The arbitrator issued an award against
him to the Bank in the amount of $28,156.49.
On September 30,2005 Ms. Carroll filed a complaint in Idaho County. She made
several claims including one for injunctive relief invalidating the arbitration award. On

November 3,2005 Mr. Capps filed an equivalent complaint against the Bank alleging the
same causes of action and requesting the same relief.
On January 17,2005 the Bank filed a request to confirm its arbitration award
against Mr. Capps. On March 29,2006 the Bank moved for summary judgment in its
favor regarding the complaints filed by both Ms. Carroll and Mr. Capps. On May 11,
2006 the cases were consolidated. Both parties moved for summary judgment and they
were denied.
On September 14,2006 I issued a Memorandum Decision and Order in which I
found that an arbitration agreement did exist between the Bank and Mr. Capps and
between the Bank and Ms. Carroll. I then confirmed both the arbitration award in favor of
the Bank against Ms. Carol in the sum of $30,241.41 and the arbitration award in favor of
the Bank against Mr. Capps in the sum of $28,156.49.

In.
1.

CONTENTIONS

Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll contend that the Bank's claim was fraudulent, that

NAF was biased, that the arbitration was unconscionable, that the arbitration provision
was obtained by stealth and that the Agreement was illusory and deceptive.
2.

Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll contend that the Bank lacks standing because it

allegedly transferred the accounts receivables from Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll to a third
party. Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll also request discovery on the standing issue to be
reopened.
3.

The Bank contends that Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll have waived the standing

issue because they raised it for the first time in their amended motion for reconsideration.

4.

Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll contend that this court must vacate the arbitration

awards entered by their arbitrators due to the arbitrators' lack of jurisdiction on the basis
that if the underlying arbitrators lacked jurisdiction to enter the arbitration awards, this
court necessarily lacked jurisdiction to confirm them. They argue that the arbitrators
lacked jurisdiction pursuant to LC. 5 7-902(a) since they continued to arbitrate without
seeking a court order compelling arbitration after receiving notice of Mr. Capps' and Ms.
Carroll's challenges to the existence of an arbitration agreement with the Bank.

5.

The Bank contends that the arbitration awards Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll seek to

vacate do not constitute "judgments" that can be vacated by this court under I.R.C.P.

5

60(b)(4).
6.

Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll contend that Delaware law, 6 Del. C. 5 2708, does not

allow a Delaware choice of law provision in contracts that involve less than $100,00 and
that my reliance on Delaware law was therefore in error.

IV.

DISCUSSION

A. Motion for Reconsideration: Fraud, Bias, Unconscionability, Stealth, Zllusion
and Deception.
Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll timely moved for reconsideration of my Memorandum
Decision and Order of September 14,2006, on the basis that the Bank's claim was
fraudulent, the NAF was biased, the arbitration was unconscionable, that the arbitration
provision was obtained by stealth, and that the Agreement was illusory and deceptive.
To the extent that new material was presented or legal arguments made that had
not already been considered, they did not establish admissible or relevant facts or legal
predicates that gave rise to a meritorious defense.

For example, the affidavit of Gregory Duhl explains his dissatisfaction with the

NAF procedures. This testimony confirms that arbitration procedures are much less
formal than court procedures. That is always the case because the purpose of arbitration
is to make the proceedings less formal and less expensive. In any event there is no
evidence that what Mr. Duhl experienced reflected the procedures used in this case. The
same can be said of Edward Anderson's deposition testimony.
Ms. Carroll complains in her Affidavit in Support of Motion for Reconsideration
about the structure, power, and motives of banks that issue credit cards. And she may be
right. My role, however, is not to legislate. Making statutory and regulatory changes in
the banking and credit card industry is a quintessential legislative h c t i o n . I am obliged
to apply the law as it exists.
On these bases the motion for reconsideration or to alter the judgment should be
denied.

B. Motion for Reconsideration: Lack of Standing

Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll amended their motion for reconsideration on October
10,2007 to include a defense that the Bank did not have standing because it had sold its
accounts receivabIe. Civil Rue 1l(a)(2)(B) requires a motion for reconsideration to be
brought "not later than fourteen (14) days after the entry of the final judgment." The
Memorandum Decision and Order of September 14,2006 was a final appealable order
and was dispositive rather than interlocutory. Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll also viewed the
Memorandum Decision and Order as a final judgment because they moved in the
alternative to alter the judgment on the same bases that they asserted to support the
motion to reconsider.

The motion is not timely. More than fourteen days elapsed from the time my
Memorandum Decision and Order was issued until the standing motion was brought.
The fact that Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll amended their timely motion to reconsider does
not cure the timing flaw. While Civil Rule 15(c) permits the effective date of an
amended pleading to relate back to the date of the original pleading, that does not apply
to motions. O'Neil v. Schuckardt, 116 Idaho 507, 509 (1989). Civil Rule 7(a) defines
pleadings and that definition does not include motions. As such motions do not relate
back to the date of the original pleading. Id. Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll's motion for
reconsideration based on lack of standing should therefore be denied.
C. Motion to Vacate: Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll's motion to vacate is based upon this court's lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. A contest to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any
time. State Dep 't of Health and Welfare v. Housel, 140 Idaho 96, 101,90 P.3d 321,326
(Idaho 2004).
1. The Applicable Standard
The rule for vacating a judgment is outlined in I.R.C.P. 60(b), which states:
On Motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party
or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for
the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3)
fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),

misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the
judgment is void . . . .
Mr. Capps and Ms. C m l l specifically move to vacate my September 2006
Memorandum Decision and Order pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60@)(4), alleging that my
judgment is void. Plaintiffs 'Motion to Vacate Void Judgment at 1-2.
Generally in order for a judgment to be void under I.R.C.P. 60@)(4) "there
must be some jurisdictional defect in the court's authority to enter the judgment,
either because the court Iacks personal jurisdiction or because it lacks jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the suit." Puphal v. Puphal, 105 Idaho 302,306,669
P.2d 191, 195 (Idaho 1993) (citing 7 Moore's Federal Practice 5 60.25[2] (2d ed.
1975); First Security Bank v. Neibaur, 98 Idaho 598,605 at n. 4,570 P.2d 276,
283 at n. 4 (Idaho 1977)).
The Bank contends that an I.R.C.P. 9 60@)(4) is not available to Mr. Capps and
Ms. Carroll. It posits that the true purpose of Mr. Capps' and Ms. Carroll's motion is to
have vacated the underlying arbitration awards rather than my September 2006
Memorandum Decision and Order confirming those awards. Because the arbitration
awards are not "judgments," the Bank contends that Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll are
misapplying 1.R.C.P 9 60(b)(4).
On the other hand, Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll implicitly contend in their motion
that if the underlying arbitrators lacked jurisdiction to issue the arbitration awards, this
court necessarily lacked jurisdiction to confirm those awards. My September 2006
Memorandum Decision and Order confirming those awards would consequently be void
due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and thus vacatable under I.R.C.P. 9 60@)(4).

Thus, the issues I must determine are, first, whether the underlying arbitrators had
jurisdiction to issue the awards despite the challenges of Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll as to
the existence an arbitrations agreement, and second, whether this court had subject matter
jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration awards
2. Existence of an Arbitration Agreement.

An arbitrator's jurisdiction or authority to arbitrate arises from an agreement
between the parties to arbitrate. Moore v. Omnicare, Inc. 141 Idaho 809, 816, 118 P.3d
141, 148 (July 2005); Hecla Mining Co. v. Bunker Hill Co., 101 Idaho 557, 565,617 P.2d
at 868 (Idaho)). Under Idaho law it is the role of the court to determine whether or not an
arbitration agreement exists which would grant an arbitrator jurisdiction. Oil, Chemical

&Atomic Workers International Union, AFL-CIOLocal2-652 v. EG & GIdaho, Inc.,
115 Idaho 671,674,769 P.2d 548,551 (Idaho 1989); Accomaszo v. CEDUEducational

Sewices Inc., 135 Idaho 145, 147,15 P.3d 1153,1155 (Idaho 2000); AT& T
Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643,649,106 S.Ct. 1415, 1418,
89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986). The lack of an arbitration agreement is a basis under which the
court can be asked to stay an arbitration under LC. 5 9-702 or to vacate an arbitration
award under I.C. 5 9-712.
Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll do not contend in their motion to vacate that this court
did not have jurisdiction to determine whether an arbitration agreement existed between
themselves and The Bank. Rather, they contend that this court did not have jurisdiction
to confirm the arbitration award letters because the underlying arbitrators granting the
awards failed to have jurisdiction to arbitrate.
3. Jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration awards.

Mr. Capps' and Ms. Carroll's argue that the NAF arbitrators did not have
jurisdiction to issue the arbitration awards because Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll
notified the arbitrators that they challenged the existence of an arbitration
agreement, thereby tolling the arbitrators' jurisdictional authority until a court
determination about whether an arbitration agreement existed. Plaintiffs Motion

to Vacate, at 3-4. Because an arbitrator does not have jurisdiction unless the
parties have agreed to arbitrate and because it is the role of the court to determine
whether such an agreement has been made, this issue is squarely presented.
Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll argue that it does not matter that I decided that
an arbitration agreement existed. September 14, 2006 Memorandum Decision

and Order, at 6. In their words an "arbitrator cannot be clothed with jurisdiction
after the fact. If the award was made without proper jurisdiction, it is forever
void." Plaintiffs Motion to Vacate Void Judgment at 2. To support of their
argument, they rely on MBNA American Bank, N.A. v. Credit, 281 Kan. 655,132
P.3d 898 (Kan. 2006) (bereinafter MBNA v. Credit), the Federal Arbitration Act,
and a portion of the Idaho Arbitration Act addressing proceedings to compel or
stay arbitration (Idaho Code 7-902(a)). Plaintiffs motion to vacate voidjudgment
at 2-5.
In MBNA v. Credit, MBNA submitted a dispute to arbitration regarding a
credit card debt allegedly owed to it by Credit. MBNA v. Credit, at 655-56.
Credit sent a letter to MBNA objecting to the proceeding because it believed ther
was not an agreement to arbitration. Otherwise Credit did not participate in the
arbitration. Id. at 656. Despite Credit's objection letter, the arbitrator proceeded

to enter an arbitration award against Credit in favor of MBNA. Id. When MBNA
filed a motion to confirm the award, Credit moved the court to vacate the award.
Id. at 657. The district court held and the appellate court affirmed that no
arbitration agreement existed between MBNA and Credit making the arbitration
agreement void and the award vacatable. Id. at 655,660.
On appeal, MBNA challenged Credit's timeliness in moving to vacate the
award. In this context the court discussed when it is proper for the court and the
parties to address disputes regarding the existence of an arbitration agreement. In
this regard the court stated:
We note first that MBNA cannot rely on Credit's tardiness
in challenging the award if the arbitrator never had jurisdiction to
arbitrate and enter an award. An agreement to arbitrate bestows
such jurisdiction. When the existence of the agreement is
challenged, the issue must be settled by court before the arbitrator
may proceed. See U.S.C.

3 4; K.S. A. 3 5-402.

All we have in the record is Credit's assertion that she sent
an apparent timely objection to the arbitrator, contesting the
existence of an agreement to arbitrate. Although no copy of this
objection is in the record, MBNA's counsel admitted at oral
argument before this court that his client '"probably" has a copy of
the objection; thus we look to MBNA as the appellant to
demonstrate that the objection was somehow ineffective to trigger
its responsibility to seek court intervention to compel arbitration.

See 9. U.S.C. 5 4; K.S.A. 5-402. In the absence of such a
demonstration, we, like the district court, have no choice but to
accept Credit's version of events.
Under both federal and state law, Credit's objection to the
arbitrator meant the responsibility fell to MBNA to litigate the
issue of the agreement's existence. Neither MBNA, as the party
asserting existence of an arbitration agreement, nor the arbitrator
was simply free to go forward with the arbitration as though Credit
had not challenged the existence of an agreement to do so. "If
there is a challenge to the arbitration it is for the courts, not the
arbitrator to decide whether the agreement to arbitrate exists and
whether the issue in dispute fails within the agreement to
arbitrate." MBNA v. Creidt, 281 Kan. at 658-59, 132 P.3d at 90001.
The Kansas Supreme Court interprets the Federal Arbitration Act and
Kansas's analogous arbitration act to require parties to seek court intervention
before proceeding with arbitration whenever the existence of the arbitration
agreement is challenged. Unfortunately the Kansas Supreme Court did not
discuss its interpretation of these statutes.
The Kansas Supreme Court's decision is instructive but it is not binding. I

am free to make my own interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act and the
analogous Idaho Arbitration Act (which is almost verbatim to the Kansas

Arbitration ~ c t ) ' . Thus, while I may look to the Kansas Court's decision for
guidance, I am free to draw my own conclusions.
The MBNA v. Credit case lends support to Mr. Capps' and Ms. Carroll's
argument. Nevertheless, I decline to follow MBNA v. Credit because it is
factually distinguishable from this case in an important regard. In MBNA v.

Credit, the district court found, and the appellate court affirmed, that no
arbitration agreement existed. Without a valid arbitration agreement it did not
matter whether the arbitrator's jurisdiction was tolled by party's challenge to the
arbitration agreement's existence. The arbitrator never did and never would have
jurisdiction to arbitrate, and thus any arbitration award would have been void.

In contrast to MBNA v. Credit, I have found that an arbitration agreement
existed between the parties. As such, there was a jurisdictional basis for the
arbitrators to make an award in favor of the Bank against Mr. Capps and Ms.
Carroll. In this situation it does matter whether or not a party's challenge to an
arbitration agreement tolls the arbitrator's jurisdiction until a judicial
determination of the arbitration agreement's existence is made. If a challenge
does in fact toll the arbitrator's jurisdiction, then the NAF arbitrators failed to
have jurisdiction when they issued their awards against Mr. Capps and Ms.
Carroll because the awards were made after Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll contested
the existence of an arbitration agreement's existence and before a judicial
determination was made on the matter. However, if a challenge does not toll an
arbitrator's jurisdiction, then the NAF arbitrators' had jurisdiction to enter their

'

The Relevant portion of the Kansas Arbitration Act is K.A.S. 5 5-402. The relevant portion of the Idaho
Arbitration Act is I.C. 5 7-902.

awards against Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll because I have found that an
arbitration agreement does exist between MBNA and Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll.
The issue of a whether an arbitrator's jurisdiction is tolled by a challenge is
determined statutorily.
a.

Federal and Idaho Arbitration Acts

There is nothing in the language of the Federal Arbitration Act or the Idaho
Code explicitly requiring an arbitrator to cease action on an arbitration
proceeding upon notification that a party challenges the existence of an arbitration
agreement. While the Idaho Code and the Federal Arbitration Act do provide a
mechanism for a party to compel arbitration if the other party contests the
existence of an arbitration agreement, I conclude that option is permissive.
The Federal Arbitration Act states:

A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to
arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United
States district court which, save for such agreement, would have
jurisdiction under title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject
matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an
order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in
such agreement.
9 U.S.C. 5 4 (emphasis added). Under this statute a party is not obliged but is
permitted to petition the court for an order to compel arbitration if the other party
refbes to arbitrate.

An order to compel arbitration is similarly authorized in the Idaho Code.
The Idaho Code, like the Federal Arbitration Act, allows but does not require a
party to petition the court to order arbitration when another party contests the
arbitration due to an alleged lack of an arbitration agreement. Idaho Code Section
7-902 states:
(a) On application of a party showing an agreement described in section
7-901, Idaho Code, and the opposing party's refusal to arbitrate, the court
shall order the parties to proceed with arbitration, but if the opposing party
denies the existence of the agreement to arbitrate, the court shall proceed
summarily to the determination of the issue so raised and shall order
arbitration if found for the moving party, otherwise, the application shall
be denied
(b) On application, the court may stay an arbitration proceeding
commenced or threatened on a showing that there is no agreement to
arbitrate. Such an issue, when in substantial and bona fide dispute, shall
be forthwith and summarily tried and the stay ordered if found for the
moving party. If found for the opposing party, the court shall order the
parties to proceed to arbitration. Idaho Code 3 7-902 (emphasis added).
While there are competing policies that could be argued to buttress an obligatory
or permissive interpretation of the statute, I am permitted to determine what the
legislature intended only if the statute itself is ambiguous. Whether or not a statute is
ambiguous is a question of law. Silliam v. Sump, 140 Idaho 266 (2004). If the plain
words of the statute make the legislative intentions clear, there is nothing to construe.

State v. Quick Transport, Inc., 134 Idaho 240,244 (2000). I am not permitted to add or
delete statutory provisions by judicial construction because to do so would intrude on the
quintessential function of the legislature to legislate. Conty v. Idaho State Tax

Commission, 138 Idaho 178, 182 (2002). The only time the literal interpretation of a
statute does not prevail is if that interpretation is obviously out of harmony with the
objective and policy of the statute or leads to an otherwise absurd result. Danaz v. Preist

River Glass Co., 125 Idaho 333,336-37 (2004). It is in the context of these mandates
that the arbitration statute must be construed.
There has been nothing presented that persuades me that there are two reasonable
interpretations of the statute. As a result I conclude it is not ambiguous. See Stvuhs v.

Protection Technologies fnc, 133 Idaho 715,719 (1 999).
The statute permits but does not require an application to the court. The statute
says that "[ulpon application of a party.. ." the court must then act. It does not condition
the viability and enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate on application to the court.
The purpose of arbitration is to permit an informal and hopefully less expensive
resolution of disputes in lieu of more formal court proceedings. Interpreting the statute to
force a party to invoke a court process if one party objects to the existence of an
arbitration agreement could defeat the objective of avoiding litigation. What the statute
does permit is to force a recalcitrant party to participate in the determination of the
legality of the agreement before arbitration begins.
The statute unequivocally contemplates that parties or a party can go to arbitration
or decline to go to arbitration and then question the legality of the arbitration agreement.
If there had been any doubt that section 902 of the Idaho Arbitration Act was permissive

rather than obligatory, section 912(5) removes that doubt. It provides that "[ulpon
application of aparty the court shall vacate an award where . . . [tlhere was no arbitration
agreement and the issue was not adversely determined in proceedings under section 7902, Idaho Code, and the party did not participate in the arbitration hearing without
raising the objection."
In other words, so long as a party either raises the issue of arbitratabilitybefore
the arbitration occurs or during the arbitration if the objecting party participates, that
party may move to vacate the arbitration award based on the absence of an agreement to
arbitrate. See Cody v. Allstate Ins. Co., 113 Idaho 667,669 (Ct. App. 1987).
The statute as a whole does not reasonably submit to any other interpretation,
given the options of preempting an arbitration proceeding before it begins under section
902 or vacating an award after the arbitration precedes and has been completed under
section 912(5).
D. Amended Motion for Reconsideration: Choice of Law

The next issue is whether Delaware law, 6 De1.C. 5 2708, allows a choice of law
provision in the Agreement that involves less than $100,000 and whether my reliance on
Delaware law in my Memorandum Decision and Order of September 14,2006, was
therefore in error.

In my decision I applied Delaware law to the provision in the Credit Card
Agreement (Agreement) that Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll signed with MBNA. Mr. Capps
and Ms. Carroll now direct my attention to 6 Del. C. 3 2708. Both parties have briefed
the issue.
6 Del. C. 5 2708 provides in part:

(a) The parties to any contract ... may agree in writing that the contract ... shall
be governed or construed under the laws of this State without regard to the
principles of conflict of laws, or that the laws of this State shall govern, in whole
or in part, any or all of their rights ... if the parties are ... (i) subject to the
jurisdiction of the courts of, or arbitration in, Delaware and, (ii) may be served
with legal process.

(b) Any person may maintain an action in a court of competent jurisdiction in this
state where the action or proceeding arises out of or relates to any contract,
agreement or other undertaking for which a choice of Delaware law has been
made in whole or in part and which contains the provision permitted by
subsection (a) of this section.
(c) This section shall not apply to any contract ... (i) to the extent provided to the
contrary in $ 1-301(c) of this title, or, (ii) involving less than $100,000.
Section 301 of 1 De1.C. provides:
The rules of construction and the definitions set forth in this chapter shall be
observed in the construction of this Code and all other statutes, unless such
construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the General
Assembly, or repugnant to the Code or to the context of the same statute.
6 Delaware Code § 2708 is not a choice of law statute in the traditional sense of
agreeing to the law that will be used to interpret the agreement. Rather it is a choice of
Delaware courts as the fonun to resolve contractual disputes of $100,000 or more and a
consent to jurisdiction by those courts for that purpose. Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware,

Lawyers, and Contractual Choice oflaw, 19 Del. J. Corp. L. 999, 1003-1004 (1994).

According to the synopsis of the statutory amendments enacting 6 Delaware Code section
2708, its purpose is to "supersede all Delaware common law limitations [due to the lack
of a material relationship with Delaware] on the enforceability of Delaware choice of law
provisions . . . ,as well as limitations on contractual consent to jurisdiction or service of
process." 6 Del. C. $2708, Synopsis of the Amendments. However this override of
common law principles applies only to contracts that exceed $100,000.00. See 6 Del. C.
$2708(c) stating that "[tlhis section shall not apply to any contract, agreement or other
undertaking to the extent [it] . . . (ii) involv[es] less than $100,000.").
6 Delaware Code Section 2708(c) merely overrides any common law limitations
on contractual consent to jurisdiction by Delaware courts when contracts are over
$100,000. It is not intended to nor does it "alter the case law development with respect to
choice of law provisions in contracts," such as the contracts between the Bank and Mr.
Capps and Ms. Carroll, that are specifically excepted from the Delaware court
jurisdiction provisions of 6 Delaware Code section 2708(a) and (c). 6 Del. C. 5 2708,

Synopsis of the Amendments. This is made manifest by subsection (e) which specifically
states that "[tlhis section shall not limit any jurisdiction otherwise existing in a court
sitting in the State and shall not affect the validity of any other choice of law provisions
in any contract, agreement or other undertaking." 6 Del. C. § 2708(e).
It is uncontested that there is a Delaware choice of law provision in the
Agreement the parties entered into. This Delaware choice of law provision is authorized
under 6 Del. C. 5 2708(e). The Delaware statute governing choice of law in matters
regarding revolving credit provides that "[a] revolving credit plan between a bank and an
individual borrower shall be governed by the laws of this State." 5 Del. C. $956.

Because Idaho is the fonun state, I must also consider whether the choice of
Delaware law conforms to Idaho's choice of law principles. In my Memorandum
Decision and Order of September 14,2006,I held that using the Delaware choice of law
clause did not violate Idaho's choice of law principles. I am not persuaded that decision
was wrong.
Because I iind I did not err in applying Delaware's law, I do not address Mr.
Capps and Ms. Carroll's discussion of the Idaho Credit Code.

K

CONCLUSION

1. Mr. Capps' and Ms. Carroll's motion for reconsideration based on fraud bias,
unconcsionability, stealth, illusion, and deception is denied for lack of factual and
legal merit.
2. Ms. Capps' and Ms. Carroll's amended motion for reconsideration based on lack
of standing is denied as untimely.
3. The NAF arbitratofs had jurisdiction over the Bank and Mr. Capps and the Bank
and Ms. Carroll because arbitration agreements existed between both the Bank
and Mr. Capps and the Bank and Ms. Carroll.
4. This jurisdiction was neither tolled nor stripped by Mr. Capps' and Ms. Carroll's
challenges to the existence of arbitration agreements between themselves and the
bank.
5. This court had subject matter jurisdiction both to determine whether an arbitration

agreement existed between the parties and to confirm the arbitration awards
against Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll pursuant to the Idaho Arbitration Act, Idaho
Code Section 7-902.

6. The parties' Delaware Choice of Law term in their Agreement is valid under
Delaware Law and is consistent with Idaho's choice of law principles; therefore,
my reliance on Delaware law in my Memorandum Decision and Order of
September 2006 was not in error.
VI.

Order

Mr. Cappss snd Ms. Carroll's motions to vacate and for reconsideration and to
alter the judgment are DENIED.
It is so ORDERED, this the

L'
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JOHN BRADBURY
DISTRICT JUDGE

day of November, 2007.
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This case comes before me on a motion by Miriam Carroll and David Capps
questioning this court's jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration awards, a motion to
reconsider the confirmation decision, a motion questioning the standing of the Bank to
bring its complaint, and a motion to reopen discovery on the issue of standing. MBNA
American Bank (Bank) has opposed the motions.
I.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 14, 2006, I issued a Memorandum Decision and Order in which I
confirmed arbitration awards against Miriam Carroll in the sum of $30,242.42 and
against David Capps in the sum of $28,156.49. I also held that Delaware law applied to
the agreement to arbitrate and other contractual issues.

On September 28,2006, Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll moved for reconsideration or
in the alternative to alter or amend a judgment on the basis of that the Bank's claim was
fraudulent, that the arbitrators did not have jurisdiction, that National Arbitration Forum
(NAF) was biased in favor of the Bank, that the arbitration was unconscionable, that the

arbitration provision was obtained by stealth, and that the Arbitration Agreement
(Agreement) was illusory and deceptive. Each of these issued was raised for the first
time in the motion for reconsideration.
On October 10, 2006, Ms. Carroll and Mr. Capps amended their motion for
reconsideration or to alter or amend the judgment to include their argument that Delaware
law did not apply to the Agreement because of 6 Del. C. 3 2708. The Bank responded
that any faults with the arbitration awards should have been brought by a motion to
vacate the awards pursuant to Idaho Code 3 7-912(5).
Briefing on the motion went through April of 2007. On May 24,2007, Ms.
Carroll and Mr. Capps moved to open limited discovery on the issue of whether or not
the Bank had standing to bring the underlying action. On July 12,2007, the hearing was
held on the standing and reopening discovery issues. I indicated I would have a decision
by the end of August. However, on July 23,2007, Ms. Carroll and Mr. Capps questioned
this court's jurisdiction to issue its decision in the first instance. Since the court's
jurisdiction over the subject is a predicate to the other two motions, I have deferred ruling
on them until I could review the jurisdiction issue.

TI.

FACTS

In December 2004, after receiving a monthly statement for their credit card
agreement, Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll mailed a letter to the Bank alleging a dispute in

their credit card liability. Ms. Carroll's letter purported to place in dispute a debt in
excess of twenty-four thousand dollars. Mr. Capps' letter purported to place in dispute a
debt in excess of twenty-one thousand dollars. The Bank did not reply to these letters.
Rather the Bank filed claims against Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll with the NAF, requesting
that the disputes be arbitrated.

In April 2005 the NAF received a letter from Ms. Carroll moving to dis~nissthe
claim filed with them. The motion to dismiss alleged that the original agreement between
Ms. Carroll and the Bank did not include an arbitration agreement. The motion to
dismiss also alleged that she had not received notice of an amendment to the agreement
which added an arbitration clause that would have allowed her the opportunity to opt-out.
Therefore, the motion to dismiss posited that NAF did not have authority to arbitrate her
dispute with the Bank. In July 2005, an equivalent Ietter was sent by Mr. Capps to NAF.
After acknowledging receipt of the April motion to dismiss and requesting
submission of evidence from the parties to the dispute, the NAF issued a decision on
August 3,2005. The NAF arbitrator found that there was a valid arbitration agreement
between the parties thereby granting it authority to hear the dispute. The arbitrator, upon
considering the evidence submitted, issued an award to the Bank in the amount of
$30,241.41 against Ms. Carroll. On September 30,2005 a different arbitrator made a
similar finding in the claim against Mr. Capps. The arbitrator issued an award against
him to the Bank in the amount of $28,156.49.
On September 30,2005 Ms. Cmoll filed a complaint in Idaho County. She made
several claims including one for injunctive relief invalidating the arbitration award. On

November 3,2005 Mr. Capps filed an equivalent complaint against the Bank alleging the
same causes of action and requesting the same relief.
On January 17,2005 the Bank filed a request to confirm its arbitration award
against Mr. Capps. On March 29,2006 the Bank moved for summary judgment in its
favor regarding the complaints filed by both Ms. Carroll and Mr. Capps. On May 11,
2006 the cases were consolidated. Both parties moved for summary judgment and they
were denied.
On September 14,2006 I issued a Memorandum Decision and Order in which I
found that an arbitration agreement did exist between the Bank and Mr. Capps and
between the Bank and Ms. Carroll. I then confirmed both the arbitration award in favor of
the Bank against Ms. Carol in the sum of $30,241.41 and the arbitration award in favor of
the Bank against Mr. Capps in the sum of$28,156.49.
111.
1.

CONTENTIONS

Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll contend that the Bank's claim was fraudulent, that

NAF was biased, that the arbitration was unconscionable, that the arbitration provision
was obtained by stealth and that the Agreement was illusory and deceptive.
2.

Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll contend that the Bank lacks standing because it

allegedly transferred the accounts receivables from Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll to a third
party. Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll also request discovery on the standing issue to be
reopened.
3.

The Bank contends that Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll have waived the standing

issue because they raised it for the first time in their amended motion for reconsideration.

4.

Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll contend that this court must vacate the arbitration

awards entered by their arbitrators due to the arbitrators' lack ofjurisdiction on the basis
that if the underlying arbitrators lacked jurisdiction to enter the arbitration awards, this
court necessarily lacked jurisdiction to confirm them. They argue that the arbitrators
lacked jurisdiction pursuant to LC. § 7-902(a) since they continued to arbitrate without
seeking a court order compelling arbitration after receiving notice of Mr. Capps' and Ms.
Carroll's challenges to the existence of an arbitration agreement with the Bank.
5.

The Bank contends that the arbitration awards Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll seek to

vacate do not constitute "judgments" that can be vacated by this court under I.R.C.P.

5

60(b)(4).
6.

Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll contend that Delaware law, 6 Del. C. 9 2708, does not

allow a Delaware choice of law provision in contracts that involve less than $100,00 and
that my reliance on Delaware law was therefore in error.

IV.

DISCUSSION

A. Motion for Reconsideration: Fraud, Bias, Unconscionability, Stealth, Illusion
and Deception.
Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll timely moved for reconsideration of my Memorandum
Decision and Order of September 14,2006, on the basis that the Bank's claim was
fraudulent, the NAF was biased, the arbitration was unconscionable, that the arbitration

provision was obtained by stealth, and that the Agreement was illusory and deceptive.
To the extent that new material was presented or legal arguments made that had
not already been considered, they did not establish admissible or relevant facts or legal
predicates that gave rise to a meritorious defense.

For example, the affidavit of Gregory Duhl explains his dissatisfaction with the

NAF procedures. This testimony confirms that arbitration procedures are much less
formal than court procedures. That is always the case because the purpose of arbitration
is to make the proceedings less formal and less expensive. In any event there is no
evidence that what Mr. Duhl experienced reflected the procedures used in this case. The
same can be said of Edward Anderson's deposition testimony.
Ms. Carroll complains in her Affidavit in Support of Motion for Reconsideration
about the structure, power, and motives of banks that issue credit cards. And she may be
right. My role, however, is not to legislate. Making statutory and regulatory changes in
the banking and credit card industry is a quintessential legislative function. I am obliged
to apply the law as it exists.
On these bases the motion for reconsideration or to alter the judgment should be
denied.

B. Motion for Reconsideration: Lack of Standing
Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll amended their motion for reconsideration on October
10,2007 to include a request for additional discovery for the purpose of establishing a
defense that the Bank did not have standing because it had sold its accounts receivable.
Civil Rule 11(a)(2)(B) states that "[a] motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory
orders of the trial court may be made at any time before the entry of final judgment but
not later than fourteen (14) days after the entry of the final judgment." The
Memorandum Decision and Order of September 14,2006 is not a final judgment, nor has
a final judgment been entered. Consequently Mr. Capps' and Ms. Carroll's motion for
reconsideration of my September 2006 Memorandum Decision and Order was filed

within the time limits provided by Civil Rule 11(a)(2)(B). See Devil Creek Ranch, Znc.,

v. Cedar Creek Reservoir di Canal Co., 126 Idaho 202 (1994).
While Mr. Capps' and Ms. Carroll's motion is framed as one for reconsideration,
it does not point to established facts that were overlooked. Compare Coeur d' Alene

Mining Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 118 Idaho 812 (1990). Rather the motion is to reopen
discovery for the opportunity to see if there are facts that would provide a defense that the
Bank does not have standing. The time for that endeavor is long past.
The Scheduling Order of February 24,2006, amended on May 15,2006, required
the parties to file all motions not later than May 4, 2006, and to complete discovery by
June 8,2006. Scheduling Order, at 1 (February 24,2006). The amended motion for
reconsideration seeks to reopen discovery almost a full year after discovery was supposed
to have been completed. The motion and the request for discovery are therefore
untimely, and as such should be denied.

C. Motion to Vacate: Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll's motion to vacate is based upon this.court's lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. A contest to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any
time. State Dep 't ofHealth and Welfare v. Housel, 140 Idaho 96, 101,90 P.3d 321,326
(Idaho 2004).

1. The Applicable Standard
The rule for vacating a judgment is outlined in 1,R.C.P. 60(b), which states:
On Motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party
or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for
the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable

neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3)
kaud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the
judgment is void . . . .
Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll specifically move to vacate my September 2006
Memorandum Decision and Order pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4), alleging that my
judgment is void. Plaint@ss'Motion to Vacate Void Judgment at 1-2.
Generally in order for a judgment to be void under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) "there
must be some jurisdictional defect in the court's authority to enter the judgment,
either because the court lacks personal jurisdiction or because it lacks jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the suit." Puphal v. Puphal, 105 Idaho 302,306,669
P.2d 191, 195 (Idaho 1993) (citing 7 Moore's Federal Practice § 60.25[2] (2d ed.
1975); First Security Bank v. Neibaur, 98 Idaho 598,605 at n. 4,570 P.2d 276,
283 at n. 4 (Idaho 1977)).

The Bank contends that an I.R.C.P. 9 60(b)(4) is not available to Mr. Capps and
Ms. Carroll. It posits that the true purpose of Mr. Capps' and Ms. Carroll's motion is to
have vacated the underlying arbitration awards rather than my September 2006
Memorandum Decision and Order confirming those awards. Because the arbitration
awards are not 'Sudgments," the Bank contends that Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll are
misapplying LR.C.P $60(b)(4).
On the other hand, Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll implicitly contend in their motion
that if the underlying arbiixators lacked jurisdiction to issue the arbitration awards, this

court necessarily lacked jurisdiction to confirm those awards. My September 2006
Memorandum Decision and Order confirming those awards would consequently be void
due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and thus vacatable under I.R.C.P.

9 60(b)(4).

Thus, the issues I must determine are, first, whether the underlying arbitrators had
jurisdiction to issue the awards despite the challenges of Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll as to
the existence an arbitrations agreement, and second, whether this court had subject matter
jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration awards
2. Existence of an Arbitration Agreement.

An arbitrator's jurisdiction or authority to arbitrate arises from an agreement
between the parties to arbitrate. Moore v. Omnicare, Inc. 141 Idaho 809, 816, 118 P.3d
141, 148 (July 2005); Hecla Mining Co. v. Bunker H I Co., 101 Idaho 557, 565,617 P.2d
at 868 (Idaho)). Under Idaho law it is the role of the court to determine whether or not an
arbitration agreement exists which would grant an arbitrator jurisdiction. Oil, Chemical

&Atomic Workers International Union, AFL-CIO Local 2-652 v. EG & G Idaho, Inc.,
115 Idaho 671,674,769 P.2d 548,551 (Idaho 1989); Accomazzo v. CEDUEducational

Sewices Inc., 135 Idaho 145, 147, 15 P.3d 1153, 1155 (Idaho 2000); A T & T
Technologies,Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643,649,106 S.Ct. 1415, 1418,
89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986). The lack of an arbitration agreement is a basis under which the
court can be asked to stay an arbitration under LC. 3 9-702 or to vacate an arbitration
award under LC. $9-712.
Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll do not contend in their motion to vacate that this c o w
did not have jurisdiction to determine whether an arbitration agreement existed between
themselves and The Bank. Rather, they contend that this court did not have jurisdiction

to confirm the arbitration award letters because the underlying arbitrators granting the
awards failed to have jurisdiction to arbitrate.
3. Jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration awards.
Mr. Capps' and Ms. Carroll's argue that the NAF arbitrators did not have
jurisdiction to issue the arbitration awards because Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll
notified the arbitrators that they challenged the existence of an arbitration
agreement, thereby tolling the arbitrators' jurisdictional authority until a court
determination about whether an arbitration agreement existed. Plaintzfls Motion

to Vacate,at 3-4. Because an arbitrator does not have jurisdiction unless the
parties have agreed to arbitrate and because it is the role of the court to determine
whether such an agreement has been made, this issue is squarely presented.
Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll argue that it does not matter that I decided that
an arbitration agreement existed. September 14, 2006 Memorandum Decision

and Order, at 6. In their words an "arbitrator cannot be clothed with jurisdiction
after the fact. If the award was made without proper jurisdiction, it is forever
void." Plaintiffs Motion to Vacate Void Judgment at 2. To support of their
argument, they rely on MBNA American Bank, NA. v. Credit, 281 Kan. 655, 132
P.3d 898 (Kan. 2006) (hereinafter MBNA v. Credit),the Federal Arbitration Act,
and a portion of the Idaho Arbitration Act addressing proceedings to compel or
stay arbitration (Idaho Code 7-902(a)). Plaintiff's motion to vacate voidjudgment
at 2-5.

In MBNA v. Credit, MBNA submitted a dispute to arbitration regarding a
credit card debt allegedly owed to it by Credit. MBNA v. Credit, at 655-56.

Credit sent a letter to MBNA objecting to the proceeding because it believed ther
was not an agreement to arbitration. Otherwise Credit did not participate in the
arbitration. Id. at 656. Despite Credit's objection letter, the arbitrator proceeded
to enter an arbitration award against Credit in favor of MBNA. Id. When MBNA
filed a motion to confirm the award, Credit moved the court to vacate the award.
Id. at 657. The district court held and the appellate court affirmed that no
arbitration agreement existed between MBNA and Credit making the arbitration
agreement void and the award vacatable. Id. at 655,660.
On appeal, MBNA challenged Credit's timeliness in moving to vacate the
award. In this context the court discussed when it is proper for the court and the
parties to address disputes regarding the existence of an arbitration agreement. In
this regard the court stated:
We note first that MBNA cannot rely on Credit's tardiness
in challenging the award if the arbitrator never had jurisdiction to
arbitrate and enter an award. An agreement to arbitrate bestows
such jurisdiction. When the existence of the agreement is
challenged, the issue must be settled by court before the arbitrator
may proceed. See U.S.C.

5 4; K.S. A. § 5-402.

All we have in the record is Credit's assertion that she sent
an apparent timely objection to the arbitrator, contesting the
existence of an agreement to arbitrate. Although no copy of this
objection is in the record, MBNA's counsel admitted at oral
argument before this court that his client "probably" has a copy of

the objection; thus we look to MBNA as the appellant to
demonstrate that the objection was somehow ineffective to trigger
its responsibility to seek court intervention to compel arbitration.
See 9. U.S.C. 5 4; K.S.A. 5-402. In the absence of such a
demonstration, we, like the district court, have no choice but to
accept Credit's version of events.
Under both federal and state law, Credit's objection to the
arbitrator meant the responsibility fell to MBNA to litigate the
issue of the agreement's existence. Neither MBNA, as the party
asserting existence of an arbitration agreement, nor the arbitrator
was simply free to go forward with the arbitration as though Credit
had not challenged the existence of an agreement to do so. "If
there is a challenge to the arbitration it is for the courts, not the
arbiirator to decide whether the agreement to arbitrate exists and
whether the issue in dispute falls within the agreement to
arbitrate." MBNA v. Creidt, 281 Kan. at 658-59, 132 P.3d at 90001.
The Kansas Supreme Court interprets the Federal Arbitration Act and
Kansas's analogous arbitration act to require parties to seek court intervention
before proceeding with arbitration whenever the existence of the arbitration
agreement is challenged. Unfortunately the Kansas Supreme Court did not
discuss its interpretation of these statutes.

The Kansas Supreme Court's decision is instructive but it is not binding. I

am gee to make my own interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act and the
analogous Idaho Arbitration Act (which is almost verbatim to the Kansas
Arbitration ~ c t ) ' .Thus, while I may look to the Kansas Court's decision for
guidance, I am free to draw my own conclusions.
The MBNA v. Credit case lends support to Mr. Capps' and Ms. Carroll's
argument. Nevertheless, I decline to follow MBNA v. Credzt because it is
factually distinguishable from this case in an important regard. In MBNA v.
Credit, the district court found, and the appellate court affirmed, that no
arbitration agreement existed. Without a valid arbitration agreement it did not
matter whether the arbitrator's jurisdiction was tolled by party's challenge to the
arbitration agreement's existence. The arbitrator never did and never would have
jurisdiction to arbitrate, and thus any arbitration award would have been void.
In contrast to MBNA v. Credit, I have found that an arbitration agreement
existed between the parties. As such, there was a jurisdictional basis for the
arbitrators to make an award in favor of the Bank against Mr. Capps and Ms.
Carroll. In this situation it does matter whether or not a party's challenge to an
arbitration agreement tolls the arbitrator's jurisdiction until a judicial
determination of the arbitration agreement's existence is made. If a challenge
does in fact toll the arbitrator's jurisdiction, then the NAF arbitrators failed to
have jurisdiction when they issued their awards against Mr. Capps and Ms.
Carroll because the awards were made after Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll contested

'

The Relevant portion of the Kansas Arbitration Act is K.A.S. $5-402. The relevant portion of the Idaho
Arbitration Act is LC. 6 7-902.

the existence of an arbitration agreement's existence and before a judicial
determination was made on the matter. However, if a challenge does not toll an
arbitrator's jurisdiction, then the NAF arbitrators' had jurisdiction to enter their
awards against Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll because I have found that an
arbitration agreement does exist between MBNA and Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll.
The issue of a whether an arbitrator's jurisdiction is tolled by a challenge is
determined statutorily.
a.

Federal and Idaho Arbitration Acts

There is nothing in the language of the Federal Arbitration Act or the Idaho
Code explicitly requiring an arbitrator to cease action on an arbitration
proceeding upon notification that a party challenges the existence of an arbitration
agreement. While the Idaho Code and the Federal Arbitration Act do provide a
mechanism for a party to compel arbitration if the other party contests the
existence of an arbitration agreement, I conclude that option is permissive.
The Federal Arbitration Act states:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to
arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United
States district court which, save for such agreement, would have
jurisdiction under title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject
matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an
order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in
such agreement.

9 U.S.C.

4 4 (emphasis added).

Under this statute a party is not obliged but is

permitted to petition the court for an order to compel arbitration if the other party
reiitses to arbitrate.

An order to compel arbitration is similarly authorized in the Idaho Code.
The Idaho Code, like the Federal Arbitration Act, allows but does not require a
party to petition the court to order arbitration when another party contests the
arbitration due to an alleged lack of an arbitration agreement. Idaho Code Section

7-902 states:
(a) On application of a party showing an agreement described in section
7-901, Idaho Code, and the opposing party's refusal to arbitrate, the court
shall order the parties to proceed with arbitration, but if the opposing party
denies the existence of the agreement to arbitrate, the court shall proceed
summarily to the determination of the issue so raised and shall order
arbitration if found for the moving party, otherwise, the application shall
be denied
(b) On application, the court may stay an arbitration proceeding
commenced or threatened on a showing that there is no agreement to
arbitrate. Such an issue, when in substantial and bona fide dispute, shall
be forthwith and summarily tried and the stay ordered if found for the
moving party. If found for the opposing party, the court shall order the
parties to proceed to arbitration. Idaho Code § 7-902 (emphasis added).
While there are competing policies that could be argued to buttress an obligatory
or permissive interpretation of the statute, I am permitted to determine what the

legislature intended only if the statute itself is ambiguous. Whether or not a statute is
ambiguous is a question of law. Silliam v. Sump, 140 Idaho 266 (2004). If the plain
words of the statute make the legislative intentions clear, there is nothing to construe.
State v. Quick Transport, Inc., 134 Idaho 240,244 (2000). 1am not permitted to add or

delete stahtory provisions by judicial construction because to do so would intrude on the
quintessential function of the legislature to legislate. Conty v. Idaho State Tax

Commission, 138 Idaho 178, 182 (2002). The only time the literal interpretation of a
statute does not prevail is if that interpretation is obviously out of harmony with the
objective and policy of the statute or leads to an otherwise absurd result. Danaz v. Preist

River Glass Co., 125 Idaho 333,336-37 (2004). It is in the context of these mandates
that the arbitration statute must be construed.
There has been nothing presented that persuades me that there are two reasonable
interpretations of the statute. As a result I conclude it is not ambiguous. See Struhs v.

Protection Technologies Inc, 133 Idaho 715,719 (1999).
The statute permits but does not require an application to the court. The statute
says that "[ulpon application of a party.. ." the court must then act. It does not condition
the viability and enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate on application to the court.
The purpose of arbitration is to permit an informal and hopefully less expensive
resolution of disputes in lieu of more formal court proceedings. Interpreting the statute to
force a party to invoke a court process if one party objects to the existence of an
arbitration agreement could defeat the objective of avoiding litigation. What the statute
does permit is to force a recalcitrant party to participate in the determination of the
legality of the agreement before arbitration begins.

The statute unequivocally contemplates that parties or a party can go to arbitration
or decline to go to arbitration and then question the legality of the arbitration agreement.
If there had been any doubt that section 902 of the Idaho Arbitration Act was permissive
rather than obligatory, section 912(5) removes that doubt. It provides that "[ulpon
application of a party the court shall vacate an award where . . . [tlhere was no arbitration
agreement and the issue was not adversely determined in proceedings under section 7902, Idaho Code, and the party did not participate in the arbitration hearing without
raising the objection."

In other words, so long as a party either raises the issue of arbitratability before
the arbitration occurs or during the arbitration if the objecting party participates, that
party may move to vacate the arbitration award based on the absence of an agreement to
arbitrate. See Cody v. Allstate Ins. Co., 113 Idaho 667, 669 (Ct. App. 1987).
The statute as a whole does not reasonably submit to any other interpretation,
given the options of preempting an arbitration proceeding before it begins under section
902 or vacating an award after the arbitration precedes and has been completed under
section 912(5).

D. Amended Motion for Reconsideratioit: Choice of Law
The next issue is whether Delaware law, 6 De1.C. 9 2708, allows a choice of law
provision in the Agreement that involves less than $100,000 and whether my reliance on
Delaware law in my Memorandum Decision and Order of September 14,2006, was
therefore in error.
In my decision I applied Delaware law to the provision in the Credit Card
Agreement (Agreement) that Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll signed with MBNA. Mr. Capps

and Ms. Carroll now direct my attention to 6 Del. C. 9 2708. Both parties have briefed
the issue.

6 Del. C. 9 2708 provides in part:
(a) The parties to any contract .. . may agree in writing that the contract . .. shall
be governed or construed under the laws of this State without regard to the
principles of conflict of laws, or that the laws of this State shall govern, in whole
or in part, any or all of their rights ... if the parties are . . . (i) subject to the
jurisdiction of the courts of, or arbitration in, Delaware and, (ii) may be served
with legal process.
(b) Any person may maintain an action in a court of competent jurisdiction in this

state where the action or proceeding arises out of or relates to any contract,
agreement or other undertaking for which a choice of Delaware law has been
made in whole or in part and which contains the provision permitted by
subsection (a) of this section.
(c) This section shall not apply to any contract ... (i) to the extent provided to the
contrary in $ 1-301(c) of this title, or, (ii) involving less than $100,000.
Section 301 of 1 De1.C. provides:
The rules of construction and the definitions set forth in this chapter shall be
observed in the construction of this Code and all other statutes, unless such
construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the General
Assembly, or repugnant to the Code or to the context of the same statute.
6 Delaware Code 9 2708 is not a choice of law statute in the traditional sense of
agreeing to the law that will be used to interpret the agreement. Rather it is a choice of

Delaware courts as the forum to resolve contractual disputes of $100,000 or more and a
consent to jurisdiction by those courts for that purpose. L a r y E. Ribstein, Delaware,

Lawyers, and Contractual Choice oflaw, 19 Del. J. Corp. L. 999, 1003-1004 (1994).
According to the synopsis of the statutory amendments enacting 6 Delaware Code section
2708, its purpose is to "supersede all Delaware common law limitations [due to the lack
of a material relationship with Delaware] on the enforceability of Delaware choice of law
provisions . . . , as well as limitations on contractual consent to jurisdiction or service of
process." 6 Del. C. $ 2708, Synopsis of the Amendments. However this override of
common law principles applies only to contracts that exceed $100,000.00. See 6 Del. C.

$ 2708(c) stating that "[tlhis section shall not apply to any contract, agreement or other
undertaking to the extent [it] . . . (ii) involv[es] less than $100,000.").
6 Delaware Code Section 2708(c) merely overrides any common law limitations
on contractual consent to jurisdiction by Delaware courts when contracts are over
$100,000. It is not intended to nor does it "alter the case law development with respect to
choice of law provisions in contracts," such as the contracts between the Bank and Mr.
Capps and Ms. Carroll, that are specifically excepted from the Delaware court
jurisdiction provisions of 6 Delaware Code section 2708(a) and (c). 6 Del. C. § 2708,

Synopsis ojthe Amendments. This is made manifest by subsection (e) which specifically
states that "[tlhis section shall not limit any jurisdiction otherwise existing in a court
sitting in the State and shall not affect the validity of any other choice of law provisions
in any contract, agreement or other undertaking." 6 Del. C. 9 2708(e).
It is uncontested that there is a Delaware choice of law provision in the
Agreement the parties entered into. This Delaware choice of law provision is authorized

under 6 Del. C. 5 2708(e). The Delaware statute governing choice of law in matters
regarding revolving credit provides that "[a] revolving credit plan between a bank and an
individual borrower shall be governed by the laws of this State." 5 Del. C. § 956.
Because Idaho is the forum state, I must also consider whether the choice of
Delaware law conforms to Idaho's choice of law principles. In my Memorandum
Decision and Order of September 14,2006, I held that using the Delaware choice of law
clause did not violate Idaho's choice of law principles. I am not persuaded that decision
was wrong.
Because I find I did not err in applying Delaware's law, I do not address Mr.
Capps and Ms. Carroll's discussion of the Idaho Credit Code.

V.

CONCLUSION

1. Mr. Capps' and Ms. Carroll's motion for reconsideration based on fraud bias,
unconcsionability, stealth, illusion, and deception is denied for lack of factual and
legal merit.
2. Ms. Capps' and Ms. Carroll's amended motion for reconsideration based on lack

of standing is denied as untimely.
3. The NAF arbitrators had jurisdiction over the Bank and Mr. Capps and the Bank
and Ms. Carroll because arbitration agreements existed between both the Bank
and Mr. Capps and the Bank and Ms. Carroll.
4. This jurisdiction was neither tolled nor stripped by Mr. Capps' and Ms. Carroll's
challenges to the existence of arbitration agreements between themselves and the
bank.

5. This court had subject matter jurisdiction both to determine whether an arbitration

agreement existed between the parties and to confirm the arbitration awards
against Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll pursuant to the Idaho Arbitration Act, Idaho
Code Section 7-902.
6. The parties' Delaware Choice of Law term in their Agreement is valid under
Delaware Law and is consistent with Idaho's choice of law principles; therefore,
my reliance on Delaware law in my Memorandum Decision and Order of
September 2006 was not in error.
VI.

&r

Mr. Cappss and Ms. CarroII's motions to vacate and for reconsideration and to
alter the judgment are DENIED.

ti"

It is so ORDERED, this the -day of November, 2007.

JOHN BRADBURY
DISTRICT JUDGE

/'-'

David F. Capps
Miriam G. Carroll
104 Jefferson Drive
Kamiah, ID 83536-9410
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MBNA AMERICA BANK,

MBNA AMERICA BANK,
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named appellants, David F. Capps and Miriam G. Carroll
appeal against the above named respondent to the ldaho Supreme Court
from the District Court's final MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER,
entered in the above entitled action on the 7'h day of November, 2007, and
its ORDER CONFIRMING ARBITRATION AWARD entered in the above
entitled action by the Honorable Judge John Bradbury presiding.

2.

That the parties have a right to appeal to the ldaho Supreme Court, and
that the judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are
appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule ?f(a)(l) I.A.R.

3.

Capps and Carroll intend to assert the following issues on appeal;
provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellant
from asserting other issues on appeal;
a.

Whether the trial court erred in finding that the Delaware choice of
law provision was valid in ldaho Consumer Credit Contracts under
the ldaho Credit Code.

b.

Whether the trial court erred in finding that MBNA could unilaterally
amend a Consumer Credit Contract in the State of ldaho.

c.

Whether the trial court erred in deciding that Capps' and Carroll's
motion to open limited discovery on the issue of standing was not
timely.

d.

Whether the trial court erred in finding that the National Arbitration
Forum could determine "that an arbitration agreement existed"
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between the parties once the existence of an agreement to arbitrate
was challenged.
e.

Whether the trial court erred in finding that there was an agreement
to arbitrate without a "meeting of the minds".

f.

Whether the trial court erred in finding the arbitration provision,
which was added by a negative option without effective notice did
not violate basic contract principles and was substantially and
procedurally conscionable.

g.

Whether the trial court erred in allowing Capps' and Carroll's
constitutionally protected right to a trial by jury (concerning the
original dispute) to be waived through a "negative option" without
Capps and Carroll both knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily
consenting to the waiver.

4.

No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

5.

(a)

A reporter's transcript has been requested.

(b)

The appellant requests the preparation of the following reporter's
partial transcript:
(i)

The testimony provided by Mr. Capps at the hearing on the
1 2 ' ~day of July, 2007.

6.

The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the
clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28,
I.A.R.
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Capps' PLAINTIFF'S BRlEF FOR EVlDENTlARY HEARING ON
AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE entered on the 26th day of July,
2006 (CV-36747)
Carroll's BRlEF IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO
CONFIRMATION OF AWARD LETTER dated the 27thday of June,
2006 (CV-37320)
Carroll's AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF BRlEF IN SUPPORT OF
OPPOSITION TO CONFIRMATION OF AWARD LETTER dated
the 27thday of June, 2006 (CV-37320)
Capps' AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S BRlEF FOR
EVlDENTlARY HEARING ON AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE
dated the 251h day of July, 2006 (CV-36747)
Carroll's AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S BRlEF FOR
EVlDENTlARY ON AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE dated the 25th
day of July, 2006 (CV-36747)
Capps' and Carroll's POST HEARING MEMORANDUM
REBUTTAL dated the 1 7 ' ~day of August, 2006 (CV-36747)
Carroll's DEFENDANT'S BRlEF IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION
TO CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION AWARD dated the 5'h day
of September, 2006 (CV-37320)
Carroll's AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION dated the

lothday of October, 2006 (CV-

36747)
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NOTICE OF APPEAL
-XL

-

I.

Capps' and Carroll's AMENDED MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION dated the

lothday of October, 2006 (CV-

36747).
1.

Capps' and Carroll's REBUTTAL OF POST HEARING
MEMORANDUM BY MBNA dated the 6'h day of November, 2006
(CV-36747).

k.

Capps' and Carroll's POST HEARING MEMORANDUM dated the
13thday of November, 2006 (CV-36747).

I.

day of
The District Court's NOTICE OF HEARING dated the llth
January, 2007 (CV-36747).

m.

Capps' and Carroll's PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF ON APPLICABILITY OF
5 DEL. CODE § 956 dated the 1 8 ' ~day of January, 2007 (CV36747).

n.

Carroll's DEFENDANT'S BRIEF ON APPLICABILITY OF DEL
CODE § 956 dated the 25thday of January, 2007 (CV-37320).

o.

Capps' BRIEF ON THE APPLICABILITY OF DELAWARE LAW
AND THE IDAHO CREDIT CODE dated the 1 5 ' ~day of February,
2007 including exhibits (CV-36747)

p.

Capps' and Carroll's ADDENDUM TO THE BRIEF ON THE
APPLICABILITY OF DELAWARE LAW AND THE IDAHO CREDIT
CODE dated the 2" day of March, 2007 including exhibits (CV36747).

NOTICE OF APPEAL

4 iDa i .*3
6

Pg. 5 of 8.

q.

Capps' and Carroll's REBUTTAL OF PLAINTIFF'S
MEMORANDUM BY MBNA AMERICA BANK IN OPPOSITION TO
CONTINUING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION dated the l g t h
day of March, 2007 (CV-36747).

r.

Capps' and Carroll's POST HEARING MOTION TO OPEN
LIMITED DISCOVERY ON THE ISSUE OF STANDING dated the
24thday of May, 2007 (CV-36747).

s.

Capps' and Carroll's MEMORANDUM ON COURT JURISDICTION
COVERING DISCOVERY ON STANDING ISSUE dated the 23rd
day of July, 2007 (CV-36747).

t.

Capps' and Carroll's MOTION TO VACATE VOID JUDGMENT
dated the 23'* day of July, 2007 (CV-36747).

u.

Capps' SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT entered the

lothday of

August, 2007 (CV-36747).
v.

Carroll's SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT entered the 10th day of
August, 2007 (CV-36747).

7.

1 certify:
(a)

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the
reporter.

(b)

(1)

[]

That the clerk of the district court has been paid the

estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript.
(2)

[I

That the appellant is exempt from paying the

estimated transcript fee because
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(c)

(1)

[]

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's

record has been paid.
(2)

[]

That the appellant is exempt from paying the

estimated fee for the preparation of the record because
(d)

(1)

[]

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

(2)

[]

That the appellant is exempt from paying the

appellate filing fee because
(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to Rule 20.

Dated this /-day

of November, 2007.

(\
Miriam G. Carroll

State of Idaho

1

County of ldaho

)
)

ss

David F. Capps and Miriam G. Carroll being duly sworn, depose and say:
That the parties are the appellants in the above-entitled appeal and that all
statements in this notice of appeal are true and correct to the best of his and her
knowledge and belief.
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G.C--

Miriam G. Carroll

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

day of November, 2007.

My commission exptres

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
certify, under penalty of perjury, that I mailed a
OF APPEAL to the following parties this
addresses:

Jeffrey M. Wilson
Wilson & McColl
420 W. Washington
P.O. Box 1544
Boise, ID 83701
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From-IDAHO COUNTY DIST COURT

12089832378

IN THB WlSTlirCT COURT OF THE

T-585

P 001

F-128

DISTNCT OF

IDAHO, IN AND
O'CLOCK

I

MWAM G. CARROLL,
Plaintiff,
VS.

Case No.: CV 36747

MBNA &ERICA BAN&
Defendant.

j
MBNA AMERICA BANK,
Plaintiff,
VS.

ORDER FOR CONSOLIDATION

I

DAVD F. CAPPS,
defend an^.

MBNA AMEfUCA BANK,
Plaintiff,
VS.

Case No. CV 37320

MIRIAM G. C r n O L L ,
Defendant.

IT IS I-IEREBY ORDERED that case number CV 37320 shall be joined with case

numbcr CV 36747. All &&her pleading and filings shall be filed in case number CV 36747.
Dorte this November @ ,2007.
h

JOHN BRADBURY
DISTRICT JUDGE

ORDER FOR CONSOLIDATION

URT
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IDAHO COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

David F. Capps
Miriam G. Carroll
104 Jefferson Drive
Kamiah, ID 83536-9410
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
MIRIAM G CARROLL,

1
)

Platnt~ffIAppellant,
vs
MBNA AMERICA BANK,
DefendanffRespondent,

1
)
)
)
)
)
)

Docket No 34765
AMENDED NOTICE OF
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

1
MBNA AMERICA BANK,
Platnttffl Respondent,
VS.

DAVID F CAPPS,

)
)

Idaho DC Docket # 05-36747

1
)
)
)
)

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, MBNA AMERICA BANK AND THE
PARTY'S ATTORNEY,
JEFFREY M. WILSON ISB#1615
WILSON & McCOLL
420 W. WASHINGTON
P.O. BOX 1544
BOISE, ID 83701
AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT.
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named appellants, David F. Capps and Miriam G. Carroll
appeal against the above named respondent to the ldaho Supreme Court
from the District Court's final MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER,
entered in the above entitled action on the 7thday of November, 2007, and
its ORDER CONFIRMING ARBITRATION AWARD entered in the above
entitled action by the Honorable Judge John Bradbury presiding.

2.

That the parties have a right to appeal to the ldaho Supreme Court, and
that the judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are
appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule IlfaKlfll(a)(8) I.A.R.

3.

Capps and Carroll intend to assert the following issues on appeal;
provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellant
from asserting other issues on appeal;
a.

Whether the trial court erred in finding that the Delaware choice of
law provision was valid in ldaho Consumer Credit Contracts under
the Idaho Credit Code.

b.

Whether the trial court erred in finding that MBNA could unilaterally
arnend a Consumer Credit Contract in the State of ldaho.

c.

Whether the tr~alcourt erred in deciding that Capps' and Carroll's
motion to open limited discovery on the issue of standing was not
timely.

d.

Whether the trial court erred in finding that the National Arbitration
Forum could determine "that an arbitration agreement existed"
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between the parties once the existence of an agreement to arbitrate
was challenged.
e.

Whether the trial court erred in finding that there was an agreement
to arbitrate without a "meeting of the minds".

f.

Whether the trial court erred in finding the arbitration provision,
which was added by a negative option without effective notice did
not violate basic contract principles and was substantially and
procedurally conscionable.

g.

Whether the trial court erred in allowing Capps' and Carroll's
constitutionally protected right to a trial by jury (concerning the
original dispute) to be waived through a "negative option" without
Capps and Carroll both knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily
consenting to the waiver.

4.

Noorder has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.

5.

(a)

A reporter's transcript has been requested.

(b)

The appellant requests the preparation of the following reporter's
partial transcript:
(i)

The testimony provided by Mr. Capps at the hearing on the
12'h day of July, 2007.

6.

The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the
clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under .Rule 28,
I.A.R.
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Capps' PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF FOR EVlDENTlARY HEARING ON
AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE entered on the 26th day of July,
2006 (CV-36747)
Carroll's BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO
CONFIRMATION OF AWARD LETTER dated the 27Ih day of June,
2006 (CV-37320)
Carroll's AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
OPPOSITION TO CONFIRMATION OF AWARD LETTER dated
' of
~ June, 2006 (CV-37320)
the ~ 7day
Capps' AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF FOR
EVlDENTlARY HEARING ON AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE
dated the 25" day of July, 2006 (CV-36747)
Carroll's AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF FOR
EVlDENTlARY ON AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE dated the 25'h
day of July, 2006 (CV-36747)
Capps' and Carroll's POST HEARING MEMORANDUM
REBUTTAL dated the 1 7 ' ~day of August, 2006 (CV-36747)
Carroll's DEFENDANT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION
TO CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION AWARD dated the 5'h day
of September, 2006 (CV-37320)
Carroll's AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION dated the

lothday of October, 2006 (CV-

36747)
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Capps' and Carroll's AMENDED MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION dated the

lothday of October, 2006 (CV-

36747)
Capps' and Carroll's REBUTTAL OF POST HEARING
MEMORANDUM BY MBNA dated the 6Ih day of November, 2006
(CV-36747)
Capps' and Carroll's POST HEARING MEMORANDUM dated the
1 3 ' ~day of November, 2006 (CV-36747)
day of
The Dlstr~ctCourt's NOTICE OF HEARING dated the 1lth
January, 2007 (CV-36747)
Capps' and Carroll's PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF ON APPLICABILITY OF
5 DEL CODE 3 956 dated the 1 8 ' ~day of January, 2007 (CV36747)
Carroll's DEFENDANT'S BRIEF ON APPLICABILITY OF DEL
CODE $j 956 dated the 2fjthday of January, 2007 (CV-37320)
Capps' BRIEF ON THE APPLICABILITY OF DELAWARE LAW
AND THE IDAHO CREDIT CODE dated the 1 5 ' ~day of February,
2007 rncludlng exh~blts(CV-36747)
Capps' and Carroll's ADDENDUM TO THE BRIEF ON THE
APPLICABILITY OF DELAWARE LAW AND THE IDAHO CREDIT
(CVCODE dated the 2"d day of March, 2007 including exh~b~ts
36747)
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q.

Capps' and Carroll's REBUTTAL OF PLAINTIFF'S
MEMORANDUM BY MBNA AMERICA BANK IN OPPOSITION TO
CONTINUING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION dated the 1 9 ' ~
day of March, 2007 (CV-36747).

r.

Capps' and Carroll's POST HEARING MOTION TO OPEN
LIMITED DISCOVERY ON THE ISSUE OF STANDING dated the
24'h day of May, 2007 (CV-36747).

s.

Capps' and Carroll's MEMORANDUM ON COURT JURISDICTION
COVERING DISCOVERY ON STANDING ISSUE dated the 23rd
day of July, 2007 (CV-36747).

t.

Capps' and Carroll's MOTION TO VACATE VOID JUDGMENT
dated the 23rdday of July, 2007 (CV-36747).

u.

Capps' SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT entered the

lothday of

August, 2007 (CV-36747).
v.

Carroll's SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT entered the 10th day of
August, 2007 (CV-36747).

7.

1 certify:
(a)

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the
reporter.

(b)

(1)

[1

That the clerk of the district court has been paid the

estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript.
(2)

[I

That the appellant is exempt from paying the

estimated transcript fee because
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(c)

(1)

[1

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's

record has been paid.
(2)

[I

That the appellant is exempt from paying the

estimated fee for the preparation of the record because
(d)

(1)

[XI

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

(2)

[I

That the appellant is exempt from paying the

appellate filing fee because
(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to Rule 20.

Miriam G. Carroll

State of Idaho
County of ldaho

)

1

SS.

)

David F. Capps and Miriam G. Carroll being duly sworn, depose and say:
That the parties are the appellants in the above-entitled abpeal and that all
statements in this notice of appeal are true and correct to the best of his and her
knowledge and belief.
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((

Miriam G. Carroll

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

6fh

be
day of NorrembA. 2007,

My commission expires:

Seal
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, David F. Capps, hereby certify, under penalty of perjury, that I mailed a
true and correct copy of this NOTICE OF APPEAL to the following parties this
at the following addresses:

Jeffrey M. Wilson
Wilson & McColl
420 W. Washington
P.O. Box 1544
Boise, ID 83701
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
Miriam G. Carroll
~laintiff/Appellant,
MBNA America Bank,
Defendant/Respondent

)
)
)
)
)
)

MBNA America Bank,
Plaintiff/Respondent

)
)
)

VS

.

vs .
David F. Capps,
Defendant/Appellant

Supreme Court No. 3 4 7 6 5
NOTICE

)
)
)
)
)

Notice is hereby given that the document requested by
the appellants "Carroll's DEFENDANT'S BRIEF ON APPLICABILITY OF
DEL. CODE

§

9 5 6 dated the 25th day of January, 2 0 0 7

(CV-37320)

,"

is not included in this clerk's record as it is not on file in
Case No. CV 3 7 3 2 0 .
Done this l l t hDecember 2 0 0 7 .
ROSE E. GENRING, CLERK

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, the undersigned Deputy Clerk of the above entitled
Court, do hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed
or delivered by me on \d ((.0'1 to:

Jeffrey M. Wilson
Attorney at Law
PO Box 1544
Boise, ID 83701
David F. Capps
Miriam G. Carroll
104 Jefferson Drive
Kamiah, ID 83536
ROSE E. GEHRING, CLERK
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Hearing Scheduled (~otio; 04/13/2006 03:30
PM)
Request for Continuance
John Bradbury

4/6/2006

CONT

KATHYJ

KATHYJ
2/24/2006

Hearing result for Motion held on 04/13/2006
03:30 PM: Continued

3'28

John Bradbury

John Bradbury
John Bradbury

John Bradbury

-
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Time:
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ROA Report
Case: CV-2005-0036747 Current Judge: John Bradbury
Miriam G Carroll vs. MBNA America Bank. NA

Miriam G Carroll vs. MBNA America Bank. NA
Date

Code

User

4/6/2006

HRSC

KATHYJ

NOTC

Judge
John Bradbury

KATHYJ

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/04/2006 09:OO
AM)
Notice of Continuance

John Bradbury

NOTC

ZIMMER

Notice of Service

John Bradbury

LODG

KATHYJ

CONS

KATHYJ

Answering Brief to Motion for Summary Judgment John Bradbury
John Bradbury
Order Consolidating (w/CV 36827)

INHD

KATHYJ

MlSC

KATHYJ

Hearing result for Motion held on 05/04/2006
09:OO AM: lnterim Hearing Held
PreTrial Statement

John Bradbury

AFFD

KATHYJ

Affidavit in Support of Writ of Execution

John Bradbury

WRIT

KATHYJ

Writ Issued

John Bradbury

MlSC

KATHYJ

Pretrial Stipulation

INHD

HOLMAN

CONS

HOLMAN

Hearing result for Pretrial held on 0511112006
02:30 PM: lnterim Hearing Held
Consolidation Of Files (with CV 06-37201)

John Bradbury
John Bradbury

CONT

HOLMAN

HRSC

HOLMAN

HRSC

HOLMAN

ORDR

KATHYJ

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 05/30/2006
08:30 AM: Continued
Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 08/10/2006
08:30 AM)
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial 06/22/2006 03:30
PM)
Amended Scheduling order

ORDR

KATHYJ

Amended Scheduling Order

John Bradbury

ORDR

KATHYJ

Memorandum Decision and Order

John Bradbury

NOTS

KATHYJ

Notice of Service

John Bradbury

NOTS

KATHYJ

Notice of Service

John Bradbury

STIP

KATHYJ

Pretrial Stipulation

John Bradbury

STIP

KATHYJ

Amended Pretrial Stipulation

John Bradbury

CONT

KATHYJ

Hearing Continued

John Bradbury

HRSC

KATHYJ

John Bradbury

INHD

KATHYJ

HRVC

KATHYJ

NOTC

KATHYJ

Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial 06/23/2006 09:OO
AM)
Hearing result for Pretrial held on 06/23/2006
09:OO AM: lnterim Hearing Held
Hearing result for Court Trial held on 08/10/2006
08:30 AM: Hearing Vacated
Notice of Stipulation to bench trial

NHRG

KATHYJ

Notice Of Hearing

John Bradbury

HRSC

KATHYJ

Hearing Scheduled (~videhiary08/10/2006
08:30 AM)
Objection to Wording of the Proposed pre-trial
Order

John Bradbury

KATHYJ

John Bradbury

John Bradbury
John Bradbury
John Bradbury
John Bradbury
John Bradbury

John Bradbury
John Bradbury
John Bradbury

John Bradbury

-

Second Judicial District Court Idaho County

Date: 1/3012008
Time:

QAM
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ROA Report
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Case. CV-2005-0036747 Current Judge: John Bradbury
Miriam G Carroll vs. MBNA America Bank, NA

Miriam G Carroll vs. ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ~ mBank,
e r NA
i c a
Date

Code

User

712612006

MISC

KATHYJ

AFFD

KATHYJ

AFFD

KATHYJ

8/3/2006

ORDR

KATHYJ

811012006

INHD

KATHYJ

ADVS

KATHYJ

811412006

MlSC

KATHYJ

Hearing result for Evidentiary held on 0811012006 John Bradbury
08:30 AM: Interim Hearing Held
John Bradbury
Case Taken Under Advisement
John Bradbury
Post Hearing Memorandum

811712006

MlSC

KATHYJ

Post Hearing Memorandum Rebuttal

John Bradbury

911412006

CDlS

KATHYJ

CIVIL DISPOSITION

John Bradbury

911512006

MEMO

KATHYJ

Memorandum Decision and Order

John Bradbury

9/28/2006

MOTN

KATHYJ

Motion for Reconsideration

John Bradbury

NOTC

KATHYJ

Notice of Motion

John Bradbury

NHRG

KATHYJ

Notice Of Hearing

John Bradbury

HRSC

KATHYJ

John Bradbury

AFFD

KATHYJ

AFFD

KATHYJ

CERT

KATHYJ

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 1012612006 02:OO
PM)
Affidavit of Ammount Due as to Miriam Carroll
Only
Affidavit for Attorney's Fees as to Miriam Carroll
Only
Certificate Of Mailing as to Miriam carroll Only

John Bradbury

AFFD

KATHYJ

Affidavit of Amount Due as to David Capps Only

John Bradbury

AFFD

KATHYJ

John Bradbury

MEMO

KATHYJ

Affidavit for Attorney's Fees as to David Capps
Only
Memorandum of Costs as to David Capps Only

CERT

KATHYJ

Certificate Of Mailing as to David Capps Only

John Bradbury

HOLMAN

Amended Motion for Reconsideration

John Bradbury

Memorandum of MBNA America Bank, N. A. in
opposition to motion for Reconsideration
~emorandumby MBNAAmerica Bnk, N.A. in
Opposition to Amended Motion for
R$consideration
Rebuttal to memorandum by MBNA America
Bank, N.A. in Opposition to Amended Motion for
Recondiseration
Memorandum by MBNA America Bank, NA in
Opposition to Amneded Motion for
Reconsideration
Hearing result for Motion held on 10/2612006
02:OO PM: Hearing Held

John Bradbury

.

10/10/2006

MlSC

1011712006

MEMO

HOLMAN

1011912006

MEMO

KATHYJ

1012312006

MlSC

KATHYJ

1012612006

MEMO

HRHD

a

KATHYJ

KATHYJ

Plaintiffs Brief for evidenfiary Hearing on
Agreement to Arbitrate
Affidavit in Support of plaintiffs brief for
Evidentiaty hearing on Agreement to Arbitrate
Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs Brief for
Evidentiary on Agreement to Arbitrate
Pretrial Order

388

3ohn Bradbury
John Bradbury
John Bradbury
John Bradbury

John Bradbury
John Bradbury

John Bradbury

John Bradbury

John Bradbury

John Bradbury

John Bradbury

-
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Miriam G Carroll vs. MBNA America Bank, NA

Miriam G Carroll vs. MBNA America Bank, NA
Date

Code

User

10/30/2006

MEMO

KATHYJ

11/6/2006

MlSC

KATHYJ

11/14/2006

MEMO

KATHYJ

1111/2007

HRSC

KATHYJ

NHRG

KATHYJ

MlSC

KATHYJ

111812007

KATHYJ

Judge
John Bradbury
post-hearing Memorandum by Plaintiff in
Opposition to Amended Motion for
Reconsideration
Rebuttal of Post-hearing Memorandum by MBNA John Bradbury
Post-Hearing Memorandum
John Bradbury
Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument 01/25/2007 John Bradbury
12:OO PM)
Notice Of Hearing
John Bradbury
Plaintiffs Brief on Applciability of 5 Del. Code
S956
Hearing result for Oral Argument held on
01/25/2007 12:OO PM: Interim Hearing Held

John Bradbury
John Bradbury

2/8/2007

NOTC

KATHYJ

Notice of Joinder

John Bradbury

2120l2007

MlSC

KATHYJ

John Bradbury

3/2/2007

MlSC

KATHYJ

3/16/2007

MEMO

KATHYJ

3/20/2007

MlSC

KATHYJ

4/2/2007

MEMO

KATHYJ

411612007

MISC

KATHYJ

5/24/2007

MOTN

KATHYJ

NOTC

KATHYJ

NHRG

KATHYJ

Brief on the Applicability of Delaware Law and the
ldaho Credit Code
Addendum to the Brief on the Applicability of
Delaware Law and the ldaho Credit Code
Memorandum by Mbna America Bank in
Opposition to Continuing Motion for
Reconsideration
Rebuttal of Plaintiffs Memorandum bu MBNA
America Bank in Opposition to Continuing Motion
for Reconsideration
Supplemental Memorandum to Amended Motion
for Reconsideration
Response by MBNA America Bank to Latest
Supplemental Memorandum from Carroll Capps
Post-Hearing Motion to Open Limited Discovery
on the lssue of Standing
Notice of Post-Hearing Motion to Open Limited
Discovery on the issue of Standing
Notice Of Hearing

KATHYJ

5/25/2007

HRSC

6/8/2007

MlSC

KATHYJ

6/21/2007

HRHD

KATHYJ

6/22/2007

HRSC

KATHYJ

NHRG

, KATHYJ

711212007

HRHD

KATHYJ

7/23/2007

MEMO

KATHYJ

'

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/21/2007 01:30
PM)
Opposition to Post-Hearing Motion to Open
Limited Discovery in the lssue of Standing
Hearing result for Motion held on 06/21/2007
01?30PM: Hearing Held
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/12/2007 11:OO
AM)
Notice Of Hearing
,
Hearing result for Motion held on 07/12/2007
11:OO AM: Hearing Held
Memorandum on Court Jurisdiction Covering
Discovery on Standing lssue

John Bradbury
John Bradbury

John Bradbury

John Bradbury
John Bradbury
John Bradbury
John Bradbuw
John Bradbury
John Bradbury
John Bradbury
John Bradbury
John Bradbury
John Bradbury
John Bradbury
John Bradbury

-

Date: 1/30/2008
Time: '

'jAM
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Second Judicial District Court Idaho County
ROA Report
Case: CV-2005-0036747 Current Judge: John Bradbury
Miriam G Carroll vs. MBNA America Bank. NA

Miriam G Carroll vs. MBNA America Bank, NA
Judge

Date

Code

User

7/23/2007

MOTN

KATHYJ

Motion to Vacate Void Judgment

John Bradbury

NOTC

KATHYJ

Notice of Motion

John Bradbury

NHRG

KATHYJ

Notice Of Hearing

John Bradbury

7/24/2007

HRSC

KATHYJ

John Bradbury

8/3/2007

MlSC

KATHYJ

Hearing Scheduled (Adjudicatory Hearing
08/09/2007 02:30 PM)
Opposition to Motion to Vacate Void Judgment

8110/2007

HRHD

KATHYJ

John Bradbuw

AFFD

KATHYJ

Hearing result for Adjudicatory Hearing held on
08/09/2007 02:30 PM: Hearing Held
Supplemental Affidavit (2)

MlSC

KATHYJ

NHRG

KATHYJ

HRSC

KATHYJ

HRHD

KATHYJ

DEOP

811712007

John Bradbury

John Bradbury

Opposition to Supplemental Affidavits of Miriam
G. Carroll and David F. Capps
Notice Of Hearing

John Bradbuw

John Bradbury

KATHYJ

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/04/2007 01:30
PM)
Hearing result for Motion held on 10/04/2007
01:30 PM: Hearing Held
Memorandum Decision and Order

CERT

KATHYJ

Certificate Of Mailing

John Bradbury

MEMO

KATHYJ

Amended Memorandum Decision and Order

John Bradbury

CERT

KATHYJ

Certificate Of Mailing

John Bradbury

COUNTER

John Bradbury

John Bradbury
John Bradbury

MOTN

ZIMMER

John Bradbury
Filing: T - Civil Appeals To The Supreme Court
($86.00 Directly to Supreme Court Plus this
amount to the District Court) Paid by: Carroll,
Miriam G (plaintiff) Receipt number: 01 19865
Dated: 11/15/2007 Amount: $15.00 (Check) For:
Carroll, Miriam G (plaintiff)
John Bradbury
Motion to Vacate Void Judgment (Verified)

NOTC

ZIMMER

Notice of Motion

John Bradbury

ORDR

ZIMMER

Appeal Order

John Bradbury

ORDR

ZIMMER

John Bradbury

ORDR

KATHYJ

Declination to consider Motion for Want of
Consideration
Appeal Order

John Bradbury

ORDR

KATHYJ

Order for Consolidation

John Bradbury

MlSC

KATHYJ

Amended Notice of Interlocutory Appeal

John Bradbury

12/13/2007

BNDC

COUNTER

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 120279 Dated
12/13/2007 for 200.00)

John Bradbury

12/20/2007

AFFD

HALL

Affidavit of Attorney's Fees

John Bradbury

COST

HALL

Memorandum Of Costs

John Bradbury

AFFD

HALL

Affidavit of Amount Due

John Bradbury

JDMT

KATHYJ

Judgment

John Bradbury

CERT

KATHYJ

Certificate Of Mailing

John Bradbury

CDlS

KATHYJ

CIVIL DISPOSITIONc
...

John Bradbury

12/27/2007
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
Miriam G. Carroll,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs .
MBNA America Bank,
Defendant/Respondent
MBNA America Bank,
Plaintiff/Respondent
vs .
David F. Capps,
Defendant/Appellant
STATE OF IDAHO

)

County of Idaho

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court No. 34765
Idaho County No. CV 05-36747
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
RE: EXHIBITS

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

I, Rose E. Gehring, Clerk of the District Court of the
Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the
County of Idaho, hereby certify that the following are all the
exhibits admitted or rejected to-wit:
NO EXHIBITS WERE OFFERED IN THIS CASE.
Dated

January 2008.
ROSE E. GEHRING, Clerk

BY:

ddgyrn

Deputy Clerk
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE RE: EXHIBITS - 1
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
Miriam G. Carroll,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs .
MBNA America Bank,
Defendant/Respondent

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IDAHO COUNTY NO. CV 05-36747
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

MBNA America Bank,
Plaintiff/Respondent

David F. Capps
Defendant/Appellant
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Idaho

)
)
)

I, Rose E. Gehring, Clerk of the District Court of the
Second Judicial District, of the State of Idaho, in and for the
County of Idaho, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing
Record in the above entitled cause was corr~piledand bound under my
direction, and is a true, full and correct Record of the pleadings
and documents as are automatically required under Rule 28 of the
Idaho Appellate Rules.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE - 1

I, do further certify, that all exhibits, offered or
admitted in the above entitled cause, will be duly lodged with the
Clerk of

the Supreme Court along with the court reporter's

transcript and the clerk's record, as required by Rule 31 of the
Idaho Appellate Rules.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and
affixed the seal of said Court at Grangeville, Idaho, this 30th day
of January 2008.
ROSE

$3.

GEHRING, CLERK

BY:

-c'

Deputy Clerk

, .... .,"..

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

-

2

,'

JEFFREY M. WILSON, ISB No. 1615
LISA B. RASMUSSEN, ISB No. 4931
WILSON McCOLL & RASMUSSEN
420 W. Washington
P.O. Box 1544
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: 208-345-9100
Facsimile: 208-384-0442
Attorneys for Plaintiff
JN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, JN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LEWIS

In the Arbitration of:
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A.,
APPLICATION FOR
CONFIRMATION OF
ARBITRATION AWARD

Plaintiff,
VS.

FEE CATEGORY: A1
FILJNG FEE: $82.00

DAVID F CAPPS,
Defendant.

!

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A., by and through is counsel
of record, and hereby moves this court, pursuant to Idaho Code 9 7-91 1, for confirmation of the
arbitration award against the Defendant David F Capps and in support states as follows:
1,

That the Plaintiff is now and at all times pertinent hereto was a foreign

corporation with its principal place of business located outside the State of Idaho.
This communication is from a debt collector, the purpose of which is to
collect a debt; any information obtained may be used for that purpose
APPLICATION FOR CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION AWARD

-

1

2.

The Defendant now and at all pertinent times hereto resided in LEWIS County,

3.

That the Defendant entered into an credit card agreement with the Plaintiff

Idaho.

whereby the Plaintiff agreed to extend a revolving line of credit to the Defendant for cash
advances or the purchase of goods and services. The account was assigned account no.

XXXX-

xxxx-xxxx-4374.
4.

The agreement includes a provision to the effect that any dispute arising out of the

agreement, its performance or breach, can be submitted to arbitration by the National Arbitration
Forum.

The arbitration hearing is to occur within the federal district that includes the

Defendant's billing address at the time the claim was filed. A copy of the National Arbitration
Forum Rules of Procedure are available at www.arb-forum.com or by contacting Plaintiffs
counsel.
5.

That the Defendant breached the agreement by failing to pay the minimum

monthly installment as called for in the agreement.
6.

The Plaintiff submitted the matter to arbitration by the National Arbitration

Forum as specified in the agreement. Following its procedure, a notice of arbitration was served
upon the Defendant.
7.

The arbitrator entered an award in favor of the Plaintiff in the sum of $28156.49.

A true and correct copy of the arbitrator's award is attached hereto as Exhibit "A".
8.

Neither party has sought to vacate or modify the award per Idaho Code 5 7-912 or

Idaho Code § 7-913.
This communication is from a debt collector, the purpose of which is to
collect a debt; any information obtained may be used for that purpose
APPLICATION FOR CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION AWARD

-

2

9.

The arbitration award remains unpaid.

10.

The Plaintiff is entitled to a judicial confirmation of an arbitration award pursuant

to Idaho Code 3 7-911.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff applies for relief as follows:

1.

That the arbitration award be confirmed;

2.

For a money judgment in the sum of $28156.49.

3.

For Plaintiffs reasonable attorney's fees incurred herein pursuant to Idaho
Code 3 12-120(3), in the amount of $500.00 should this matter be uncontested;
otherwise, the sum of $135.00 per hour for the time expended on behalf of
Plaintiff herein, should said action be contested;

4.

For Plaintiffs costs incurred herein; and,

5.

For such other and further relief as to the Court may appear just.

DATED this2day

of December, 2005.
WILSON McCOLL & RASMUSSEN

This communication is from a debt collector, the purpose of which is to
collect a debt; any information obtained may be used for that purpose
APPLICATION FOR CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION AWARD

-

3

NATYQNAL

ARBITMION
FORUM.
MBNA America Bank, N.A.
C/OWolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P.
Attorneys in the Practice of Debt Collection
702 King Farm Blvd, Two Irvington Centre
Rockville, MD 20850-5775
CLAIMANT(s),
:

AWARD
MBNA America Bank, N.A. v David F Capps
File Number: FA0506000498945
Claimant File Number: 5490353603674374

David F Capps
Hc 1 1 Box 366
Kamiah, ID 83536-0000

The undersigned Arbitrator in this case FWDS:
That no known conflict of interest exists.
That on or before 06/16/2005 the Parties entered into a1agreement providing that this matter shall be
resolved through binding arbitration in accordance with the Forum Code of Procedure.
That the Claimant has filed a Claim with the Forum and served it on the Respondent in accordance with Rule 6.
That the Respondent has filed a Response with the Forum and served it on the Claimant.
That the matter has proceeded in accord with the applicable Forum Code of Procedure.
The Parties have had tile opportunity to present all evidence and information to the Arbitrator.
That the Arbitrator has reviewed all evidence and information submitted in this case.
That the informatio~~
and evidence submitted supports the issuance of an Award as stated.
Therefore, the Arbitrator ISSUES:
An Award in favor of the Claimant, for a total amount of $28,156.49.
Entered and Affirmed in the State of Idaho

%a
Honorable Cathy R Silak
Arbitrator

Date: 09/30/2005

.

~

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND CERTTFICATE
O F SERVICE
This Award was duly entered and the Forum hereby
above referenced

lDAHOCOUNw DISTRICT C(

AT^

FILED

O'CLOCK~.M.

2G 21186
ROSE E. GEHRING

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
DAVID F. CAPPS,
Plaintiff,
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A.,
Defendant,

)
)
)

Case No. 36827

)
)
)
)

ORDER CONSOLIDATING
CASE NO. 36827 INTO
CASE NO. 36747

Having reviewed the parties and issues of the two cases involved, the
Plaintiffs Motion to Combine cases is hereby GRANTED. The court hereby
orders Case No. 36827 be consolidated into Case No. 36747, and that they both
proceed to trial according to the Scheduling Order issued by this court for case
No. 36747.

Dated this

day of April, 2006.

'r

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The Clerk of the District Court hereby certifies that I have served @p
order
of the court on each of the parties involved by regular U.S. Mail this (;13day of
April, 2006, at the following addresses:
David F. Capps
HC-11 BOX366
Kamiah. ID 83536
Miriam G. Carroll
HC-I 1 BOX366
Kamiah, ID 83536
Jeffrey M. Wilson
Wilson, McColl & Rasmussen
420 W. Washington
P.O. Box 1544
Boise, ID 83701

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MIRIAM G. CARROLL,
DAVID F. CAPPS,
VS

.

Plaintiff,

MBNA AMERICA BANK,
Defendant.
MBNA AMERICA BANK,
Plaintiff,
vs .

)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 36747

ORDER FOR CONSOLIDATION

Case No. CV 37201

1
)
)
)

DAVID F. CAPPS,
Defendant.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that case number CV 37201 shall
be joined with case number CV 36747.

All further pleadings and

filings shall be filed in case number CV 36747.
Done this May

u,

2006

ORDER FOR CONSOLIDATION

. .

3$2

I, the undersigned Deputy Clerk of the above entitled
Court, do hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed
to:
or delivered by me on 5--1(-&
MBNA America Bank
c/o Wilson, McColl
P.O. Box 1544
Boise, ID 83701

&

Rasmussen

David Capps
HC-11 Box 366
Kamiah, ID 83536
Miriam Carroll
HC-11 Box 366
Kamiah. ID 83536
/--^ROSE; E. GEHRING, CLERK
L@ ,&kt&-.-

Deputy

ORDER FOR CONSOLIDATION
." t

!
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.
,
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... ,
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i
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JEFFREYM. WILSON, ISB NO. i6i5
WILSON & McCOLL
420 W. Washington
P.O. Box 1544
. .
.
,
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: 208-345-9100
..'
Attorney for Defendant

'..

"e.

IDAHO COUMY
DISTRICTCOUFK
FILED

ATY:D I

o'cLOCKR.M.

AWG 14' 2006
,

.

,

IN TI-IE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

1

DAVID CAPPS,

1
Plaintiff,

1
1

vs.

1
1

MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A.,

Case No. CV 05-36747

MIRIAM CARROLL,
Plaintiff,

j
1

VS.

MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A.
Defendant.

1
1
1
1
)

COMES NOW the above-named Defendant, MBNA America Bank, N.A., by and through its
counsel, and submits the following Post I-Iearing Memorandum with respect to this matter.

-

POST HEARING MEMORANDUM 1

--I I

3$4

R w g ' 1 4 06 08: 58a

W i 2 y o n & McCoII

(20.?1384-0442

,

!

1
,

,

',

. . ..

:

Per the Court's Pre-Trial 0rde'r filed August 03,2006, this matter was set for an Evidentiary
Hearing on thcse consolidated cascs on the issue of the existence ofa binding arbitration agree~~leiit
between these parties. The Pre-Trial Order fi~rtherstates if the Court so finds the existence of such
agreement the Arbitration Awards shall be confim~ed,if not, the matter will proceed to trial at a date
as yet to be determined. MBNA America Bank, N.A. presented the testimony of its witness, Michael
<

2

Milnes that uucquivocaIIy established the following:
1.

That as to the Defendant Capps, he opened a cardholder agreement with
MBNA, which cardholder agreement
was subsequently ameuded to
,< .
a:.:
'
.
,I<
'

include an arbitration provision;
...

. , a ,

2.

$

:,.: : , ,

That the origi~lalcardholder agreement and the amended cardholder
;. ..: : r .

.... ,. ,.

.;

,,

agreement were mailed to Mr. Capps at the address indicated at the time
.

;

..

.

,.

,

of opening the account;
3.

',.,

.

, , ,

,.

.:'

That at no time did Mr. Capps advise MBNA of a change in address of his
account;

4.

That throughout the life of the account there were more that one occasion
.

, .,,

where representatiires of m N A had'ti?&plionic contact with Mr. Capps
. < ,.. . , .

,

.

confim~inghis address and phone number;
5.

That in conjunction with forwarding the amended cardholder agreement
,!

:.

.

,'.

,

contilining the arbhtion provision, Mr. Capps was advised in writing of
. .. .
his right to "opt*
out" of the arbitriilbn
provision in the amended
,
.
..
,
,

. i

.

. ,. .,.. .

'

cardholder agreement;
6.

That Mr. Capps hidnot iotify MBWl:of his desire to "opt out" of the
.. :i.,,

. , 3 ,i

amended cardholder
agreement;
. .. . .
.,<;,.:

t

M S T HPARMG MBMOR*NDUM - 2

, . . . 'L
,. ...,.

...I

."

3 $)5

i i

.

'
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That Mr. Capps continued to use the MBNA card;
That as to the Defendant Carroll, at the time she opened her MBNA
account, it was already subject to the amended cardholder agreement
providing for arbitration;
9.

That a copy of such cardholder agreement was mailed to Ms. Carroll at the
time of opening her account;

10.

That the amended cardholder agreement was mailed to Ms. Carroll at the
address she provided at the time of opening such account;

11.

That at no time did Ms. Carroll advise of any change in her address;

12.

That thereafter, on several occasions, MBNA had telephonic contact with
Ms. Carroil wherein she confirmed her address; and,

13.

That, afier receipt of the cardholder agreement requiring arbitration, Ms.
Carroll continued to incur charges on her MBNA credit card.

The Court has admitted into evidence the amended cardholder agreement containing the
arbitration provision, as well as the "opt out letter" (see Plaintiffs Exhibits 1 and 2).
Neither, Ms. Carroll or Mr. Capps offered any testimony rebutting the testimony of MBNA
wilness Michael Milnes. Inslead, Defendaxit Capps read excerpts from what appeaied to be.-s

&m

briefing andlor other authority he had previously filed with the Court in this matter. Mr. Capps

also entered into evidence his Exhibit A setting forth certain provisions ofthe laws of the State of
grant MBNA the statutory authority to
Delaware. A reading of $952(a) would certainly appearto
, .
.

.,:.,,
> .,

,

amend its cardholder agreement. The terms of the cardholder agreement itself allow for such
:

. .., ,. ,

2

amendment. Subsection (b)(l) of $952 is not applicable to the issues related to this evidentiary
proceedings as it relates to changes in interest rates which are irrelevant to this matter.
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Wilson & McColl

Per the evidence presented at the hearing held August 10,2006, MBNA urgesthat the record
is un-rebutted as to the issue of an agreement to arbitrate and that this Court should so find.
DATED this &ay

of August, 2006.

JEFF&

id.WILSON

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

L.
d

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
ay of August, 2006, I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoingPRE-TRIAL STATEMENT by regular United States mail with the correct postage affixed
thereon addressed to:
David F Capps
Miriam G, Carroll
HC 1 1 Box 366
Kamiah ID 83536

,

-
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William L. Bishop, Jr.
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BISHOP, WHITE & MARSHALL, P.S.
POBox 2186
Seattle, Washington 981 11-2186
720 Olive Way, Suite 1301
Seattle, Washington 98101
2061622-5306 Fax: 2061622-0354
8771259-1016
Idaho State Bar 87242

ROSE E. GEHRING

IN TI% DISTRICT COURT OF T I E SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TI-IE COUNTY OF IDAHO
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A
Plaintiff,

/

i

VS.

M W M G CARROLL,

APPLICATION FOR
CONFIRMATION
ARBITRATION AWARD

Defendant.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A., by and through is counsel of
record, William L. Bishop, Jr., and hereby moves this court for confirmation of the arbitration
award against the Defendant, M W M G CARROLL, and in favor of the Plaintiff in the sum
of CV2005-189 pursuant to the National Arbitration Award attached hereto as Exhibit "A".
This application is made pursuant to Idaho Code 5 7-91 1.
DATED this

day of May, 2006.
BISHOP, WHITE & MARSHALL, P.S

APPLICATION FOR CONFIRMRTION
OF ARBITRATION AWARD -1-

MBNA America Bank, N.A.
c/o Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P.
Attorneys in the Practice of Debt Collection
702 King Farm Blvd, Two Irvington Centre
Rockville. MD 20850-5775
CLAIMANT(§),
RE:

AWARD
MBNA America Bank, N.A. v Miriam G Carroll
File Number: FA0503000443990
Claimant File Number: 4313033111006016

Miriam G Carroll
Hc 11 Box 366
Kamiah, ID 83536-9410

The undersigned Arbitrator in this case FINDS:
1. That no known conflict of interest exists.
That on or before 0311712005 the Patties entered into an agreement providing that this matter shall be
resolved through binding arbitration in accordance with the Forum Code of Procedure.
3. That the Claimant has filed a Claim with the Forum and served it on the Respondent in accordance with Rule 6
4. That the Respondent has filed a Response with the Forum and served it on the Claimant.
5. That the matter has proceeded in accord with the applicable Forum Code of Procedure.
6. The Parties have had the owortunitv to vresent all evidence and information to the Arbitrator.
7. That the Arbitrator has reviewed alfeviience and information submitted in this case.
8. That the information and evidence submitted supports the issuance of an Award as stated.
2.

Therefore, the Arbitrator ISSUES:
An Award in favor of the Claimant, for a total amount of $30,241.41.

Entered in the State of Idaho
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND CERTIFICATE
OF SERVICE
This Award was duly entered and the Forum hereby
by first class
certifies that a

Date: 08/03/2005

Miriam G. Carroll
HC-11 Box 366
Kamiah, ID 83536
208-935-7962
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL D I S T R I C T T ~ ~
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A.,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)

1

VS.

MIRIAM G. CARROLL,
Defendant,

1

Case No. CV-06-37320
OPPOSITION TO
CONFIRMATION OF
AWARD LETTER

)
)
)

COMES NOW the Defendant, Miriam G. Carroll, and opposes the confirmation of
this award letter from the National Arbitration Forum on the grounds that there
was no valid agreement between the parties to arbitrate this, or any other
dispute. The award was obtained without an agreement to arbitrate and is null
and void ab initio. The Defendant lodges the attached brief in support of her
position and prays that this court will vacate the award letter.
Dated this 2 4

day of June, 2006.

G - C--*(\

,,k,
Miriam G. Carroll, Defendant, in propria persona

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Miriam G. Carroll, hereby certify, under penalty of perjury, that I mailed a true and
correct copy of this OPPOSITION TO CONFIRMATION OF AWARD LETTER
and BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO CONFIRMATION OF AWARD
day of June, 2006, by First Class Certified Mail #7003
LETTER this 27
0500 0005 3304 9348 to the attorney for the Plaintiff at the following address:
William L. Bishop, Jr.
Bishop, White & Marshall, P.S.
P.O. Box 2186
Seattle, WA 98111-286 2/86
720 Olive Way, Suite 1301
Seattle, WA 98101

bv(.;6-

G-

(?-A\

Miriam G. Carroll, Defendant, in propria persona

:

,

,

JEFFREY M. WILSON, IS
WILSON & McCOLL
420 W. Washingtoll
P.O. Box 1544
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone 208-345-9 100
Facsimile: 208-384-0442
Attorneys for MBNA Ameri
. ..<
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the arbitration awards entered in
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,

fact, the Decision and Order thei id&fies:.the 'dispositive issue of Defendants'
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underlying motion to be whether there was an enforceable/valid arbitration
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award in favor of MBN
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s Order (and the Judgments
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expressly based on it) regarding which ~efendantstriay'seek reconsiderationlamendment
by this motion.

dgnent, Defendants can only
be asking this Court

tent in that September 14,
P.2d 1030 (Ct. A.pp., 1982).

11 considering that req&;
actually adjudicated in that
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RECONSIDERATION - 2

,

.

.

,

.

,

.

,

.

,

upon reconsideration, the Court's resolution o
.

fact."

.

.

,

.

:

tuted such "errors of law or

.

, ' ,., .

!.

.

es as constituting, and upon

In this case, the Co
which would be adjudicate

e was no enforceable arbitration

"1. Mr. Caps and

.

.

:

. .

.,,

. .

.;,<
' :!,::.:.

:
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ct of.a~MahoCode $7-912 or 7-913 n~otion

Instead, such attacks we

motion was never made by

to vacate or correct the
Defendants. While couche

deration, Defendants' initial

arguments in "support" of the instant motion actually
seek vacation of the underlying
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arbitration award. That can onfy'occur in the context of ,a timely filed motion to vacate
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fact." Id., citing Huphes v. Hughes, 123 Idaho 711, 713, 851 P.2d 1007, 1009
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Additionally, of course,
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Defendants' fifth argument is the speculative assertion that cl-edit card holders in
general do not typically read materials enclosed with their monthly credit card bill, the
apparent point being that Defendants did not know of MBNA's amendment to the credit
,..
. .
>;:,: ;.,,!:i;:2:!..::.

, . , . .;.;.

::

!,,. .:j<.;!.j*.,'.:

card agreement adding an arbitration clause.
While no evidence or proof of this generic
.
. . , , ,

. ...

. ..
.

;

> ,

.'..,,,.. ,,

.

:

:

i

.,

assertion is offered, it is irrelevant in any event. AS thls Court correctly pointed out in its
September 14, 2006 Decision and Order, Delaware law, expressly admitted by all parties
.

.

t MBNA could add an arbitration

to govern the instant dispute,
provision by un

ent and that notice of such

amendment coul

envelope with the monthly
,

,.

,

.

c::. ,:,~.: . ;:;

,

<:::.'

,

..,..
.,.

,.: : ,, :

billing. 5 Del. C. sec.'9'52(a). Defendant's fifth. a~gunient,that this Delaware law is

the underlying credit card
agreement is "illuso

.

.

:,<>,,.];;;:;.\:

to be able to teiminate the

: .LV!>
<,,

,Cil,:,!
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,./

.

;~, ;,,: ;::.;q*

:,:.:

, ' ,

agreement whereas 'that same agreement does not expIicitly state that MBNA must give
. .
.
: . , .,.
. , , ,,., ;::.,: i i , , ., .
....
ti.:.:
. , , .:c ..,.: : i , L 4 +l>!
,
.
! :.A,: ,,.s.*,2 >!;,
.
. . i.;
notice when it seeks toi. tem~nate,~\e..,ag~@nt.
$t.:is
s6mewhaf:
difficult to understand
.,.,,,i,::::,
..
y,
.."::.T, :
'.
!

,

>$.

.c,;,;s . ;:. :j?<!." ....:v:;<... ..,,,:..
.
much Gss .rebut
. . .. ..,,
it..-bueitis
.. . .,:irrelevant
. , -I. f6 this motion to reconsider in any
,

this "argument,"

I

..

:..::

. :<\>. . .:;,t.: ..

.:
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,

;,,.,.<:!:<y.fi:,
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L?.. . .c,..,,

'

:.: %I
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,
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,
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*.. ,... . ,,. ,.. . ,,.., .sf.
. ..,.,<:Sc<;~.,:,;;,i<,,
>(:ri[ .,j.!

,,

:

;!;..

.

event. Firstly, attacking ..some
proyisionof t~eunderlyingagreement
would properly have
,,, , : .
.
: ! ,'('.;:::;:.;:
.:!:. ',
, , ,;< >, ..< ,,
, ,.:J., ~.,r3!.i?:ia<,':.~,>;
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been the subject of a motion. t. o. :vacate
.
the award,. Defendants never filed any such
:.:

,

,

.,

.,

,.

,.

:

'

.

.

I.:,

motion. Secondly, Defendants never rajsed this argpment in the judicial proceedings and
,,.!

,

:',

~

. . .. . .. . . . .

. :,..

they have thus waived any righi i&. .0 . $. ~.~.~ i i ' i ~... o w . ~ $there
h i r dis~absolutely
~,
no authority
.

. . . .

:

:

'

(or logic) for Defendant's contentioilin
..,
. ally event. Fourthly, whether MBNA had to give
. . . . .. .. .. . . :. . . . . . . . . ...' *

:

.;

,

notice (or not) to terminate the' cidit bard agreemetit and/or whether the cardholders had
.

.

.

.

.

;:::

3, .,+.

.,..

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

':

to do the santc, or not, is utterly meaningless in the instant case because MBNA never did
.

. . . .

, . .

.

tet~llinatethe agreement, nor did ~efendants,
. . . . . . ~ i f t h lthis
~ , Court painstakingly interpreted
the credit card agreement between the parties, with specific reference to Delaware law, in

.
its September 14, 2006 Decision.bd Order, indicating with particularity why and how
.

,.

.

:

,

'

. . . . . . . . . . ., . . .

- . . . ....
the arbitration provision between theseparties came to be effectively and lawfully placed

..:

,

:

eement, 'or lack thereof, or the

in their cardholder a
. .

:

.

:

. . .. . . , . . . .

manner in which it could, or could
. . . . .,not,
. . . .be,
. . . accomp.li,shed;by one party or the other, truly
.............

had no bearing upon nor relevahie to.
..,,thit,adj<dic,ati&.
.... ! . , . . . . .
Defendants' 12' hour assertion of
.. . . ,
....
. . . . .. ,
! .
: , .
some mysterious lack-of-termination-notice symmetry is,.meaninglessin the extreme.
,..>

,:

. . .. . .... .. .. .. . .. . . . . . .

,,:

.8.,

Defendants' seventh and final argument fares no better. In fact, it is nothing more
s." No evidence is provided to

than an attempted su
support Defendants' ass

arguments, to the extent that

those generic assertions

, no law is cited to support

these "arguments." Nothin

nor fact. Instead, Defendants

appear to rehash irrelevan

rejected by this court and
,..>

..
....

>\>..'>

.. !...*..

..,jlPi,.

.

somehow conclude froill this that'th'6~o~rtihould.
. . . . . . .
therefore reverse itself. Such baseless
,

,,..i,., ..

and immaterial assertions callno
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"Where Defendant fails to provide my new information in support of bis motion
I

I
I

for reconsideration and instead essentially maintains that the district court was wrong in
their decision and asks that the district Court reverse itself and rule in favor of defendant,
this is an inappropriate use of Rule 60(b) as a disguised substitute for an appeal."State, 141 Idaho 670, 115 P.3d 761 (Ct. App., 2005). Defendants' proper legal remedy at
.
..., ,
this juncture is not to solicit this Court - yet again - to finally agree with their already
. .,

.,; /..

i,?.
8 , u
.,. * *.
<

":

judicially rejected and wholly unsupported legal conclusions and factual speculations, but
rather to proceed with an appeal. The instant motion for reconsideration cannot be
.
:

,

c..

:.

. .". ,

i<j

,":

.

.>:.

,

.i.
... ,

.'

,

,ll:'l.

lawfully used as "a disguised substikte for atimely appeal." In re Estate of Bade& 117

.

.
. . :,,: ,.~i...,::',.::;;!.t'

..

2 :,

,~:,;>,:>:,.>

,.

Idaho 1091,793 P . Z ~1263 (Ct.App., 1990). See also, Bubak v. Evans, 117 Idaho 510,
.

,..,.

,

.

...'~;;.,~,l.~:,,

<i:&:'..',: .

'.

..:j<;i:.

2:::

788 P.2d 1333 (Ct. App., 1989).

Defendants'

d e o f failures. Most, if not all, of
.;,;.,;::,

. ;:,:)

$...

;,,><>;;Gi
: ,,,

.,

,y:~.t:i,2.:,:'

,

them should have' been made in thecontext of an Idaho Code $7-912 motion to vacate.
.::,?>.,,!.

'j%::? i.-(! 2

i;;,<:.;,:,>.[

No such motion has beei'filed:. z..and,.:i t , is,
now too, latq:to do so. Additionally, all of the
:.. .
,

'

. ~ ) ( , .

I .

arguments lack eith
.:.,:$

the arguments lack'h

assertions made, and most of

,

.; . . .

3 . .

.. ...,
, i ,3L,
.
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e ajsq
:.irrel'eFant.
This Court specifically
. . . .,,:,:
;

<
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,

.,.
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: , s . .

indicated the issues up*
. whibh
.
itprqnised
its S$ptember.
14,2006 Decision and Order.
,. . . ,
. . .. .. . .
.:,, :,?,,.~ ,P
., .>
,
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Defe~idantsfacial1

,

3

,

Orde~..yet
to address its foundational
,.;; 3 , .," , ,...fail
..
.,

,

.I)

,

and dispositive issues.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILW
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I mailed a true and
1N OPPOSITION TO
correct copy of the f~regqing
MOTION FOR RECONS~DERATIONby regular ~nitid'Statesmail with the correct
postage affixed thereon addressed to:
I I-BREBY CERTIFY that on the

Miriam G. Carroll
David F. Capps
HC-11 BOX366. . . .
Kamiah, ID 83536
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420 W. Washington
P.O. Box 1544
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone 208-345-9100
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Facsimile: 208-384-0442
Attorneys for MBNA America Bank, N.A.
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EPUly

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
MIRIAM G. CARROLI;, :

..,

:'...1. .

::.

,. , .

)

. 1

..

Plaintiff;

)

:
.

,

Case No. CV 05 36747

1
1
j
1
1

v.
MBNA AMERICAN BANK,

)

Defendant

1
)
)
)

MBNA AMERICA BANK,

MEMORANDUM BY MBNA
AMERICA BANK, N.A. IN
OPPOSITION TO AMENDED
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

1
1

Plaintiff

1

DAVID F. CAPPS
Defendant

Comes Now MBNA,AMERICA BANK, by and through its counsel of record
,., .

recited above, and hereby oppose? the ~ m e b d h dMotion for Reconsideration by
*.: :, . ! .
. .. " :.. , . , .. , .
Defendants Carroll and Capps as follows:
,

..,.

,

.

.. ,
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I.
...INTRODUCTION
.:,& .% : ,.L:

..

t

In this Court's September.F4i llt:2006Memorandum Decision and Order, sought to
be reexamined by Defendants' instant ainended motion for reconsideration/amendinent of
judgment, this Court characterizes the underlying motion of Defendants that resulted in
the Court's Decision. . .andt;Oi;der..as
....
, . .,.....
.one seeking "injunctive relief invalidating the
..

arbitration awards entered in favor of MBNA Bank against them individually." Following
its recitation of relevant fact, the Decision and Order then identiiied the dispositive issue
of Defendants' underlying motion to be whether there was an enforceabie/valid
arbitration clause between the parti+d.~ti~$he:time:~heidisP~te
arose. The Court answered

.
that question in the affihative, ~dncludingtiat "the axbitration agreement is valid and
:..... ,..,.<. ;:<,:,:
. .,...,q j ,
. . . .,,.>!
'

.

!

.

: ' . : ; , ; >

'

,{. ;

i

:

.. t. ...:..

;

,

r ,

.

,

enforceable...tile decision of the arbitrator is valid and enforceable...The arbitration
. . . . . . .L.. .,,.!,
...........................

1.:.

:

.

1%:.

. . ..:. . .

,

!

award in favor of MBNA against Ms. Carroll.. .[and].. .Mr. Capps is' CONIFRMED.. ."

!. .

,. . ,,.
,,. a . i .

.

. ! ..

..

.

;

,

.

., ... ,..
,

This being the Order of tlie' Cou&'~lf.isnecessarily only this Order (and the Judgments

., , ,<,.. ,, ,

.. ..

,

,

\>,

%

- ,',r!:.$'x:

,. \ ;..t i .,.

..cz

i.,,

:

... : ; i . :

expressly based on it) regarding which ~efendantsniay seek reconsideration/amendment
.

,
:

by this motion.

,:.c

,. :. .% . , >

. , ! , ,:,.<

'

.

.

;!;,.,j:

;,,?!.\

;..;,,;(.i<.l>

.. !c;. . ~L.,. ....

:,;.

:

i('i yi><.!.:,

i..:,!.

! i

>~

11.
.,',!i;;!.$*::f

,.

~

, ,

v,;? <:,2+:,4::!'.>.:;,s'::!
.;

. . . . . .:
'.j:,.:.'

.,j'!i!~,

dinent of judgment,

BY their ainended;
,moLion .,for
.
.
. . rec
.$
.,.;>,,
. . .,>:: ..;< :!LC. <:~>.;,!::>,:,:..:
:.
Defendants can only be . askulgtbis
...
Cqui?
to
"co
. . .i,.. .:.
. . .. .:
. . ..; ;::
...... i?>.,S.
.. . . ,, , :., ..,!!LA
<.'
September 14, 2006 DecisiouandOrder.
, ,,
. . . . . . . . . . . . bri'.;:.,..'.?:. . , i i
'

i

i

i:

ii.:,.Oi.

. i . .

offact and law" existent in its

:i.,

;i;i

,.,Lb

Idaho 259, 646 P.2d 1030

,

. . .. . . ..*;. ; ' i <,. . . .
.,.. . :.!\>
(,(;~??-i,;,
;,.. .:;.:;c.,;
i

.

;

.$?'%,.
{I:,:;,;

:c.

(Ct. App., 1982). In considering
. . . . . . . .that
.." . request it is !herefore necessary to frrst identify the
. ,1. , a ' : ;,. .!,:;!i: .: :. .
?:,;i)&;.h:
.;,i;;i,, L j :s ,i;$,>:!: ,,i..:
%

. . . . . . . . ..,.< ,,.

;:/:

dispositive issue(s) adtually ad5djcated in that ~+isidn'$hd,Order so that one can then
:;:,

i . ' < , > ,;;:#..j:j;<:.

.$;

..

:A,. , . , \ I

;./....;
?,

....

,..<!'..
. .
.
. ,

',,

,

.

,

o~rt~:6~~esolutioi1
... .
of thein constituted such

determine whether, upon re
"errors of law or fact."

tified two issues as constituting, and up011

..

..,

.

en$ ttiii'tjieri was no enforceable arbitration
rties at the time the dispute
.:

..;. .~
.

arose.

,

i . :

..:,.>. 1. . .
:..
.

,.

;.,

, . ,

.

.
..

...
.

,

.:. .

:

2. MBNA Bank illeggs that: there wa
.

.. .

,

.,,.;,

..,..:

:'

..,

.

.!
,

, ? . .

valid arbitration agreement

,

.,:;:;:.,;(>4,:;:~i[,,:,{;,
'!

between the parties at the time the dispute arose.
:,

., .,.::., .,

r l

:

~

.

Accordingly, as regards:the,instan$:alllended motion, the sole question is whether
the Court committed
error in concluding th
the sole basis of the
inquiry in this amended

articular whether it committed
ent ?s vaiid and enforceable."

hat being

necessarily the sole material
Anything else would be,

as it is, wholly irrelevant to the 0

DEFENDANTS' NEW CL

DELAWARE CHOICE

oice of law provision is not
valid" is without merit.
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Firstly, Defendants have &Ire$&$'%f&ulatdd-tb.this Court in this action regarding
this very issue that ~ e l a w b rlaw
i $id'gij;r&n ththe 6ontiict between the parties. As stated
.

.'

.., '.,

,

,

,. . . . .

.

by this Court on page 5 of its ~e~teinb$:
14, 2006 Memorandun1 Decision and Order,
"The original contract also included a choice of law provision stating that Delaware law
..

: :

,

:

would govern the rights and ob~i~atibds
k. d. e r the'cbintract. See Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and
. ~, '. .

/:

,

.. .

,,,;!.,c: :. ';.I:

,.

,

:

2. Neither Ms. Cairo11 ilor Mr. Capfls.&ie"contestingthat Delaware law applies; indeed,
.

,, ,

. .

,..
a

they affirmatively state that it does; $ 6 Pi.dintifFs
~
Post Hearing Memorandum Rebuttal
and Plaintiffs Brief for Evidentiary Hearing on Agreement to Arbitrate." Defendants

.

.,;.. .

:;

.,.... k.'.'

.,. .

' ""

.

'!'!
,
I .

s:y&:i:

...

having so stipulated and having then failed to prevail, it would be unfair, illogical and
inequitable in the extreme' to

s to now entirely reverse themselves and

see if they do any better with

at very issue. Defendants
. . . .

,

',

'.,,.'.

,

.

'

....
3

.,.",

have already stipulated, and this Cougthas. accepted their stipulation, that "Delaware law
would goveil1 the ri

ct." Now that this matter has
.
,
:(:.i:.,. ~2
...

.. ., . ,... .. ........,. ,
:. :;:,!:.,.,!: . . .:
been finally adjudicated, they sliou1d:not be allowed to somehow withdraw their
. ..
_,.
::*;:.
,,!~..:.:>. >: ,,,,; p;,,; !!
: :,
. . ., ,
stipulation and claim exactly the opposite.
, ? , . >s3;:'

,

>

:i:

(<.

;

i . ~ l i " '' '' ' '

Secondly, the oily "

Dpfmdants
..
in purported support of their
,,b.

,

.. :.\.

*

.... ,
,;.:', !.;,~1~.5%,.!:: >,,:,*fi.:

qflpw provisipn.
is
not valid contradicts that very
new assertion that the ~ i l a w..a r chojcp
e..
..
.

ting parties may designate

claim. Defendants cite
their choice of law butt
,,

ntracts less than $100,000.
.

,,,

,~..'::.:..:;?\;.:i,

$*:\>;:

; ,2

!,!,.i
;i:+,;r ? , '
,

.,.
that the underlying contract
Defendants then assert
. . . . . . . in
; I ' . - ithis
.
. - . co~ec'tly
.
.;>...;.
; , - . i ,.. pctrticul&.. .....,
9;:..:&
.$

.L."".

,.,,,,

,

:.<

,,,< :!:*!*:ii,{t>i;,:;.,ji,i;

\

;;ir, {>,::,,!;,.:,.

:

between Plaintiff anh .~efend,~ts:j-nvo'lv'e$:tess
. . .
,%;.:<,.
than
$100,000, thus concluding that this
.(
.
, .
.
i i ' : :
~

;

1

~

;,

~
...,.., .,,, . . . . ,..
>.:G/;!;,i

,.

,'

::..:;;K <

section is inapplicable. T~at.assertion;is
alsp' cox
. . ,'';:.:,. , . :,:,:;,,;.,; ".',..$*"
,,.>
. .< < ?is:
.
.
. . .. ,
.:,<
' . , ! , ?!&T. ;:.!<,v,.<c<
2.
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..

. , > (,

.'

!'!

.;,;;

,

it does
not lead to the
:
..

: .

> .

,<,...
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.
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.

.

.

. :

. ,

,

.

? :

conclusion Defendants desire. That
..,
. is becausb, in positing this shaky syllogism,
. , ,,

,,

Defendants have convenienflygnu~~~d~~t~e:.$al,,mce
. , . . 9E6
,.,
Do1 C. $2708, i.o., section (e) of
: . , .

. ) ,!,,i~,.,J. ,

. :I"...

-

1:.

:.:

:

.

..,...,..

'

that same Code provision which recites tllat '"Thi$ijwtion shall not. .. affect the validity
.

,.,:,: ,,..

..

.

'

of any other choice of law provisio~'in.
any co$$t$ct, ,agreement or other undettaking."
i,'

. .

i

:

:

,. .

.. .

:

Defendants' own citation of authoaty -their only:p@ported
authority for the proposition
- :.:, j . % . ,
.

:

,

,
. .. 3 , .
. . :.. ..

,

..

. ..

,

stated - specifically contradicts their ~wn.~ro~osition!IYefendants
are sill~plyincorrect in
.

.

.

.. , :,.

.

.

their 12" hour attack on the'validity
of
of?Iatv,provisions in Delaware. Delaware
. . cJioice
,...
. .
.,
,
,

,

specifically recognizes choiceof-law
$~ovisions.:See,
e.g., Gloucester I-ioldinp Cam. V.
.
. .. .
.
.

,

. . .,, , ,

j

.,

... .:.*.
,

',

,

2'

2'

. :'

U.S. Taoe and Stickv Products, LLC, 832 A.2d 116, l i 4 (~el.~h.,2003),
citing VGS. Inc.
.

.,

;..

.

.

.st,*,,:..

'

'

2003 WL 7232k5, at',7'&.jni':d3
, .
(ijei:ch. ~ e b 28,
. 2003) and Turtur v.

V.

,

(22

, , , ..,,.

.1:.

~

: : .,

'

ofity!for choice of law provisions found in
, .., , . .
<,,..
; . .'
.:.:.,,., .:
6 Del C. §2708(e), G Del C. ~l-301~.also~~e~~res~1~1pio~ides
, ..
. .
that "parties may agree that
Thirdly, in addition tothe

:

,

>,:L

,

.,.

.

,..,..

.

:

.,:

,

,.

. .,
, ..
,,..
, , , . ,%'j

the law either of this State or of such 0th;; itate b i nation shail govern their rights and
,

duties."

. ,, ,

,

> '

. ..,....
.. ,

'

,

,, ... ,,,
. .. . . :

:

.. .,

. . I ...: .

,,

.,:, ,

,

argument that Idaho law
Fourthly, considehng
,
, , ~ e f e, h
. dan
. t ,~
8.. n..e kifiir-the-fact
.".
,

should somehow be conside
is valid, it should be noted t
e.g., Idaho Code 828-1-301(a).

366, 368-369, 913 P.2d 582,
Corp., 1 16 Idaho 56, 77

Restatement (Second) of
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~

.

~

govern their conkactual righ&c;,;a$$$*ities
'will be. applied
if the particular issue is one
:!
,
.&
. . . . . .......
. . ., .
:

I,)

.

,

,

which the parties could have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed
to that issue'."

if

See also, ~ e s t a t ~ i n e(s,econh)
nt
conflicts
of Laws
. .
. .
'

.

........
..

>

5

187 (1971)

.,;

("contracting parties may choose the law to be appli<dto
their agreement").
,.
...

. . . .

;,>,.,.,,:.: i ..

The balance of ~efindants'first atgunlentlik6wiSe
misses the mark. In the instant
..
case, the contract between the parties was formed when the cardholder agreement was
*, >

entered into. There is no dispute that this occurred.
That agreement specifies, validly for
....
: ,: ;'

!.;..:,,.;,.

,,,'.,,
;:.::;

t

; ;

. .

,

:';

"

!,!I,:

:)>

the reasons stated above, that.Blaware'law governs that agreement, which law dictates
.....

.,%,
:,;;,+;,

.

,

.

,,

:,<,c,t . . ; : ; i c : +

L.

:;: ,.,!;,p,:.'..

,,.

t .

'\;

..

how such cardholder agreements Fat b e modified. This Court specifically determined that
,

.

' , '. *.$

! ::;,'+j!ft,:

;,::;

!;s,:

, ; ..S:!,Y,:... . . . . . .
.. v.

,.

the lnodification in this case (adding an arbitratik provision) was accomplished in
concerning "meeting of the

accordance with that

is no such issue here.

minds," etc. ail go to

ed between Plaintiff and

NO party has ever questioned t
.

.,

.

. . . .
.......... \,.;,j .:I .::a '2,;ltr;?;, .;4 .
..........
Defendants. Further, ~e'fendants'citations to theeffect that acontractuai modification in
!

..:b

evant in this case, i.e., the

general requires "cons
;+ :,:.; 5 , i , .

L<
,.>,;:

;,;~

&..<,,

.:,,;,,

,,*%&,

' C y s s :j,;,.,:,
: :,

\',

i!.;T...

cases cited address common,law
,.., contract lawin i;eqeral. In'this case, however, we have
...............
. ; . .
i.
:

, : ,,.;.,:!<-+;i!;!ii>;

. , .'
,<,>,.#
....

.

:,:..
.., ,

;:$jx

. .,

.JZ

..

'.!
A

,,,..
(

C

fix;

$:-

^,
;,,!

specific statutory law .which.
speciQcally
a&lresses
hgv
in a cardholder agreenlent such
,
;,; ;.,. :: .,, . -,,;
,,\
.,<:"',':
. ,.
*Y,, * ' . , ~
.,;..
ciic:i;
(,,:#?
.?.r
:
.
,
,. ....s.. ,. ,,, . ; $2 rsri,;; :::...: r. ..
. ...,.,
f, . h. . "face
~:>:, of those specific statutory
as this one, that agreement
. . .
pan
be
....... mod~fied.
~ . ,
. . .
>.'.,.
.
..
,

.s;.:

t.:,

r.

:,,,,,

. ,:I,::

s.,....

.

I

provisions, which pro

<,$,,"

.,3:;1

,.,. . . ..
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. .
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.,
inea.were
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,
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contract principles are
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,

For each, and certainly foyaI1,:of tl~ese. reasons,..Defendants' first argument in
.

:.:.

,

,,',~.
, ,...

..

, ,,

their amended motion for
.

.

,

. .

..

. ..

!%,
, i.

.. ..

.

. .

..,

..

.,.,,

.,

DEFENDANTS' NEXTF~URARGUMENTS:ARE
WHOLLY IRRELEVANT
:, . .... , . ., .., :. ,,,

.,

.

.

.

..

,..

..

,
,.,,.

/

.

In "support" of their .nibti& for,reconsidtiraiion of this Court's September 14,
..~ . >

. ., . .

.

...

:

,,,,.<::,;

%
;;

. .

,

:,'

2006 Memorandum Decision andlOider,Defendants'. next' four arguments (numbered no.
,

.,

,

2 through 5 in their brief) .are wholly irrelevant t o the issues upon which the Court
. ..

, , ,,

expressIy premised that Decision and;Order. In fact, .these. four grotu~dsare nothing more
.

,

,

.

:. .

.,,;~

.
, ...

;.'L,2::,,;:g;%

.

:

than attacks on the underl$&.:debts and the unde~lyi$g,a~bitration
of them. They are not
:

:.,.i.:'.,.::.I
:'
,:<:,,'.!:.,:,':

the proper subjects of this amend$d,m&ion:
, . , . . . I . : ,.,..,
, .
for reconsideration. Instead, attacks such as
.'

,.

these could only have properly been the subject of an Idaho Code $97-9121 7-913 motion
. ,.

, .

. . .,.

:'::;:!::..;!><L,:,~..>..:>:..:.:.:

to vacate or correct the underlying .arbitrat~.~li
Defendants.

...

.

;

.

i , .

.., .

,.

. , . I

,
.,

,
,

. : .

i .

i.,.. "..,

.

..

,

.c

..

li

:,... ::,.. .

,,:.

.

,

.'.

'motion was never made by

.

:

. ..

.

While couched as an arnerided.jmtionfor:rec&&deration, Defendants' arguments
,
i . i.;;; . . , ;
.,.:
numbered 2 through 5 in ac&ality seek a "actation of the &derlying arbitration award,
, ;

,;

relief not available

to vacate. Of equal if not

greater importance,

that were not issues upon

which the Court expre

ecision and Order. That

being the case, these
are irrelevant to the 0
identified the issues upon
Defendants are entirely ex
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,
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~

These four arguments'of Defendant's amended motion, (mis)captioned as one for
reconsideration or, alternatively, to alter
. , . , ...,
:or .arnena judgment, are nothing more than
, ..,
.

:

:;

'

'

.

:. . *

.

i . .

attacks on the underlying :debt and the: arbitration process wherein that debt was
.

.

adjudicated. Setting aside the.vafio~s:l~bds
that Dpfeiidants use to make this argument,
?~:
.,

,.:

i

8 . .
,..,
,:.

those are Defendants'

did not owe the debt, that no court was
,..

called upon to c

,

that the ahitrator was biased, even

"unconscionable," in ruling othenvise. By this motion, Defendants claim to seek judicial
"reconsideration" of those matters. In actuality, they ask the Court to second-guess and
: . : : . . .i;.:.:.

;

... ; .,,

...

.?( .'

reverse the arbitrator. Such judicial "reconsideration" is impenllissible in these
.
. ,,. ..
".. '.
t:: :.
. . ,< . ..,,
. . ,
circumstances.
, .
,

I ,

.hi?

8

. ' : L . . ; . ! , ~

,

,,,.
, , . . ~ .<~ . , .:.,
..., '*..
,;.,.
:

,...,,,.'

.,

Cjl' .,:

ti;.;:,:

Firstly, it should be noted that any judicial review of any arbitration award "is
, .<.,

,

..

,;'::...:!.<>"!:,,

i,.,.,,:

:..

,,:~YJ::'

limited." g i v e r v. SI COQ: 139 -Td&oo 423,
. !.s:!..::..

j::,;.;::!:,.:.!:.;<:!i~!

1024, 1027 (2003), citing

.
~. \:;<:.

.

.!.,,

;':::\,

Chicoine v. ~ictnaii,127
. . ,..Idaho..
..
225, 227, 899 P.2d 438, 440 (1995). In fact, "the
,:,,

.>

o. .,,..

,s.

,.

.,... <

.,

,. .. ,.. .
:~~~i.~~,:;~,:,!~;:>
:
....~*,. ,.

.:j:,'

arbitrator's decision isbinding onthe reviewing court botli as to questions of law and
.

.. .,

,

..:::t,.,..

./

.. .

.

.

Idaho.711, 7i3, 851 P.2d 1007, 1009
der some of the arbitrator's
is nevertheless binding on
CO& v. Interstate Electric Co., 105
the reviewing court." Id.,. citing,Bingham:Countv
:
.
.<:..:<.,,, . k > > .
. . , . ,1
, ,. ,

3 , ;
,

,

.

,

:

.

:

:

. :.

!

,!:.,:!~:->,

:

~ q t h q ~ "perhaps
a k,;,,';.~.?.ad .. most
importantly in this case -Idaho 36, 665 P.2d 1046.. ( ~. 9. ~ 3 ) . ,!,:.,,..!>:<::;:,
,.
l < i ;.!.>:I ;,. . :
:: .t:>!-?:i:.,I;.:!, .'~,.i:.~<:
A::
such limited review GtEie'
.;:..T
....~~i~~;.::j,:...
oUrt is legislativeli
a1
nIy permitted at all wile11 one
.: 1 ; I.. , ,.,
~ ..-,
..,. , .,I
. i . . i ::2:: &..A,
properly and timely seekstit,
i e when one files ... . . ,> . de 87-912 or 7-913 motion
.
. '. .; .-. .: * ~ : .. .
.,.,.
,

:.,;:21

i.,.,.

:

>

$,..

,

,

:.i;

..

3

......

, ,,

l,LL<c,,

>

% , < ~ ,

::
: ,,L..' i. '. '
to vacate or correct the underljrii~garbitratioh award witl~b,ninety days of the award's
: ,
I:
,
: ,2.::;<>i: .:,,.., . :
,
.;.
.. , ... ,... . : .
.
,
I
i;
.f:c.~? '? i ;
. 1
.. ... .,
,:,,<v;,,<>.

i..,..

,';.,>I
.

:
:
!
:

:Yb:i

8..
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"
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<..:
,,.

.

:

.. :
.

$'is o w too late to do so. 'The 90-day

issuance. Defendants fil

,.
c@&.tnied,
and acts as an absolute bar
time limitation under I. C.. ~7;~j~:@$g~'lre':8@ictl~
,.
. . . ,,.. ..
,
,.
..

!>'.:.,.:;:.,

:

>,,

..

.,,,.'!!,:!

,

to a motion to vacate that fails, tg.meet
,
the time rec$ire~nent. .. Idaho Code section 7-913
is materially the same." Driver v.. , :'.,:
S I Corn.,,
s
.<'.
2

,.

,,

.

Interstate Electric Co, supia.at'39.
..
. ,. . ,
, . .. +. ,. ,( . " '. . *.. .

g Bingkam County Comm'n v.

,"

. <.'

.,....

,

. .

.

., , ,
'

.

.'
!

C'..L

, . .. .
to. .hhae
.
..,properly
.
and timely filed a motion to vacate or
Further, this reqpire,@te$
. .,
,

,

,

. .claim
,.,
that there is no agreement to
amend applies even when,:
. . ,... herq,,r).efendants
. .
.Defendants
.
from the mandatory filing
arbitrate at all. Such a claim:, .d0es;ilot':e~em~t
..; . . ..
,.
%

. .

.

..,

, .<
:

..

.:. . .&..,,.:,,,

' .

.

:.

,

.

. . .,. ., .. ..

'

'

requirements of Idaho Code 47-912 or $7-913. III fact, so mandatory are these Code
. .: .,,.

. , .-

.., . .::
:

I

, ..
,

,'i<

:2

, .

.

.

,
..I

. ... .

provisions, including theirninety-day. fiI&grequirenient, that "even where no arbitration
'

.'. ; . .
.,.
. ~ ,*
.

,.

.,

,:,.,.: .

.: :*>. .
,,;\:,.

, ,

.

> ~ . ...,.

...' I:;'....:,

.

agreement exists, a party belatedly objecting to binding arbitration is estopped."
. .

.. , .

. \ : .,. .

.

Allstate hs.Co., 113 1 d a h d ! 6 ~ 7 , ~ ~ ~$6$ ~(ct:.App,
$d
1987), citing Arizona Public
.
,.,,

.
,

Service Comoanv v. Gamnions,
5 .1 .9,.;. ~ :'. ~1.165
d (Ariz:App:;
. ..
,.;
.r::

.,
.: . .. , ,..,..,:.. .';

: . '

,. : :

..

1974).

'.

Accordingly, ~ k f .e. ~ dargument
~ ? . nos. 2 through 5 -- that they did not owe the

biased, even "un~onscion
n any event. Attacks on the

tile wrong time and are not
underlying debts of Defe
arbitration of them, were p

state Deut. of Administsation
re to file such a motion is

v. Sizhtes, 416 N.E.2d
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,

.

. .

' ,

eiiiiderlying arbitration process. Pacific

"an absolute bar" to th

Alaska Seafoods, Inc. v. ~ i............
c : ~ o;. s .,,..
k i :n. .s. ::.,: ~ m ~Iixc.,
k i i139
~ . Idaho 472, 475, 80 P.3d 1073,
. . . .:. ..:

:,;',(,:'..

: "

s.:,.;

1076 (2003). Defendants' argument of these matters now, in the context of a motion
..

,

.

.

.

seeking reconsideration of a:coG ?rd& that did not adjudicate, or even address, such
"issues" is misplaced. These were not matters upon which this Court premised its

_.

. ...

., ,

,

,.

, ?::,

.,

I .

1

September 14,2006 Decisioli and OrdeinoW sought to.be "reconsidered." The Court did
.

.

not render ib September 14, 2006 Decision and Order on the matters Defendants attempt

, there is nothing to "reconsider" regarding

to raise by these argu

.

.

tl~em.
,..

.

,

.
:.c

,,.,

ic:

.:;-:,, : ~;.: : :;,:>.~;.i.:;>>.:t:'4,

:.:..:'.

e i

Defendants' initial ar@mnit$!m.
lK$iit,@ort",
df tbeir motion for reconsideration do
< : . :. .
. . . . ....,' ....
,.
. ,
. L . , .. . . . " . ,.. ,,.,. ,. . .
not support such a motion at a11. Their claims thatthey apparently did not owe the debt to
,

i

. . . ., . .. . . . .. .. ... .. .. .. .. .. ... .. .

,

Lii

' . :

MBNA, that a court was got c.al.l&d.upon to ' c ~ r n ~ earbitration,
1
that the arbitrator
.

..

"displayed bias" a

.
:

.

,

.

>,$I..

was ionlehow "unconscionable" cannot
t;<.,
dedision that itself did not address those

.. . .:!. ,,., :x

successfully trigger a " r
.

.

.

,:.

. . .. . . .. . .. ...:.,.* !:;:,~:':*a$
!>;.:$;,i

: ,;

.

..;. i.... ::;

matters in any event. Thes'e, ~ 9 i d ' ~ x,the
o t issues upon which the Court premised its

.

,

L:!.~.~i.,;>.:i

. .,
.........

, . s , ~ , : ~ ~ ; ~ . . , ~ ~ ; : ;,~ ! , . ~
,,:,! ~ ::,
,

,$#.:. purportedly seek to have reconsidered. There
Decision and order which
,: . . the,
, : , , pqfenda$$
,,.
.,

~b

:

is notlling to "reconsid
~~

.

.

.*.

, , ..,. ., , .'
. . . .. . % , .
: .. . .,
. . .

.

,

,

,
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~
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,
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DEFENDANTS7LAST THREE ARGUMENTS A& A ~ S O
WHOLLY RUULEVANT
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:
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<ii:,.ij: , ,

,

* .,.

,.
. ,
.... . . .
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?L..~!,,
t,

~ef&dai~ts'
sixth a w m e n,. f. ~ ~ ~ s t ~ ~ , ~ s p ~gssertion
c u l a t i vthat
~ credit card holders in
. . . .. . , : .......: r . ;
:
. . . 2 i . a ..< '..;>.?!<;;:JF~:, ;
,!: ......'>..":. .
., ...
wjtl~,
,:,:.
t1ieir monthly credit card bill, the
general do not typically read;mat#ti;iks'e$clased
.
L

.:

,

:

. . . . . . . . . . . . ,,.<;::,:::
..
,.:
, . , . . , , . A .,..
,

', ,

!<.:;>,;:'

>,>%:

.

d:':.~!

:
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. . . ,. . .. :

apparent point being t h a.,t ' ~ ~. f e n d a n ~ not
, d l kno
d
,>,.,
..>{.'\..'...'$,.;, < : ';
. . ,
:,,
,c:p;
,.;,
. . .,. . . . . . ..,:L.>,;ii:.!(.;i,.j;
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,

;

'
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's amendment to the oredit
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evidence or proof of this generic

assertion is offered, it is irrele"iitid'inY'6vent. As 'this Court correctly pointed out in its

d&:lkw, expressly admitted by all parties

September 14, 2006 D
;;, ,: ,,'i

,'

'

to govern the instant d i s p ~. t. e. ., ~. ~ e ~ i f r b f i that
l ~ ~MBNA
r 6 ~ i dcould
~ add an arbitration
.

. . . . I. ,
,:.
.

provision by unilaterally amending the. ckdit card agreement and that notice of such
. .:, . , : .. ;,.< . . . ' .2 .
' .;> . ,, .% ,-:. .

amend~nentcould lawfully

6e se~itin the envelope with
tih eff&ti+efy
.
,

,

the monthly

. . .

billing. 5 Del. C. sec. 952(a). Defendant's fifth argument, that this Delaware law is
.

,,.;

..

,

.

apparently unfair, is wholly irrele~aint:in~~&6.~roceedrn~.
that the underlying credit card

Defendants' sevelltl~

e to be able to terminate the

agreement is "illusory" bec

e that MBNA

agreement whereas th

must give

at difficult to understand

notice when it seeks to t
. . . . . . . . .

this "argument," much

is. irrelevant to this amended motion to

reconsider in any event.

ine provision of the underlying agreeinent

would properly have bee

otion to vacate the award. Defendants never

filed any such motion. S

ed this argument in the judicial

. . . . . . .

..

proceedings and they hav
.

.

.

(pi

':.:..I . . . ;

y right. to assert it now. Thirdly, there is
. . .,.,x;,,
.
. . .:,,,
. .; ..i:?,
:.'L,.:..r:...'.,

:.
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Conclusion:
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does not apply. They are erroneous in that assertion
(b) Delaware law applies bccause:

(i) 6 Del C. $2708, providing that contracting puties may designate their
choice of law but that such section does not apply to contracts less than $100,000 does
not prohibit Delaware choice-of-law provisioi~sin contracts less than $100,000. This
Code section is merely inapplicable to such contracts. That is precisely what thls statute
says. Additionally, this concIusion is denlonst~atedby subsection (e) of this same statute
expressly providing that 'This.sbctibh sl~a~ll
not.. .,si'$f&tthi validity of any other choice
of law provisions in any contract, agreement or other undertaking."
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Defendant's motion for reconsideration should be denied.

%day of ~ctober,2006
DATED this WILSON & McCOLL
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

1
1
1
1
1

MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A.
Plaintiff,

)

1
1

v.

NO. CV 06-37320
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM
ON THE APPLICABILITY OF
DELAWARE LAW AND THE
IDAHO CREDIT CODE

)

1
1
1
1

MIRIAM G. CARROLL,
Defendant.

Comes Now MBNA America Bank, ("MBNA"), by and through its counsel of record
recited above, and hereby submits its Memorandum on the Applicability of Delaware law and
the Idaho Credit Code, and related matters, as follows:

INTRODUCTION
The matter at hand is awaiting confirmation pursuant to Idaho Code 97-91 1 of the
arbitration award entered in favor of MBNA by the National Arbitration Forum and against
Defendant Miriam Carroll on August 3,2005 in the amount of $30,241.41. CV 05-36747 is a
similar case presently before this Court and involves Plaintiff MBNA and Defendant Miriam
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM ON
APPLICABILITY OF DELAWARE LAW
AND THE IDAHO CREDIT CODE- 1

..

A 9 d

Carroll and Mr. David Capps on separate MBNA credit accounts. Subsequent to this Court's
Memorandum Decision and Order dated September 14,2006 filed solely in CV 05-36747,
wherein this Court applied Delaware law after stipulation of the parties and confirmed MBNA's
arbitration awards in related case CV 05-36747, Defendants Miriam Carroll and David Capps
brought a Motion for Reconsideration alleging, among other things, that Idaho law should apply
to their respective cases at the exclusion of Delaware law. During a joint hearing held on
January 25,2006 on both the present case and CV 05-36747, the Court requested further briefing
on the issues of 1) Idaho's ability to apply Delaware law, and 2) to the applicability of the Idaho
Credit Code to the facts in these cases.
Idaho law unquestionably permits the application of Delaware law to the present case and
to similar case CV 05-36747. Under Delaware law, this Court has already concluded that
MBNA was authorized to amend its credit agreement with the Defendants. An application of the
Idaho Credit Code to these cases is unsupported in the Idaho case law but would provide an
identical result. MBNA was permitted to amend its credit agreement with the Defendants
Miriam Carroll and David Capps under both Delaware and Idaho law to include the arbitration
provision governing dispute resolution.

IDA110 LAIV EXPRESSLY PEI1iVlI'l'S CIIOICI<-OF-LA\\' CON1'RACrUAL
P1tOI'lSlONS AND L)EL2%\4'AIIELAW SlIOULI) THEKFOllE BE Al'l'LlED
The Defendants state in their Brief on the Applicability of 5 Del. Code $956, pg. 5, that
this Court should render its d i n g in this case based upon the rulings of the Idaho State Supreme
Court. In regard lo Idaho's endorsement of contractual choice-of-law provisions, we completely
agree. Idaho laws permits the application of Delaware law through the parties contractual
choice-of-law provision found in their original credit card agreement. See MBNA 's Credit Card
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM ON
APPLICABILITY OF DELAWARE LAW AND THE IDAHO CREDIT CODE- 2
-.

4!$5

Agreement, Exhibit 1 to Plaintif's Certijication in Support of Conjrmation of Arbitration
Award, pg. 8.
The Idaho Supreme Court in Ward v. Purego expressly authorized contractual choice-oflaw provisions similar to that contained in the original credit card agreement between MBNA
and the Defendants. See, e.g. Ward v. Pureno Co., 128 Idaho 366,368-369,913 P.2d 582,584585 (1996) holding that "In Cerami-Kote, Inc.

V.

Energywave Corp., 116 Idaho 56,773 P.2d

1143 (1 989), we approved of the rule set forth in the Restatement Second of Conflict of Laws 5
187. Id. at 58 n. 1,773 P.2d at 1145 n.1. This rule provides in relevant part that: "(1) The law of
the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties will be applied if the
particular issue is one which the parties could have resolved by an explicit provision in their
agreement directed to that issue." See also, Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws 8 187
(1971) ("contracting parties may choose the law to be applied to their agreement"). As such,

Idaho law clearly authorizes the application of Delaware law in its choice-of-law endorsement
and conflict of law rules. Delaware law should therefore apply to this case and to CV 05-36747
as contracted to and intended by the parties.

OTHER JURISDICTIONS AUTHORIZE THE APPLICATION OF DELAWARE LAW
IN FACTUALLY ANALAGOUS CASES
This Court may find it instructive that several jurisdictions that also recognize choice-oflaw contractual provisions have routinely upheld Delaware's statutory scheme of permitting
banks to unilaterally amend credit card agreements to add arbitration agreements, where, as here.
the cardholder is given notice of the amendment, and the agreement is subject to an "opt out"
provision, that permits the cardholder the choice of whether to accept or reject the amendment.

See eg. Johnson v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA. N.A. 784 N.Y.S.2d 921,2004 N.Y. Misc.
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM ON
APPLICABILITY OF DELAWARE LAW
AND THE IDAHO CREDIT CODE- 3
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LEXIS 133, Edelist v. MBNA America Bank, 790 A.2d 1249 (Del. 2001), Pick v. Discovery
Financial Services, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15777,2001 WL 1180278 (D Del2001); Joseph
v. MBNA America Bank, N.A., 148 Ohio App. 3d 4090, 775 N.E. 2d 550 (2002). The rules set
forth by the Idaho Supreme Court in

m,supra, in conjunction with the Court's ratification of

the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws 5 187 expressly permit and establish the path for
a similar holding here.

APPLICATION OF TIIE IDAHO CREDIT CODE TO THIS CASE IS UNFOUNDED
The Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration filed in CV 05-36747 and subsequent
briefing is void of legal authority but full of unsubstantiated argument that 3 28-41-201(8)(a) of
the Idaho Credit Code should he applied to demonstrate that the contractual parties' choice-oflaw provision is invalid. See Dejkndant 's Briefon Applicability o f 5 Del. Code $956, pg. 3,
After thorough and extensive research, Plaintiffs counsel found no Idaho case law support for
the Defendants proposition. The Idaho Credit Code should accordingly not be applied to
invalidate a choice-of-law provision in a consumer credit card agreement in direct opposition to
the Idaho Supreme Court's ruling in

m,supra, and the state's adoption of the Restatement

(Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 187.
Purpose:
An application of the Idaho Credit Code to this case is not supported by the stated
purposes of the statute. The absence of Idaho case law applying the nearly twenty year old Idaho
Credit Code to Delaware financial institutions such as MBNA or its competitors supports this
suggestion. As set forth in Idaho Code § 28-41-102 and in relevant part,
This act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and
policies. (2) The underlying purposes and policies of this act are:
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM ON
APPLICABILITY OF DELAWARE LAW
AND THE IDAHO CREDIT CODE- 4

(c) To protect debtors against unfair practices by some suppliers of
credit, having due regard for the interests of legitimate and scrupulous
creditors; (emphasis ours)
The Idaho Credit Code was thereby not intended to be applied universally to all creditors who
transact business with Idaho residents. The Idaho Credit Code is arguably intended to
supplement the rights and protections of Idaho debtors in situations where creditors are not those
already strictly regulated by the federal government.
Jurisdiction:
The Idaho Credit Code need not be applied to these cases. Idaho Code 5 28-41-203 sets
forth the limits ofjurisdiction for the Idaho Credit Code as follows:
The courts of this state may exercise jurisdiction over any creditor with respect to any
conduct of the creditor subject to this act or with respect to any claim arising from a
transaction subject to this act. (emphasis ours)
Thus jurisdiction of this Court is therefore permissive and not mandatory.
When viewed in conjunction with Idaho's adopted conflict of law principles and choiceof-law permissions as set forth herein, application of the Idaho Credit Code to these cases is
unnecessary, superseded by established laws, and without established legal authority in Idaho.
The Court is entitled to avoid application of the Idaho Credit Code.

MBNA WAS EN'L'ITLEI) T O AMEND ITS AGREEMENT
I'URSUANT 1'0 THE IDAHO CREDIT CODE
In the event the Court determines that the Idaho Credit Code applies in this case, then
MBNA should prevail, consistent with the Court's analysis and conclusion stated in its
September 14,2006 Memorandum Decision and Order in CV 05-36747. MBNA was
authorized to amend its credit agreement with the Defendants under Idaho law and specifically
the Idaho Credit Code.
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM ON
APPLICABILITY OF DELAWARE LAW
AND THE IDAHO CREDIT CODE- 5
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The Idaho Code 928-43-203 states as follows:
CHANGE IN TERMS OF OPEN-END CONSUMER CREDIT ACCOUNTS. Whether
or not a change is authorized by prior agreement, a creditor may change the
terms of an open-end consumer credit account applying to any balance incurred
before or after the effective date of the change. (emphasis ours)
The Idaho Code 928-41-301 defines open-end credit as an arrangement pursuant to
which:
(a) A creditor may permit a debtor, from time to time, to purchase on
credit from the creditor or pursuant to a credit card, or to obtain loans
from the creditor or pursuant to a credit card;
(b) The amounts financed and the finance and other appropriate charges
are debited to an account;
(c) The finance charge, if made, is computed on the account periodically;
and
(d) Either the debtor has the privilege of paying in full or in
installments or the creditor periodically imposes charges computed on the
account for delaying payment and permits the debtor to continue to
purchase on credit.
Idaho Code $28-43-203 provides authority for MBNA to amend its agreement. The
arrangement between MBNA and the Defendants matches the definition of an open-end credit
agreement as set forth above. Ifthe Idaho Credit Code is found to apply, MBNA properly
amended its agreement pursuant to Idaho Code $28-43-203.

CONCLUSION
Delaware law should apply to the present matter and to similar case CV 05-36747. If the
Court determines that the Idaho Credit Code should apply, MBNA was authorized to amend its
credit card agreement with the Defendants. The Defendant thereafter failed to follow all of the
statutory procedures to challenge the Arbitration process. MBNA is entitled to confirmation of

>

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM ON
APPLICABILITY OF DELAWARE LAW
AND THE IDAHO CREDIT CODE- 6

the arbitration award entered by the National Arbitration Forum against Defendant Miriam
Carroll.

DATED this ____ day of February, 2007.

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM ON
APPLICABILITY OF DELAWARE LAW
AND THE IDAHO CREDIT CODE- 7
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420 W. Washington
P.O. Box 1544
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Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAI-IO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
MIRIAM G. CARROLL, and DAVID
CAPPS,
Plaintiffs

)

1

v.

)

MBNA AMERICAN BANK,
Defendant
MBNA AMERICA BANK,
Plaintiff

Case No. CV05 36747

1
)
)

NOTICE OF JOINDER

1
)

1

v.
)

DAVID F. CAPPS
Defendant
Comes Now MBNA AMERICA BANK, by and through its counsel of record
recited above, and hereby gives the Court Notice that it joins in the filing of the
Memorandum on the Applicability of Delaware Law and the Idaho Credit Code filed by
the firm Bishop, White & Marshall, P.S. in their case MBNA America Bank, N.A. v.

NOTICE OF JOINDER - 1

Miriam Carroll, case number CV 06-37320.
DATED this L ' d a y of February, 2007.
WILSON & McCOLL

Att

V

e for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
day of February, 2007, I caused to be
I DO HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
served the following parties of record a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing
document by placing the same in the United States Mail, sufficient postage affixed
thereon and addressed to:
David F Capps
Miriam G, Carroll
HC 11 Box 366
Kamiah ID 83536
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JEFFREY M. WILSON, ISB No. 1615
WILSON & MCCOLL
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P.O. Box 1544
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone 208-345-9100
Facsimile: 208-384-0442
Attorneys for MBNA America Bank
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDANO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
MIRIAM G. CARROLL,
MBNA

1
1
1
)

v.
MBNA AMERICAN BANK,
Defendant

1
1
1
)

1
1

Case No. CV 05 36747
MEMORANDUM BY MBNA AMERICA
BANK IN OPPOSITION TO CONTINUING
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

MBNA AMERICA BANK,
MBNA
v.
DAVID F. CAPPS
Defendant

)
)

1
1
1
1
1

Comes Now MBNA AMERICA BANK, by and through its counsel of record recited
above, and hereby submits this Memorandum in Opposition to Continuing Motion for
Reconsideration regarding Delaware choice-of-law provisions, and related matters, as follows:

MEMORANDUM BY MBNA AMERICA BANK IN OPPOSITION
TO CONTINUING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 1

I.
APPLICABILITY OF DELAWARE LAW
Miriam G. Carroll and David F. Capps (hereafter "CarrolllCapps") concede, as they must,
the existence of a Delaware choice-of-law provision in the credit card agreement between the
parties. Nevertheless, entirely reversing their earlier position, they have recently contested the
applicability of Delaware law. They may not do so.
Firstly, CarrollICapps already stipulated to this Court that Delaware law did govern the
contract between the parties. As stated by this Court on page 5 of its September 14, 2006
Memorandum Decision and Order, "The original contract also included a choice of law provision
stating that Delaware law would govem the rights and obligations under the contract. See
MBNA's Exhibits 1 and 2. Neither Ms. Carroll nor Mr. Capps are contesting that Delaware law
applies; indeed, they affirmatively state that it does. See MBNA's Post Hearing Memorandum
Rebuttal and MBNA's Brief for Evidentiary Hearing on Agreement to Arbitrate." CarrolllCapps
having so stipulated and having then failed to prevail, it would be unfair, illogical and
inequitable in the extreme to allow Carroll/Capps to now entirely reverse themselves and see if
they do any better after taking a 180 degree position on that issue. CarrollICapps stipulated and
this Court accepted their stipulation that "Delaware law would govern the rights and obligations
under the contract." Now that this matter has been finally adjadicated, CarrollICapps should not
be allowed to somehow withdraw their stipulation and claim exactly the opposite.
Secondly, CarrollICapps have waived any "right" to now argue any supposed limitation
of 6 Del C. $2708 and/or any purported applicability of Idaho law (in particular the Idaho Credit
Act - LC. $28-41-101 et seq.) regarding the applicability of Delaware law. This is because these
arguments were not raised before the September 14, 2006 Memorandum Decision and Order
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now sought to be reconsidered and, regarding the Idaho Credit Act in particular, that argument
was not raised in Carroll/Cappsl initial brief in support of their own motion for reconsideration
despite the express requirement of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7@)(3) that a brief in support
of a motion be filed no less than fourteen days before the hearing. CarrollICapps first raised the
Idaho Credit Act argument on the literal eve of the first hearing of their motion for
reconsideration. Such an assertion is and remains untimely .CarroII/Capps have waived any right
to make such an argument and it is prejudicially unfair to MBNA to allow them to do so.
11.
THE DELAWARE CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION IS VALID
Carroll/Capps assert that the Delaware choice-of-law provision, admittedly in the credit
card agreement between the parties, is nevertheless invalid, claiming that 6 Del. Code $2708
"prohibits contracts less than $100,000 from containing a Delaware choice-of-law provision."
CarrollICapps have raised this same objection on at least two previous occasions, MBNA has
provided legal argument on both occasions demonstrating that Carroll/Capps' repeated assertion
in this regard is legally wrong and the Court has rejected this same argument by Carroll/Capps
on those previous occasions. This argument is no more meritorious the third time around.
Firstly, 6 Del. Code $2708(a) does not provide that choice-of-law provisions in contracts
less than $100,000 are invalid. It merely states that the section is inapplicable to contracts less
than that amount. Secondly, its subsection (e) then expressly indicates that the section does not
"affect the validity of any other choice of law provisions in any contract" and, in this case, of
course, it is undisputed that the contract between the parties does have such a choice-of-law
provision. Thirdly, 6 Del C. $1-301 provides express statutory authority for contractual Delaware
choice of law provisions by stating that "parties may agree that the law either of this State or of
MEMORANDUM BY MBNA AMERICA BANK IN OPPOSITION
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such other state or nation shall govern their rights and duties." Fourthly, 5 Delaware Code 5956
provides that a revolving credit plan between a bank and a11 individual borrower shall be
governed by the laws of this state. §941(1) defines the term "bank," §941(4) "individual
borrower" and §941(3) "revolving credit plan," a11 terms applicable in this case. Fifthly,
Delaware case law likewise upholds Delaware choice-of-law provisions. See, e.g., Gloucester
Holdinn Corp. v. U.S. Tape and Sticky Products. LLC, 832 A.2d 116, 124 (Del.Ch.,2003), citing
VGS, Inc. v. Castiel, 2003 WL 723285, at 7 & n. 29 (Del.Ch. Feb. 28, 2003) and Turtur v.
Rothschild Renistry Int'l, Inc., 26 F.3d 304, 309 (2d Cir.1994). Delaware law appl~esin this case
because the agreement between the parties expressly so provides and that provision is valid.
111.
IDAHO RECOGNITION OF CHOICE-OF-LAW PROVISIONS
CarrollICapps also cite Idaho Code $28-41-201(8) for the proposition that "the Delaware
choice-of-law provision is also invalid under Idaho law." Initially it should be noted that such an
assertion is oxymoronic in this case because the agreement expressly provides that Delaware law
applies and, therefore, Idaho law, whatever it is on this point, is necessarily irrelevant in
enforcing that Delaware choice-of-law provision. Having said that, however, the law is clear that
Idaho law also upholds such choice-of-law provisions.
Intentionally or otherwise, CarrollICapps mis-read Idaho Code $28-41-201(8) which, in
truth, provides that an agreement may be invalidated if it provides that the laws of another state
applies, and that the parties consent to the jurisdiction of another state, and that fixes venue. The
contractual provision in this case, however, only contains the first of those three elements, i.e., a
Delaware choice-of-law provision. Obviously, given that the instant action is proceeding in this
Idaho state court, the contractual provision in the credit card agreement between the parties does
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not fix jurisdiction in any other state (the second element) nor does it fix venue in Delaware (the
third element). CarrollICapps' claim that "the Delaware choice-of-law provision is also invalid
under Idaho law" continues to be without support or merit.
CarrollICapps also attempt to minimize the holding of the Ward v. Purearo Co. case [I28
Idaho 366, 368-369, 913 P.2d 582,584 - 585 (1996)l cited in MBNA's previous briefs,
CarrollICapps now claiming that the contract therein involved was a "business based contract,"
not a "credit card agreement." This distinction, if it is one, is meaningless. The Ward v. Purearo
Co. decision specifically holds that Idaho will recognize contractual choice-of-law provisions -

"In Cerami-Kote, Inc. v. Energywave Carp., 116 ldaho 56,773 P.2d 1143 (1989), we approved
of the rule set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws $187. Id. at 58 n. 1, 773
P.2d at 1145 n. 1. This rule provides in relevant part: '(1) The law of the state chosen by the
parties to govern their contractual rights and duties will be applied if the particular issue is one
which the parties could have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that
issue'." See also, Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws $ 187 (1971) ("contracting parties
may choose the law to be applied to their agreement").

Iv.
IDAHO LAW LEADS TO THE SAME RESULT
Carroll/Capps seek to invalidate the Delaware choice-of-law provision so that they can
avoid the legal determination already reached by this Court that the arbitration clause in the
credit card agreement was achieved in accordance with Delaware law and valid. And, while
MBNA continues to believe, for all of the reasons recited above, that Delaware law does apply,
ultimately, this same judicial result

-

a valid, enforceable arbitration clause --would likewise

flow from an appli'cation of Idaho law. In that specific regard, Idaho Code $28-43-203 provides:
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"Whether or not a change is authorized by prior agreement, a creditor may change the terms of
an open-end consumer credit account applying to any balance incurred before or after the

effective date of the change." This Court has already factually determined that this is precisely
what occurred in this case. Thus, even if, arguendo, the Idaho Credit Act were to he applied in
this instance, the result -- a valid arbitration clause -- is the same.
Lastly in this regard, on page ten of their latest brief, Carroll/Capps cite Yellowpine
Water User's Association v. Imel, 105 Idaho 349, 670 P.2d 54 (1983) and, through the careful
placement of quotation marks, appear to suggest that this case stands for the proposition that the
Idaho Credit Act does not authorize the addition of new terms to an agreement. That case says no
such thing. That case has absolutely nothing to do with the Idaho Credit Act. That case does not
contain the language recited in the brief of Carroll/Capps. In actual fact, without any need to
manipulate quotation marks so as to suggest law that does not exist, Idaho Code 528-43-203
specifically recites that "Whether or not a change is authorized by prior agreement, a creditor
may change the terms of an open-end consumer credit account applying to any balance incurred
before or after the effective date of the change." There is no case law, including the Yellowpine
case, that provides otherwise.
Idaho law does not apply in this case but, if it did, it too would uphold the arbitration
provisions of the credit card agreement between the parties.

v.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, CarrollICapps' latest brief adds nothing new. They again attack the manner in
which the arbitration clause came to be a part of the credit card agreement, a repeated claim that
has previously been well briefed, repeatedly argued and judicially rejected. This Court has
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laboriously detailed in its previous Memorandum Decision and Order how, why and when the
arbitration clause properly and lawfully became a part of the credit card agreement between the
parties. As before, what CarrollICapps continue to attempt to achieve, essentially only changing
the titles hut not the substance of their arguments, is a judicial review and overturning of the
underlying arbitration award. That, of course, could only have been achieved through the
mechanism of a timely Idaho Code 97-912 motion to vacate, something never filed by
CarrolllCapps. Driver v. SI Corn., 139 Idaho 423, 426, 80 P.3d 1024, 1027 (2003); Binnham
County Comm'n v. Interstate Electric Co., 105 Idaho 36, 665 P.2d 1046 (1983).
The Court's most recent inquiry was quite limited. MBNA has addressed it above. In
their latest brief, however, CarrollICapps have again gone well beyond anything remotely
relevant to any issue and certainly beyond the Collrt's inquiry. It is respectfully suggested that
this case does not turn on the September 27, 2001 results of the Lake, Snell, Perry & Associates
survey of 800 AT&T customers in California, nor on the "not for publication" New Jersey case
involving Discover Bank, nor on the other irrelevancies now argued by CarrolliCapps.
In their latest "brief," Defendant have added nothing relevant and have instead continued
to rehash the same arguments already made by them and rejected by this court. In the facial
context of what appears to be a continuing motion for reconsideration, CarroIllCapps continue to
attempt to appeal this Court's earlier Memorandum Decision and Order. The law does not allow
them to do so. "A party may not use a motlon [to reconsider] as a substitute for a tlmely appeal."
Bubak v. Evans, 117 Idaho 510, 788 P.2d 1333 (Ct. App., 1989). "Where Defendant fails to
provide any new information in support of his motion for reconsideration and instead essentially
maintains that the district court was wrong in their decision and asks that the district court
reverse itself and rule in favor 'of defendant, this is an inappropriate use of Rule 60(b) as a
hlEh,IOWNDUM B Y hlBNA AMERICA BANK IN OPI'OSITION
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disguised substitute for an appeal." Ross v. State, 141 Idaho 670, 115 P.3d 761 (Ct. App., 2005).
CarrolUCapps' proper legal remedy at this juncture is not to solicit this Court - yet again - to
finally agree with their already judicially rejected and wholly unsupported legal conclusions and
factual speculations, but rather to proceed with an appeal. The instant motion for reconsideration
cannot be lawfully used as "a disguised substitute for a timely appeal." In re Estate of Baglev,
117 Idaho 1091,793 P.2d 1263 (Ct. App., 1990).
The fact that CarrollICapps are pro se cannot lead to a different, more permissive
conclusion. It is irrelevant that a pro se litigant may be faced with "more of a challenge than a
non-attorney could handle." Everhart v. Washington County Road and Bridge Dept., 130 Idaho
273,275,939 P.2d 849, 851 (1997). The burden remains the same. Golay v. Loomis, 118 Idaho
387, 392, 797 P.2d 95, 100 (1990). "Prose litigants in Idaho are held to the same standards and
rules as those represented by attorneys. The failure to abide by the rules may not be excused
simply because appellant appearspro se and may not be aware of the rules." Ade v. Batten, 126
Idaho 114, 878 P.2d 813 (Ct. App., 1994). h the instant case, CarrolUCapps have not "abid[ed]
by the rules." They attempt to "appeal" this Court's Memorandum Decision and Order by means
of a motion for reconsideration which asserts "grounds" unrelated to the Order sought to be
reconsidered. Neither the Rules nor any case authority allow them to do so.
CarrolliCapps' motion for reconsideration shouid be denied.
DATED this bay

of March, 2007
WILSON & McCOLL

v.

Att rn

for MBNA America Bank, N.A.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
'
day of March, 2007, I mailed a true and correct
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on tile y

copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM BY MBNA AMERICA BANK IN OPPOSITION TO
CONTINUING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION by regular United States mail with the
correct postage affixed thereon addressed to:
Miriam G. Carroll
David F. Capps
HC-11 BOX366
Kamiah, ID 83536
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF lDAHO
MIRIAM G. CARROLL,
Plaintiff

)

1

Case No. CV 05 36747

)
)

v.

MBNA AMERICA BANK,
)

Defendant
MBNA AMERICA BANK,

1
1
1
1

RESPONSE BY MBNA AMERICA BANK
TO LATEST SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM FROM CARROLLICAPPS

)

Plaintiff
v.

1
1

DAVID F. CAPPS
Defendant

1
1

Comes Now MBNA AMERICA BANK, by and through its counsel of record
recited above, and hereby submits this Response to the April 2, 2007 "Supplemental
Memorandum to Amended Motion for Reconsideration" from CarrollICapps as follows:

RESPONSE BY MBNA AMERICA BANK TO LATEST SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM FROM CARROLLICAPPS

I.
INTRODUC TION
On September 14, 2006, after the matter had been fully briefed and argued by all
parties, this Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order confirming the arbitration
awards that had been granted in favor of MBNA and against each of Miriam G. Carroll
and David F. Capps on, respectively, August 3, 2005 and September 30, 2005. The
following month, Cmoll/Capps filed a motion for reconsideration of that Memorandum
Decision and Order. Since then, they have virtually continuously filed an entire
succession of "briefs" raising an entire variety of new and different arguments, some
contrary to their earlier asserted legal theories and arguments. MBNA has, in turn, fully
responded to each of those briefs and the Court is respectfully directed to each of those
responses as to those matters.
Cmoll/Capps have now filed yet another brief, this one entitled "Supplemental
Memorandum to Amended Motion for Reconsideration." The following Memorandum of
MBNA is submitted in brief response to it.
11.
WAlVER
CarrolliCapps have waived any right to now assert their latest argument, labeled
by them as "standing."
Tliis action was commenced approximately nineteen months ago. This COW'S
Memorandum Decision and Order was issued approximately seven months. Now, for the
first rime, Carroll/Capps seek to raise something they characterize as "standing,"
claiming, apparently, that MBNA lacks "standing" in this action. Completely apart from
the lack of substantive merit of such an argument, it is now far too late for CarrollICapps
to attempt to make it. They long ago waived any possible right to assert this claim and
affirmative defense.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) requires that affirmative defenses be
affirmatively and timely asserted. The purpose of such a rule "is to alert the parties
concerning the issues of fact to be tried and to afford them an opportunity to present
evidence to meet those defenses." Williams v. Paxton, 98 Idaho 155, 164, 559 P.2d 1123,
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1132 (1976). By requiring CanolWCapps to have earlier pled this matter, this would have
allowed MBNA to introduce evidence of its own to defeat such a preliminary assertion.
All of this is entirely subverted, however, by CarrolWCapps' 12" hour sudden assertion of
some "standing" argument. See, e.g., Primary Health Network. Inc. v. State, Deut. of

A&&.,

137 Idaho 663, 52 P.3d 307 (2002). And, of course, CmolWCapps' "failure to

raise an affirmative defense ordinarily results in a waiver of the defense." Hartwell Com.
V.Smith, 107 Idaho 134, 686 P.2d 79 (Ct. App., 1984).
Further, with respect to the affirmative defense of "standing" in particular, Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(a) requires that

"

when a party desires to raise an issue as to

legal existence of any party or capacity of any party to sue or be sued, he shall do so by
specific negative averment including supporting particulars.. . [and] that lack of capacity
to sue must be specially pleaded." Dairy Equipment Co. of Utah v. Boehme, 92 Idaho
301, 442 P.2d 437 (1968), citing Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 9(a). For the previous
eighteen month existence of this action, including through and since the Court's
September 14,2006 Memorandum Decision and Order, CanolllCapps have failed to raise
or plead this new claim of lack of standing. That failure to timely raise such an objection
results in a waiver of any right to claim it now. Such has been the law of Idaho for
decades. See, ee.g.,Shaw Supvlv Co. v. Morgan, 48 Idaho 412,282 P. 492 (1929); kldkf
Lumber & Mfg. Co.. v. Nickerson, 13 Idaho 682,93 P. 24 (1907).
By not earlier asserting it, CarrolWCapps have clearly waived any right to now
assert that MBNA lacks standing.

111.
LACK OF SUBSTANTIVE MERIT
In addition to Carroll/Capps having procedurally waived any right to make any
standing argument at this time, that late claim also has no substantive merit.
Although difficult to understand, it appears that CarrolWCapps' argument is
premised on their assertion that "Capps and Carroll have not found MBNA listed as a
licensed debt collector in the State of Idaho." CanolllCapps do not explain in their latest
brief how or why MBNA purportedly is a debt collector nor why it should purportedly
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be state licensed as such. CarrollICapps instead engage in rote speculation, contending,
without apparent meaning, that "There is no evidence or reason that the account
receivables of both Capps and Carroll would not have been sold to the Master Trust."
The undersigned is frankly uncertain as to meaning of that statement but, if it is intended
to suggest that MBNA should therefore be state licensed as a debt collector, MBNA
responds that such a conclusion is on its face premised on nothing more than speculation
without proof and, in any event, MBNA is a national association subject to the regulatory
power of the United States. See, e.g., Steward v. Atlantic Nat. Bank of Boston, 27 F.2d
224, 228 (9IhCir., 1928). MBNA is incorporated under the laws of the United States, not
under the laws of the state of Idaho. As such, it is governed by laws of the U.S.
Congress, not Idaho state laws. See, e.g., Twin Falls Nat. Bank v. Reed, 44 Idaho 573,
258 P. 526, 526 (1927) providing that the foreign corporation registration laws there at
issue were not intended to apply to a national association. The Court held likewise in
Home Owner's Loan Cornoration v. Stookey, 59 Idaho 267, 81 P.2d 1096, 1100 1101 (1938) wherein this same issue was raised and the court commented that
"Respondent is incorporated under the laws of the United States.. .It is said in C.J., Vol.
14-a, page 1214, sec. 3924: 'A corporation created by an act of congress with powers
coextensive with the Union.. .is not a foreign corporation within any state of the Union.. .
as for example...the business of banking conducted by a national bank'," citing
Falls Nat. Bank v. Reed, 44 Idaho 573, 258 P. 526 (1927); Federal Land Bank of
Spokane v. Statelen, 191 Wash. 155, 70 P.2d 1053. The Court in Federal Land Bank of
Spokane v. Parsons, 116 Idaho 545, 548, 777 P.2d 1218, 1221 (Ct. App., 1989) is in
accord, stating that "We do not agree that the bank needs a certificate of authority. First,
the bank is not a 'foreign corporation.' ...See also Twin f i l l s National Bank v. Heed, 44
Idaho 573, 576, 258 P. 526, 527 (1927) (national bank doing business in Idaho under
authority of Congress is not the type of business to which state registration laws were
intended to apply)."
Ultimately, it is constitutionally questionable whether a state could lawllly
impose any "debt collector" permit requirements on an entity created by federal law and
subject to the regulatory power of the federal government. As recently stated by the
Ninth Circuit in Bank of America v. City and County of San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551,
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558 -559 (9" Cir., 2002): "Congress has legislated in the field of banking from the days
of MfCulloch v. Maiyland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 325-26,426-27,4 L.Ed. 579 (1819),
creating an extensive federal statutory and regulatory scheme. The history of national
banking legislation has been 'one of interpreting grants of both enumerated and
incidental 'powers' to national banks as grants of authority not normally limited by, but
rather ordinarily pre-empting, contrary state law.' Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25,
32, 116 S.Ct. 1103, 134 L.Ed.2d 237 (1996) (citations omitted). Indeed, since the
passage of the National Bank Act in 1864, the federal presence in banking has been
significant. See id. at 32-33, 116 S.Ct. 1103...because there has been a 'history of
significant federal presence' in national banking, the presumption against preemption of
state law is inapplicable."
"National banks are necessarily subject to the paramount authority of the United
States." First Nat. Bank in Plant Citv. Fla. v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 90 S.Ct. 337, 24
L.Ed.2d 312, reh. den., 396 U.S. 1047, 90 S.Ct. 677, 24 L.Ed.2d 693 (1969). "The
National Banking Act constitutes by itself a complete system for the establishment and
government of national banks." Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 60 S.Ct. 480, 84
L.Ed. 694, reh den. 309 U.S. 697, 60 S.Ct. 611, 84 L.Ed. 1036 (1940). See also, foGrand Rapids, Mich., v. McCurdy, 136 F.2d 615 (1943); Dinan v. First Nat. Bank of

&@&,117 F.2d 459, cert. den.315 U.S. 824, 62 S.Ct. 622, 86 L.Ed. 1220 (1941); Stein
v. Delano, 35 F.Supp. 260, aff'd 121 F.2d 975, cert. den. 314 U.S. 655, 62 S.Ct. 106, 86
L.Ed. 525, reh. den. 314 U.S. 711,62 S.Ct. 178, 86 L.Ed. 569, reh. den. 314U.S. 713,62
S.Ct. 359,86 L.Ed. 568 (1940).
MBNA is not a debt collector, any 1 2 ' ~hour claim to the contrary is based solely
on speculation and any state permitting requirements applicable to debt collectors is preempted by federal law regarding a federally chartered banking institution such as MBNA
in any event.
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CONCLUSION
The latest arguments of CarrollJCapps have no more merit than the preceding
ones. Their motion seeking reconsideration of this Court's September 14, 2006
Memorandum Decision and Order should be denied.

DATED this

1.5day of April, 2007

yu[h

WILSON & McCOLL
/---\
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h
.
,
,
JEF
M. WILSON
~ t t d & for Plaintiff
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David F. Capps
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
MIRIAM G. CARROLL,
Plaintiff

1
1
)

Case No. CV 05 36747

1

V.

)

MBNA AMERICA BANK,
Defendant
MBNA AMERICA BANK,
Plaintiff
v.
DAVID F. CAPPS
Defendant

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

OPPOSITION TO POSTHEARING MOTION TO
OPEN LIMITED DISCOVERY
ON THE ISSUE OF STANDING

1

Comes Now MBNA AMERICA BANK, by and through its counsel of record
recited above, and hereby submits this Opposition to the May 24, 2007 "Post-Hearing
Motion to Open Limited Discovery on the Issue of Standing" from CarrolliCapps as
follows:

OPPOSITION TO POST-HEARING MOTION TO OPEN LIMITED DISCOVERY
ON THE ISSUE OF STANDING

1

MBNA hereby incorporates its April 16,2007 "Response by MBNA America
Bank to Latest Supplemental Memorandum from CarrollICapps," in which it was argued
that CarrollICapps have procedurally waived any right to make a standing argument, and
that the late claim has no substantive merit. For those reasons alone, the "Motion to
Open Limited Discovery on the Issue of Standing" should be denied.
Furlher, CarrollICapps have not cited to one iota of procedural authority andlor
precedent which would allow for discovery this late in the case. In fact, pursuant to the
Court's latest Amended Scheduling Order, entered May 15,2006, it was ordered that
"Discovery shall be completed no later than June 8, 2006." Now, approximately one (1)
year from the Court's discovery cut-off date, CarrollICapps are seeking to open
discovery. This simply cannot be allowed. For these reasons alone, the "Motion to Open
Limited Discovery on the Issue of Standing" should be denied.

DATED this (day

of June, 2007
WILSON & McCOLL

Attorney for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On this

Iday of June, 2007, 1 hereby certify that I served the following

document(s), hereinafter described to the addressee indicated, by delivering the same to
each of the following parties by method indicated below:
Document(s):

Opposition to Post-Hearing Motion to Open Limited Discovery on
the Issue of Standing

Party served: Miriam G. Carroll
David F. Capps
HC-I 1 Box 366
Kamiah, ID 83536
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF IDAHO
MIRIAM G. CARROLL,
Plaintiff
v.

MBNA AMERICA BANK,
Defendant
MBNA AMERICA BANK,
Plaintiff
V.
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1
1
1
1
1
1
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1
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CARROLL AND DAVID F. CAPPS

1
1
1
1
1
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DAVID F. CAPPS
Defendant

1
1
1

This communication is from a debt collector, the purpose of which is to collect a debt;
any information obtailted may be used for that purpose.

OPPOSITION TO SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVITS OF MIRIAM G. CARROLL AND
DAVID F. CAPPS - 1

Comes Now MBNA AMERICA BANK, by and through its counsel of record
recited above, and hereby submits this Opposition to the two (2) August 10, 2007
"Supplemental Affidavits" from CarrollICapps as follows:
First, Carroll/Capps fail to designate exactly which pending motionlpleading they
are supplementing with the aforementioned affidavits. Recently, on August 9,2007, the
Court heard arguments regarding CarrolWCapps' Motion to Vacate Void Judgment,
which was taken under advisement. However, the Court did not grant (nor was it
requested) the parties leave to file additional briefing or a supporting affidavits.
Accordingly, the Court should not consider CarrollICapps' most recent "Supplemental
Affidavits" filed on August 10,2007, as such are filed with no reference to a pending
motion and/or pleading, and such have not been approved by the Court for filing.
Second, the Court should not consider CarrollICapps' most recent "Supplemental
Affidavits" as an evidentiary hearing has already been held on the issues covered therein.
Further, a Memorandum Decision and Order has already been issued by the Court in
favor of MBNA as a result of the evidentiary hearing. The "Supplemental Affidavits" are
simply procedurally untimely.
DATED this

day of August, 2007
WILSON & McCOLL

Attorney for Plaintiff

This communication is from a debt eollector, the purpose of which is to collect a debt;
any information obtained may be used for that purpose.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On this

fiday of August, 2007, I hereby certify that I served the following

document(s), hereinafter described to the addressee indicated, by delivering the same to
each of the following parties by method indicated below:
Document(s):

Opposition to Affidavits of Miriam G. Carroll and David F. Capps

Party served: Miriam G. Carroll
David F. Capps
HC-I I Box 366
Kamiah, ID 83536

[XI U.S. Mails
[ ] Hand-Delivered
[ 1 Overnight Mail
[ ] Facsimile (208-926-4169)

This communication is from a debt collector, the purpose of which is to collect a debt;
any information obtained may be used for that purpose.
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.

JEFFREY M. WILSON, ISB No. 1615
WILSON & McCOLL
420 W. Washington
P.O. Box 1544
Boise, Idaho 83701
~elevhone:208-345-9100
Facsimile: 208-384-0442
Attorneys for Plaintiff

0EC 2 9 2007
ROSE E. GEHRING

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
TI-IE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
DAVID F. CAPPS, and MIRIAM G.
CARROLL,
Plaintiff,
VS.

MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A.,
Defendant.

1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Case No. CV 36747
JUDGMENT

)

MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A.,
Plaintiff,

vs.
DAVID F. CAPPS, AND M W M G.
CARROLL,
Defendant.

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

The Court having entered its Order Granting Judgment in favor of the Plaintiff, and good
cause appearing;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED That said Plaintiff have and
recover from the Defendants judgment as follows:

Principal as to David Capps only
Principal as to Miriam Carroll only
Costs
Attorney's fees
Total judgment

$73,488.91

said judgment to bear interest at the statutory rate from the date hereof.
DATED This

/"1

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
1

L
, 2 0 0 7 , I ma~leda
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the &day
of
true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT b y k ~ ~ u n i t statesmail
ed
with the
correct postage affixed thereon addressed to:
JEFFREY M. WILSON
ALEC T. PECHOTA
Wilson & McColl
P.O. Box 1544
Boise, ID 83701
David F: Capps,
Miriam G. Carroll
HC 11 Box 366
Kamiah. ID 83536

JUDGMENT
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